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Abstract	  
This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  unification	  of	  Germany	  in	  1871	  as	  a	  case	  study	  for	  successful	  political	  border	  drawing	  in	  the	  modern	  age.	  Germany’s	  rise	  from	  39	  separate	  kingdoms	  into	  a	  single,	  stable,	  economic	  world	  power	  is	  interesting;	  it	  reflects	  a	  similar	  environment	  currently	  found	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Africa.	  There,	  too,	  many	  smaller	  ethnic,	  religious,	  cultural,	  or	  tribal	  groups	  are	  found	  within	  a	  single	  country.	  However,	  why	  was	  Germany	  able	  to	  hold	  together,	  while	  many	  Middle	  Eastern	  and	  African	  countries	  struggle	  with	  constant	  internal	  strife?	  	  The	  rise	  of	  Germany	  into	  an	  industrial	  world	  power	  is	  best	  analyzed	  through	  the	  inspiration	  of	  Friedrich	  List's	  three	  economic	  stages	  of	  development:	  client	  state	  free	  trade,	  then,	  use	  of	  industrial	  tariffs,	  and	  last,	  full	  scale	  free	  trade.	  Germany's	  unification	  through	  these	  stages,	  rather	  than	  advancement	  through	  nobility	  or	  Imperialism,	  was	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  Germany's	  ability	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  more	  advanced	  countries	  of	  England	  and	  France.	  With	  no	  single	  noble	  family	  strong	  enough	  to	  unify	  Germany	  during	  the	  middle	  ages,	  Germany	  remained	  too	  economically	  inefficient	  to	  advance	  as	  quickly	  as	  England	  and	  France.	  However,	  during	  this	  period	  from	  1815-­‐1834	  the	  Germans	  unknowing	  began	  to	  develop	  state	  building	  by	  amalgamation.	  The	  genius	  of	  this	  strategy	  was	  the	  slow	  organization	  into	  small	  trade	  groups,	  then	  these	  small	  trade	  groups	  into	  larger	  trade	  groups,	  until	  a	  single	  politically	  sovereign	  group,	  known	  as	  a	  state,	  is	  formed.	  This	  progression	  from	  small	  and	  medium	  economic,	  to	  large	  political	  bodies	  has	  several	  important	  advantages:	  reduction	  of	  voices	  in	  negotiation,	  increase	  in	  economy	  for	  all	  groups	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involved	  throughout	  the	  process,	  and,	  low	  and	  compartmentalized	  risk	  if	  a	  politico-­‐economic	  strategy	  fails.	  List’s	  second	  stage	  of	  development	  occurred	  in	  Germany	  between	  1834~1871.	  The	  1834	  creation	  of	  the	  Zollverein	  was	  the	  first	  major	  breakthrough	  for	  the	  economic	  advancement	  of	  Germany.	  It	  brought	  most	  of	  the	  German	  states	  into	  one	  unified	  economic	  zone,	  which	  greatly	  strengthen	  both	  internal	  and,	  especially,	  international	  trade.	  Centralizing	  the	  parameters	  of	  trade	  (measurements,	  currency	  exchanges,	  etc.),	  was	  the	  key	  factor	  that	  created	  economic	  growth.	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  Zollverein	  also	  allowed	  the	  political	  growth	  of	  Prussia,	  which	  later	  gained	  enough	  power	  to	  unify	  Germany.	  Effectively,	  Prussia	  filled	  the	  previous	  lack	  of	  a	  single	  powerful	  noble	  family	  in	  Germany.	  With	  economic	  superiority,	  came	  the	  growth	  of	  Prussia’s	  politico-­‐military	  power.	  However,	  because	  economic	  prosperity	  was	  brought	  by	  the	  Prussian	  system,	  most	  German	  states	  willingly	  joined.	  Thus,	  Prussia	  mainly	  had	  to	  exert	  her	  physical	  power	  externally,	  towards	  Denmark,	  Austria,	  and	  France.	  Between	  1864-­‐1871	  the	  military	  benefits	  of	  joining	  Prussia	  were	  so	  great	  that	  most	  German	  states	  joined	  willingly,	  some	  grudgingly.	  Either	  way,	  with	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  German	  Empire	  in	  1871	  all	  members	  felt	  great	  benefits.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  time	  period	  between	  1871-­‐1914	  Germany	  began	  the	  transition	  from	  List’s	  second	  stage	  to	  his	  third.	  In	  one	  form	  or	  another	  Germany	  continued	  to	  protect	  her	  domestic	  industry	  during	  this	  time	  period;	  Otto	  von	  Bismarck	  even	  extended	  tariffs	  to	  agriculture.	  However,	  the	  growth	  of	  Germany’s	  advanced	  science-­‐based	  economy,	  which	  was	  greatly	  helped	  by	  government	  support	  and	  business	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Process	  of	  Events	  Diagram	  
I. German	  Confederation	  -­‐	  1815	  1. Trade	  Unions	  -­‐	  1815-­‐1834	  a. Germany	  had	  political	  maturity,	  but	  channels	  of	  communication	  were	  blocked	  b. Trade	  Unions	  form	  and	  open	  up	  lines	  for	  progressive/complicated	  political	  communication	  c. Trade	  Unions	  create	  Zollverein	  	  i. German	  states	  have	  enough	  economic	  sovereignty	  to	  begin	  using	  organized	  tariffs	  (List’s	  2nd	  Stage)	  2. Unification	  -­‐	  1834-­‐1871	  a. Zollverein	  draws	  attention	  from	  Austria	  to	  Prussia	  i. Prussia	  develops	  more	  industry	  b. Prussia	  uses	  new	  power	  to	  destroy	  German	  Confederation	  i. Drives	  Austria	  from	  Germany	  c. Prussia	  establishes	  North	  German	  Confederation	  i. Impresses	  South	  German	  States	  to	  join	  3. Successful	  Legacy	  -­‐	  1871~1900	  a. The	  country	  stayed	  together	  because	  i. Further	  unified	  economic/scientific	  growth	  ii. Creation	  of	  new/augmented	  culture	  iii. Political	  fell	  Apart.	  i	  and	  ii	  held	  it	  together	  II. World	  War	  I	  -­‐	  1914	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Introduction	  
Humans	  have	  always	  struggled	  with	  the	  art	  of	  drawing	  political	  borders.	  Early	  examples	  include	  the	  Delian	  League.	  Led	  by	  Athens,	  the	  league’s	  early	  struggles	  with	  border	  drawing,	  around	  450	  BCE,	  are	  documented	  by	  Thucydides’	  Melian	  dialogue.1	  Even	  by	  the	  19th	  century	  a	  method	  of	  consistently	  constructing	  new,	  stable	  borders	  had	  not	  been	  discovered;	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  European	  Imperialists’	  failed	  attempts	  in	  Africa,	  South	  America,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  Asia.2	  However,	  ultimately	  successful	  border	  drawing	  was	  used	  in	  The	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  Australia,	  and	  Japan.3	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  successful	  Imperialism	  is	  acceptable.	  Even	  the	  successful	  colonies	  were	  abused.4	  Hence	  why	  historical	  explanations	  of	  successful	  colonies	  always	  contain	  negative	  connotations,	  captured	  in	  buzzwords	  and	  phrases	  such	  as	  “The	  Stamp	  Act”	  or	  “Gunboat	  Diplomacy.”	  	  	   Thankfully,	  there	  are	  also	  non-­‐abusive	  border	  drawing	  successes	  ironically	  found	  on	  the	  continent	  that	  failed	  catastrophically	  abroad,	  Europe.	  Many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Thucydides,	  and	  Rex	  Warner.	  "Melian	  Dialogue."	  2	  Many	  modern	  conflicts	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  European	  imperialism	  of	  various	  eras.	  Three	  examples,	  and	  their	  legacy,	  are	  listed	  in	  rough	  chronological	  order.	  The	  Portuguese	  and	  Spanish	  Conquistadors,	  The	  Belgian	  Congo,	  and	  French	  Vietnam.	  Their	  causes:	  various	  South	  American	  wars	  of	  independence,	  and	  later,	  civil	  wars;	  numerous	  Congolese	  domestic	  wars	  and	  power	  struggles;	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  “Successful”	  is	  used	  broadly	  and	  from	  the	  modern	  perspective.	  Japan,	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  Australia	  are	  largely	  peaceful,	  have	  industrialized	  economies,	  and	  their	  governments	  defend	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  human	  rights.	  	  	  	  4	  Britain’s	  abuse	  of	  America	  was	  highly	  publicized	  by	  the	  American	  Revolutionary	  War,	  but	  one	  cannot	  forget	  that	  British	  citizens	  directly	  and	  indirectly	  killed	  millions	  of	  Native	  Americans.	  Australia’s	  native	  people	  shared	  a	  similar	  fate.	  Thankfully,	  Australia	  did	  eventually	  receive	  peaceful	  independence.	  Japan	  is	  a	  strange	  example	  because	  it	  managed	  to	  stay	  isolated,	  only	  later	  becoming	  forcibly	  opened	  by	  America’s	  Admiral	  Perry.	  Technically	  not	  carried	  out	  by	  Europeans,	  Japan	  was	  treated	  in	  the	  European	  style	  of	  Imperialism.	  Interestingly,	  the	  Japanese	  did	  not	  suffer	  huge	  abuse,	  but	  rather	  suffered	  from	  under	  appreciation.	  Frustrated	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  credit,	  and	  rewards,	  given	  it	  by	  European	  allies	  after	  WWI,	  Japan	  launched	  a	  military	  offensive	  to	  earn	  respect.	  The	  result	  was	  the	  first	  non-­‐European	  victory	  over	  a	  European	  opponent,	  the	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  War:	  a	  victory	  roughly	  equitable	  in	  importance	  to	  the	  Prussian	  defeat	  of	  France	  in	  1871.	  India	  is	  another	  complicated	  example	  not	  elaborated	  here.	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paths	  to	  modern	  borders	  existed.	  England	  brought	  about	  the	  end	  of	  monarchial	  rule	  and	  began	  the	  process	  of	  modern	  democratic	  governance	  beginning	  with	  the	  Magna	  Carta.	  France	  went	  through	  the	  internal	  upheavals	  of	  various	  French	  Revolutions	  and	  ultimately	  negotiated	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  state	  starting	  with	  the	  Tennis	  Court	  Oath.	  However,	  both	  of	  these	  examples	  deal	  with	  countries	  already	  largely	  in	  their	  modern	  borders.	  The	  struggle	  was	  not	  to	  create	  a	  new	  nation	  from	  old	  kingdoms,	  but	  instead	  concerned	  the	  modernization	  of	  an	  already	  existing	  sovereign	  kingdom.	  Fig.	  2	  shows	  the	  incredible	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  German	  states,	  only	  loosely	  organized	  under	  the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire	  in	  1500.	  Especially	  when	  compared	  against	  Spain,	  France,	  Portugal,	  and	  England	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Germany	  of	  today	  boasts	  the	  legacy	  of	  creating	  a	  successful,	  stable	  state	  from	  39	  separate	  ones,	  an	  incredible	  success	  of	  border	  drawing.5	  This	  thesis	  will	  define	  this	  kind	  of	  border	  drawing	  as	  border	  amalgamation:	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  larger	  unified	  border,	  through	  the	  unification	  of	  many	  smaller	  borders.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  case	  study	  comes	  from	  the	  application	  of	  border	  amalgamation	  lessons,	  learned	  by	  Germany,	  onto	  the	  scenario	  of	  the	  modern	  world.	  Some	  countries,	  such	  Iraq	  and	  Ukraine,	  seem	  to	  show	  the	  beginning	  of	  failures	  of	  borders	  drawn	  in	  the	  last	  100	  years.	  These	  examples	  can	  be	  joined	  by	  numerous	  counties	  in	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East,	  which	  are	  currently	  experiencing	  political	  upheaval	  and	  the	  questioning	  of	  borders.	  This	  paper	  explores	  the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  lessons	  in	  the	  German	  experience	  that	  offer	  hints	  as	  to	  what	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Buford	  Rowland,	  and	  J.	  C.	  Easton.	  "The	  Assembly	  of	  German	  Princes	  of	  1863."	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  
History	  14,	  no.	  4	  (1942):	  480-­‐99.	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works,	  and	  what	  does	  not,	  when	  creating	  a	  single	  nation	  out	  of	  numerous,	  smaller,	  unique	  ones.	  This	  is	  key	  because	  communities	  in	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  are	  largely	  based	  on	  cultural,	  tribal,	  religious,	  or	  linguistic	  lines.	  However,	  modern	  European	  inspired	  borders	  separated,	  and	  often	  continue	  to	  separate,	  these	  communities.	  	  This	  community	  separation	  ultimately	  led	  to	  extremist	  actions,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  ISIS,	  which	  is	  currently	  trying	  to	  build	  an	  Islamic,	  culturally-­‐based	  nation	  across	  modern	  borders.	  Aforementioned	  upheaval	  is	  a	  direct	  effect	  of	  poorly	  drawn	  borders	  causing	  internal	  strife	  between	  domestic	  factions,	  ultimately	  leading	  to	  violent	  cultural-­‐based	  anger.	  	  
Historical	  Setting	  
Before	  1815	  there	  was	  no	  “Germany,”	  there	  was	  only	  the	  Roman	  concept	  of	  “Germania,”	  and	  the	  medieval	  concept	  of	  the	  “Holy	  Roman	  Empire,”	  but	  Germany’s	  first	  form	  would	  not	  come	  into	  existence	  until	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  German	  Confederation	  in	  1815.	  Even	  under	  this	  unification	  no	  one	  claimed	  to	  be	  a	  German	  citizen.	  Instead,	  the	  people	  identified	  with	  their	  home	  states,	  such	  as	  Prussia,	  Austria,	  Bavaria,	  or	  the	  less	  well-­‐known	  formations	  of	  Hesse-­‐Darmstadt,	  Wuerttemberg,	  or	  Thuringia.	  	  	   Nation	  building	  by	  amalgamation	  is	  of	  great	  importance	  because,	  as	  the	  Germans	  quickly	  realized,	  there	  is	  huge	  economic	  benefit	  from	  the	  amalgamation	  of	  several	  smaller	  states	  into	  one	  nation.	  The	  below	  quotes	  outline	  how	  inefficient	  the	  German	  states’	  economic	  system	  was.	  	  	  The	  830	  toll	  barriers	  in	  Germany	  cripple	  domestic	  traffic	  and	  bring	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  results:	  how	  if	  every	  limb	  of	  the	  human	  body	  were	  bound	  together,	  so	  that	  blood	  could	  not	  flow	  from	  one	  limb	  to	  the	  other[.]	  In	  order	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to	  trade	  from	  Hamburg	  to	  Austria,	  from	  Berlin	  to	  the	  Swiss	  Cantons,	  one	  must	  cut	  through	  the	  statutes	  of	  ten	  states,	  study	  ten	  tolls	  and	  toll	  barriers,	  ten	  times	  go	  through	  the	  toll	  barriers,	  and	  ten	  times	  pay	  the	  tolls.	  Who	  but	  the	  unfortunate	  has	  to	  negotiate	  such	  borders?	  To	  live	  with	  such	  borders?	  Where	  three	  or	  four	  states	  collide,	  there	  one	  must	  live	  his	  whole	  life	  under	  evil,	  senseless	  tolls	  and	  toll	  restrictions.	  That	  is	  no	  Fatherland!6	  	  The	  Duesseldorfer	  Zeitung	  expressed	  a	  similar	  opinion	  in	  1843:	  
	   …we	  have	  instead	  of	  one	  Germany,	  38	  German	  states,	  almost	  the	  same	  number	  of	  courts,	  as	  many	  representative	  bodies,	  38	  distinct	  legal	  codes	  and	  administrations,	  embassies	  and	  consulates.	  What	  an	  enormous	  saving	  it	  would	  be	  if	  all	  of	  that	  were	  taken	  care	  of	  by	  one	  central	  government…Yet	  far	  worse	  than	  the	  present	  waste	  of	  money	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  these	  38	  states	  prevail	  as	  many	  separate	  interests	  which	  injure	  and	  destroy	  each	  other	  down	  to	  the	  last	  detail	  of	  daily	  intercourse.	  No	  post	  can	  be	  hurried,	  no	  mailing	  charge	  reduced	  without	  special	  conventions,	  no	  railway	  can	  be	  planned	  without	  each	  seeking	  to	  keep	  it	  in	  its	  own	  state	  as	  long	  as	  possible.7	  	  Through	  the	  experiences	  above,	  the	  Germans	  discovered	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “Fatherland,”	  a	  state	  to	  called	  Germany,	  would	  require	  economic	  unification.	  German	  politicians	  of	  various	  origins	  and	  decades	  labored	  endlessly	  to	  discover	  the	  perfect	  combination	  of	  states	  that	  would	  create	  a	  single,	  stable	  nation.	  They	  coerced	  some	  to	  join,	  forcefully	  excluded	  others,	  and	  tempered	  their	  own	  emotions	  and	  ambitions;	  all	  in	  the	  name	  of	  building	  a	  bigger,	  better	  state.	  This	  essay	  will	  examine	  their	  successes,	  their	  failures,	  and	  the	  lessons	  they	  themselves	  learned	  and	  applied.	  	  	   As	  previously	  mentioned,	  this	  paper	  begins	  with	  the	  German	  Confederation	  in	  1815,	  which	  marks	  the	  first	  attempt	  at	  creating	  a	  Second	  Reich.	  Then,	  it	  will	  trace	  events	  until	  the	  successful	  rise	  of	  the	  Second	  Reich,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Otto	  von	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Bittschrift	  des	  Allgemeinen	  Deutschen	  Handels-­‐	  und	  Gewerbevereins	  an	  die	  Bundesversammlung	  vom	  20.	  April	  1819	  gemäß	  Friedrich	  List:	  Schriften,	  Reden	  Briefe,	  Bd.	  1,	  Berlin	  1929.,	  found	  in	  Manfred	  Görtenmaker:	  Deutschland	  im	  19.	  Jahrhundert.	  2.	  Auflage.	  Leske+Budrich,	  Opladen	  1994,	  S.	  166	  ISBN	  3-­‐8100-­‐1336-­‐6.	  7	  W.	  O.	  Henderson,	  The	  rise	  of	  German	  industrial	  power,	  1834-­‐1914.	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1975,	  40.	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Bismarck.	  Last,	  this	  paper	  will	  discuss	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  successes	  and	  failures	  of:	  Bismarck,	  the	  new	  German	  economy,	  and	  the	  new	  German	  culture.	  The	  reason	  for	  ending	  in	  the	  very	  early	  20th	  century,	  as	  opposed	  to	  moving	  through	  the	  Third,	  and	  final,	  Reich	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany,	  is	  that	  the	  Weimar	  era	  was	  the	  culmination	  of	  the	  enormous	  politico-­‐economic	  developments	  made	  in	  the	  century	  before.	  The	  economy	  and	  culture	  created	  before	  the	  Weimar	  Era	  were	  what	  kept	  Germany	  unified	  during	  the	  chaotic	  early-­‐to-­‐mid	  20th	  century.	  It	  is	  this	  pre-­‐wars	  economy	  and	  culture,	  which	  define	  Germany	  today.	  Thus	  the	  time	  period	  between	  1932-­‐1945	  was,	  to	  put	  it	  very	  lightly,	  a	  political	  mistake	  and	  hiccup	  in	  the	  development	  of	  Germany.	  Germany	  should	  never	  forget	  its	  mistake,	  but	  it	  should	  also	  be	  allowed	  to	  enjoy	  its	  successes	  in	  the	  century	  before	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  The	  monument	  that	  embodies	  the	  democratic	  connection	  between	  Weimar	  Germany	  and	  today’s	  German	  Government,	  is	  the	  Reichstag,	  which	  housed	  the	  Weimar	  Diet	  and	  houses	  the	  modern	  Bundestag,	  but	  fell	  into	  disrepair	  during	  the	  Nazi	  and	  split	  regimes.8	  	  	   The	  reason	  for	  the	  examination	  of	  over	  100	  years	  of	  history	  is	  because	  Germany	  did	  not	  unify	  in	  one	  fell	  swoop	  of	  Bismarck’s	  cunning.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Germany	  was	  officially	  politically	  unified	  into	  an	  Empire	  in	  1871,	  the	  full	  unification	  process	  advanced	  slowly	  through	  economic	  and	  political	  baby-­‐steps.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Gustav	  Stolper:	  	  Thus,	  economically,	  the	  Reich	  was	  set	  up	  in	  three	  stages:	  the	  first	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Zollverein	  in	  1833;	  the	  second,	  the	  political	  formation	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  "Geschichte	  Des	  Gebäudes."	  Deutscher	  Bundestag.	  <http://www.bundestag.de/kulturundgeschichte/architektur/reichstag/geschichte>.	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Reich	  in	  1871;	  the	  third,	  the	  revolution	  of	  1918.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  1871	  was	  by	  far	  the	  most	  important.9	  	  	  The	  stage	  divisions	  of	  this	  paper	  differ	  from	  those	  of	  Stolper,	  because,	  as	  he	  states,	  he	  bases	  these	  divisions	  purely	  on	  economic	  grounds.	  This	  thesis	  also	  takes	  political	  and	  cultural	  changes	  into	  consideration	  when	  determining	  the	  stages	  of	  German	  unification.	  In	  particular,	  Stolper	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  that	  slow	  unification	  resulted	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  German	  culture	  without	  replacing	  the	  old	  regional	  cultures.	  This	  essay	  begins	  with	  a	  Germany	  that	  has	  39	  separate	  cultures	  and	  ends	  with	  a	  Germany	  that	  shares	  a	  common	  culture.	  As	  this	  essay	  will	  prove,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  common	  culture,	  symbolized	  by	  new	  national	  past	  times	  like	  soccer	  or	  Kabarett,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  elements	  that	  held	  the	  country	  together.	  This	  conclusion	  is	  not	  world	  altering,	  in	  fact,	  it	  seems	  obvious.	  Culture	  binds	  countries,	  reversely	  countries	  without	  common	  culture	  fall	  apart,	  see	  Roman	  history.	  More	  important	  is:	  how	  does	  one	  create	  common	  culture,	  especially	  in	  states	  opposed	  to	  one	  another?	  	  
Chapter	  I:	  	  
The	  Development	  of	  Communication	  	  Section	  1:	  Historical	  Context	  	   Perhaps	  the	  most	  influential	  mind	  behind	  the	  economic	  rise	  of	  Germany	  was	  Frederick	  List.	  An	  early	  German	  economist,	  List	  challenged	  the	  well-­‐loved	  School	  of	  Adam	  Smith.	  List	  questioned	  Smith’s	  “Free	  Trade”	  policy,	  arguing	  instead	  that	  there	  are	  two	  steps	  necessary	  before	  “Free	  Trade”	  economics	  can	  be	  properly	  applied.	  List	  argued	  that	  the	  first	  step	  to	  unification	  was	  to	  standardize	  measures	  and	  currencies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  	  Gustav	  Stolper,	  Karl	  Häuser,	  and	  Knut	  Borchardt.	  The	  German	  economy,	  1870	  to	  the	  present,	  (New	  York:	  Harcourt,	  Brace	  &	  World)	  1967,	  31.	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German	  history	  before	  List’s	  policies	  and	  List’s	  initial	  influence,	  are	  analyzed	  in	  the	  section	  below,	  while	  his	  greater	  strategy	  will	  be	  explained	  fully	  in	  chapter	  two.	  	  List’s	  book	  The	  National	  System	  of	  Political	  Economy,	  written	  in	  1841,	  outlines	  the	  development	  of	  unification	  in	  Germany	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe.	  Seminally,	  List	  points	  to	  the	  medieval	  German	  nobility	  for	  hindering	  Germany’s	  ability	  to	  grow	  flax	  and	  graze	  sheep,	  thus	  hindering	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  countryside.	  This	  was	  due	  to	  the	  nobility’s	  love	  of	  fighting	  over	  farms,	  in	  the	  process	  destroying	  them,	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  leaving	  trees	  in	  fields	  to	  harbor	  game	  for	  sport	  hunting.10	  The	  result	  was	  rich,	  independent	  cities	  based	  on	  trade	  separated	  by	  poor	  agricultural	  lands	  ruled	  by	  Princes.	  Soon	  cities	  began	  forming	  leagues,	  such	  as	  the	  Hanseatic,	  the	  Swabian,	  and	  the	  Helvetic.11	  Unfortunately,	  geographic	  space	  between	  the	  cities,	  owned	  by	  the	  nobility,	  stunted	  the	  success	  of	  trade	  leagues:	  “[t]hough	  they	  continued	  powerful	  for	  a	  time	  owing	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  youthful	  freedom	  which	  pervaded	  them,	  yet	  these	  leagues	  lacked	  the	  internal	  guarantee	  of	  stability,	  the	  principle	  of	  unity,	  the	  cement.”12	  The	  Germans	  understood	  the	  merits	  of	  working	  together,	  however	  several	  additional	  factors	  were	  hindering	  them:	  geography,	  nobility,	  experience,	  and	  communication.	  	  	   List	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  there	  are	  two	  forms	  of	  unification:	  one	  via	  nobility	  and	  the	  other	  by	  economics.	  The	  former	  was	  ragingly	  successful	  in	  England,	  France,	  and	  Spain.	  List	  expands,	  however,	  that	  the	  former	  was	  inoperable	  in	  Germany.	  As	  explained	  above,	  petty	  squabbles	  between	  princedoms,	  and	  want	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  List,	  Frederick.	  The	  National	  System	  of	  Political	  Economy	  by	  Friedrich	  List,	  trans.	  Sampson	  S.	  Lloyd,	  with	  an	  Introduction	  by	  J.	  Shield	  Nicholson	  (London:	  Longmans,	  Green	  and	  Co.,	  1909),	  63.	  	  11	  List,	  The	  National	  System,	  64.	  12	  List,	  The	  National	  System,	  63.	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luxury,	  prevented	  German	  rulers	  from	  building	  up	  their	  own	  economy	  through	  market	  farming	  and	  textiles.	  This	  disallowed	  build	  up	  in	  strength	  of	  one	  family	  who	  could	  then	  unify	  the	  country.13	  The	  result	  was	  that	  the	  Germans	  became	  wed	  to	  civilization	  they	  famously	  destroyed,	  Rome.	  “Hence	  the	  persevering	  adherence	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Roman	  Empire	  amongst	  German	  kings.”	  Due	  to	  the	  constant	  skirmishes	  of	  princes,	  kings	  believed	  that	  “[o]nly	  at	  the	  head	  of	  armies	  were	  the	  [Holy	  Roman]	  emperors	  rulers;	  only	  when	  they	  went	  to	  war	  were	  they	  able	  to	  bring	  together	  prince	  and	  cities	  under	  their	  banner.”14	  This	  was	  the	  fate	  and	  flaw	  of	  the	  Hohenstaufens,	  whose	  numerous	  failed	  attempts	  to	  follow	  Rome	  on	  the	  crusades,	  crumbled	  their	  strength	  and,	  along	  with	  it,	  any	  dreams	  of	  German	  unification	  though	  noble	  force.15	  In	  a	  sad	  trick	  of	  vanity,	  by	  focusing	  on	  their	  hobbies,	  instead	  of	  on	  their	  nation	  building	  duties,	  the	  German	  nobility	  managed	  to	  trick	  itself	  that	  unification	  came	  only	  by	  the	  sword,	  that	  economic	  strength	  played	  little	  role.	  Thus	  they	  ruined	  their	  own	  ability	  to	  become	  truly	  powerful	  at	  the	  head	  of	  a	  large	  nation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  second	  method,	  List	  suggests,	  is	  far	  more	  interesting	  and	  shows	  the	  early	  attempts	  of	  what	  List	  would	  inspire,	  economic	  unification.	  He	  suggests	  that	  the	  independent	  cities	  could	  have	  unified	  Germany,	  but	  quickly	  explains	  why	  they	  did	  not.	  	   The	  cities,	  inasmuch	  as	  they	  tended	  to	  promote	  the	  prosperity	  of	  agriculture,	  by	  so	  doing	  necessarily	  were	  working	  at	  their	  own	  effacement,	  unless	  they	  contrived	  to	  incorporate	  the	  agricultural	  classes	  of	  the	  nobility	  as	  members	  of	  their	  unions.	  For	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  that	  object,	  however,	  they	  lacked	  requisite	  higher	  political	  instincts	  and	  knowledge.	  Their	  political	  vision	  seldom	  extended	  beyond	  their	  own	  city	  walls	  […]	  Thus	  we	  see	  even	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  List,	  The	  National	  System,	  63.	  14	  List,	  The	  National	  System,	  64.	  15	  List,	  The	  National	  System,	  64.	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beginning	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  in	  Germany,	  barbarism	  in	  literature	  and	  language,	  barbarism	  in	  legislation,	  State	  administration	  and	  administration	  of	  justice;	  barbarism	  in	  agriculture,	  decline	  in	  industry	  and	  of	  all	  trade	  on	  a	  large	  scale,	  want	  of	  unity	  and	  of	  force	  in	  national	  cohesion;	  powerlessness	  and	  weakness	  on	  all	  hands	  in	  dealing	  with	  foreign	  nations.16	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  However,	  the	  Germans	  were	  eventually	  successful.	  So,	  how	  did	  they	  advance	  through	  barbarism	  to	  develop	  a	  complicated	  unification	  system?	  There	  is	  no	  good	  answer	  as	  to	  what	  the	  initial	  trigger	  was.	  List	  attributes	  it	  to	  the	  general	  character	  of	  the	  German	  people:	  	  One	  thing	  only	  the	  Germans	  had	  preserved;	  that	  was	  their	  aboriginal	  character,	  their	  love	  of	  industry,	  order,	  thrift,	  and	  moderation,	  their	  perseverance	  and	  endurance	  in	  research	  and	  in	  business,	  their	  honest	  striving	  after	  improvement,	  and	  a	  considerable	  natural	  measure	  of	  morality,	  prudence,	  and	  circumspection.”17	  	  	   	  This	  is	  a	  flattering	  description,	  unfortunately	  Germany’s	  actions	  100	  years	  after	  its	  original	  publication	  in	  1841	  effectively	  weaken	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  argument;	  however,	  this	  explanation,	  especially	  the	  first	  part,	  seems	  at	  least	  mostly	  true.	  	  There	  is	  a	  common	  German	  saying	  describing	  their	  culture,	  “Das	  Land	  der	  Dichter	  und	  Denker”,	  “The	  land	  of	  poets	  and	  thinkers.”	  The	  Germans	  pride	  themselves	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  art	  and	  science,	  on	  industry	  and	  improvement.	  Indeed	  List	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  his	  assertions	  about	  the	  German	  spirit.	  Otto	  Pflanze,	  one	  of	  the	  great	  intellectuals	  of	  German	  Unification,	  finds	  the	  seeds	  for	  a	  unified	  German	  culture	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Johann	  Gottfried	  von	  Herder,	  Georg	  Wilhelm	  Friedrich	  Hegel,	  and	  Adam	  Mueller.	  Herder	  asserted	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “Volksgeist.”	  Pflanze	  writes:	  Each	  nation,	  [Herder]	  taught,	  possesses	  a	  unique	  character	  determined	  by	  its	  folk	  spirit	  (Volksgeist)	  and	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  its	  historical	  growth.	  What	  applied	  to	  national	  cultures,	  others	  realized,	  could	  also	  be	  said	  of	  the	  state.	  As	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  List,	  The	  National	  System,	  63-­‐66.	  17	  List,	  The	  National	  System,	  66.	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a	  traditional	  institution	  constructed	  by	  many	  generations,	  it	  too	  was	  an	  organism	  endowed	  with	  individuality.18	  	  	  	  Hegel	  described	  the	  state	  as:	  ‘“the	  vessel	  of	  the	  world	  spirit	  [Weltgeist],”	  “the	  divine	  idea	  as	  it	  exists	  on	  earth,”	  and	  the	  actually	  existing,	  realized	  moral	  life.”’19	  Finally,	  Adam	  Mueller	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  declare	  “Christ	  died	  not	  only	  for	  men,	  but	  also	  for	  states.”20	  Whether	  one	  agrees	  with	  them	  or	  not,	  the	  great	  intellectuals	  in	  Germany	  at	  the	  time	  were	  inspired	  and	  believed	  the	  words	  of	  these	  philosophers.	  Suddenly,	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  attention	  was	  given	  to	  defining	  the	  German	  spirit,	  to	  creating	  something	  bigger	  than	  the	  intellectuals	  themselves,	  which	  would	  hopefully	  span	  “many	  generations.”	  Romanticism,	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  cultural	  movements	  in	  German	  history,	  defined	  this	  time	  period.	  It	  was	  an	  era	  of	  incredible	  intellectual	  growth	  spearheaded	  by	  philosophers	  like	  Kant,	  Hegel,	  Goethe,	  and	  Schiller;	  musicians,	  such	  as	  Mozart	  and	  Beethoven;	  artists,	  like	  Casper	  David	  Friedrich;	  and	  cultural	  researchers	  such	  as	  the	  Brothers	  Grimm.21	  With	  the	  cultural	  connections	  growing	  between	  the	  German	  States,	  economic	  ties	  progressed	  in	  a	  similar	  fashion.	  “Barbarism”	  was	  slowing	  disappearing	  in	  the	  rear	  view	  mirror.	  	  	  Section	  2:	  The	  Development	  of	  Economic	  Ties	  Economic	  ties	  were	  eventually	  created	  by	  a	  complicated	  series	  of	  trade	  treaties	  and	  unions,	  which	  slowly	  standardized	  the	  practice	  of	  trading	  amongst	  the	  German	  States.	  The	  three	  early,	  major	  unions,	  in	  chronological	  order,	  were:	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Otto	  Pflanze,	  Bismarck	  and	  the	  development	  of	  Germany.	  Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1963,	  I,	  7.	  	  19	  Pflanze,	  Bismarck,	  I,	  8.	  	  20	  Pflanze,	  Bismarck,	  I,	  8.	  21	  Pflanze,	  Bismarck,	  I,	  6-­‐7.	  Some	  of	  the	  listed	  intellectuals	  are	  not	  strictly	  romantics,	  however	  they	  all	  either	  participated	  or	  directly	  inspired	  the	  movement.	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Bavaria-­‐Wuerttemberg	  Trade	  Union,	  the	  Hesse-­‐Darmstadt-­‐Prussia	  Trade	  Union,	  and	  the	  Central	  German	  “Anti-­‐“Union.	  All	  three	  treaties	  were	  enacted	  in	  1828	  and	  ultimately	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Zollverein	  in	  1834.	  The	  successes	  here	  are	  numerous:	  standardized	  measures,	  standardized	  monetary	  exchanges,	  standardized	  tolls	  and	  travel	  fees,	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  However,	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  changes	  goes	  far	  past	  the	  monetary	  benefit.	  All	  of	  the	  states,	  large	  and	  small,	  were	  gaining	  experience	  in	  negotiating	  and	  compromising.	  These	  early	  trade	  treaties	  and	  unions,	  were	  important	  experiments	  in	  the	  art	  of	  cooperation;	  ultimately	  they	  helped	  developed	  the	  negotiating	  skills	  required	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  German	  Empire.	  The	  fighting	  between	  German	  powers	  was	  far	  from	  over,	  however,	  the	  talking	  had	  begun.	  This	  small	  step	  was	  a	  major	  breakthrough.	  The	  German	  Confederation,	  founded	  in	  1815,	  was	  an	  important	  failure	  in	  the	  history	  of	  German	  unification.	  Much	  like	  the	  Articles	  of	  Confederation	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  German	  Confederation	  sought	  to	  be	  a	  “’community	  of	  independent	  states”	  internally,	  and	  a	  “’politically	  unified,	  federated	  power	  in	  its	  external	  relations.’”22	  Unlike,	  the	  Articles	  of	  Confederation,	  it	  was	  met	  with	  initial	  hostility.	  Historian	  Heinrich	  Sybel	  points	  out	  that	  the	  Confederation	  was	  “received	  by	  the	  German	  nation	  at	  large	  partly	  with	  cold	  indifference	  and	  partly	  with	  patriotic	  indignation.”23	  It	  also	  failed	  for	  many	  of	  the	  same	  reason	  the	  U.S.	  articles	  did,	  such	  as:	  lack	  of	  federal	  power,	  lack	  of	  centralized	  monetary	  systems,	  and	  lack	  of	  easy	  interstate	  commerce.	  So,	  why	  was	  it	  so	  important?	  Because	  it	  proved	  that	  political	  unification,	  without	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  Christopher	  Clark,	  Germany	  1815-­‐1848:	  Restoration	  or	  Pre-­‐March?"	  In	  German	  History	  since	  1800,	  edited	  by	  Mary	  Fulbrook,	  by	  (London:	  Arnold	  ;	  1997),	  41.	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  Alexander	  Craig.	  Europe,	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  (3rd	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  Ill.:	  Dryden	  Press,	  1972),	  55.	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economic	  unification,	  was	  an	  infeasible	  plan.	  Economic	  failure	  is	  shown	  by	  Frederick	  List’s	  actions	  in	  1820,	  while	  the	  Confederation’s	  political	  organizational	  cracks	  begin	  to	  show	  around	  1830.	  	  	   The	  period	  of	  “List’s	  Agitation”	  occurred	  from	  1819-­‐1820	  and	  was	  the	  first	  serious	  push	  for	  national	  economic	  unification,	  but	  ended	  in	  failure.	  List	  describes	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  main	  organization	  behind	  the	  movement:	  	  It	  was	  this	  state	  of	  urgent	  necessity	  which	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  that	  private	  union	  of	  five	  to	  six	  thousand	  German	  manufacturers	  and	  merchants,	  which	  was	  founded	  in	  the	  year	  1819	  at	  the	  spring	  fair	  held	  in	  Frankfort-­‐on-­‐the-­‐Main,	  with	  the	  object	  of	  abolishing	  all	  the	  separate	  tariffs	  of	  the	  various	  German	  states,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  of	  establishing	  a	  common	  trade	  and	  customhouse	  system	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  Germany.24	  	  	  At	  first,	  List,	  and	  the	  league	  he	  led,	  focused	  on	  expressing	  the	  ideals	  of	  free	  trade	  and	  commercial	  liberty	  to	  various	  Germans	  states	  through	  numerous	  political	  mediums.	  However,	  by	  winter,	  the	  focus	  had	  shifted	  to	  industrial	  interests	  and	  domestic	  industrial	  protection.	  List	  caused	  uproar,	  especially	  amongst	  the	  independent	  trade	  city	  powerhouses	  such	  as	  Bremen,	  Hamburg,	  and	  Leipzig.25	  Though	  List	  had	  good	  ideas,	  his	  inexperience	  quickly	  became	  clear.	  His	  points	  were	  weakened	  by	  “[m]any	  sophisms,	  rationalizations,	  exaggerations,	  mistakes,	  and	  inconsistencies.”	  Then	  again,	  the	  same	  can	  be	  said	  about	  List’s	  opposition’s	  argument.26	  Either	  way,	  List	  faded	  from	  the	  limelight.	  However,	  his	  ideas	  survived,	  even	  if	  not	  in	  their	  original	  form.	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  List,	  The	  National	  System,	  71.	  25	  Price,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Zollverein,	  44.	  26	  Price,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Zollverein,	  44.	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List	  focused	  on	  economics,	  but	  his	  heart	  yearned	  for	  political	  unification.	  For,	  he	  believed	  it	  was	  key	  to	  Germany’s	  national	  welfare.27	  While	  reading	  his	  book,	  it	  quickly	  becomes	  clear	  that	  List	  loves	  Germany,	  sometimes	  even	  to	  a	  biased	  fault.	  However,	  the	  prototype	  to	  any	  project	  still	  requires	  lots	  of	  time	  and	  effort.	  List’s	  project	  was	  no	  exception.	  	   By	  the	  end	  of	  1820,	  List’s	  agitations	  had	  created	  powerful	  enemies	  and	  his	  voice	  was	  silenced	  in	  Europe.	  Finances	  and	  political	  disagreement	  strained	  personal	  relations	  within	  the	  League.	  Accordingly,	  List	  retreated	  to	  Wuerttemberg’s	  capital,	  Stuttgart,	  to	  edit	  the	  League’s	  magazine,	  Organ	  des	  deutschen	  Handels-­‐	  und	  
Frabrikantenstandes.	  By	  the	  fall,	  List	  was	  no	  longer	  involved	  with	  the	  League,	  but	  did	  publish	  a	  paper	  critical	  of	  Wuerttemberg’s	  administration.	  Quickly	  convicted,	  List	  was	  forced	  to	  emigrate	  to	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  Once	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  List	  lost	  all	  influence	  on	  German	  politics.28	  	  	  The	  German	  Confederation	  was	  provided	  some	  military	  powers.	  Ironically	  it	  was	  this	  limited	  power	  that	  caused	  the	  Federal	  Diet	  (Bundesversammlung)	  to	  fall	  from	  favor;	  another	  proof	  of	  the	  medieval	  lesson:	  unification	  needed	  to	  come	  through	  economics,	  not	  violence.	  In	  1830,	  the	  Diet	  passed	  legislation	  allowing	  it	  to	  intervene,	  without	  permission,	  into	  violent	  domestic	  conflicts	  of	  any	  member	  states.	  Then,	  in	  1833	  it	  passed	  secret	  information	  collection	  laws.	  Both	  were	  used	  in	  various	  incidents.29	  As	  can	  be	  anticipated,	  the	  smaller	  member	  states	  did	  not	  react	  kindly.	  However,	  Christopher	  Clark	  describes	  the	  confederation	  as	  both	  “illiberal	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  Price,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Zollverein,	  46.	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  Price,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Zollverein,	  162.	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  Clark,	  “Germany	  1815-­‐1848”,	  Fullbrook,	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and	  oppressive”	  and	  as	  a	  “formidable	  achievement.”30	  So,	  how	  can	  the	  German	  Confederation	  have	  been	  both	  destructive	  and	  irreplaceably	  productive?	  	   One	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  German	  Confederation	  accentuated	  the	  power	  struggle	  between	  the	  large	  and	  small	  states.	  The	  sole	  executive	  body	  of	  the	  Confederation	  was	  the	  Inner	  Council	  (Engerer	  Rat),	  which	  represented	  states	  based	  on	  their	  size.	  While	  the	  larger	  states,	  such	  as	  Austria	  and	  Prussia,	  received	  their	  own	  vote,	  smaller	  states	  were	  forced	  to	  share	  votes.	  The	  effect	  of	  this	  unequal	  representation	  was	  shown	  with	  the	  legislation	  discussed	  in	  the	  paragraph	  above.	  Confederate	  forces	  entered	  Luxemburg	  during	  a	  revolution	  in	  1830	  and	  fought	  the	  free	  city	  of	  Frankfurt	  in	  1833.	  Lastly,	  in	  1831	  Baden’s	  attempt	  to	  reform	  its	  press	  laws	  to	  a	  more	  liberal	  system	  failed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  threatened	  federal	  military	  action	  (Bundesexekution).31	  Plainly	  the	  smaller	  states	  were	  at	  a	  disadvantage,	  the	  German	  Confederation	  effectively	  created	  an	  unfair	  form	  of	  control	  over	  the	  smaller	  states.	  Though	  the	  Diet’s	  military	  power	  was	  limited,	  the	  point	  was	  made,	  and	  the	  reactionary	  anger	  was	  intense.	  	  	   The	  weakness	  of	  the	  Confederation,	  parallel	  to	  rise	  of	  unification	  sentiments,	  is	  perfectly	  exampled	  by	  the	  Göttingen	  Seven.	  In	  retaliation	  to	  revolutionary	  speech	  in	  Hambach,	  the	  Confederate	  Diet	  (the	  legislative	  body)	  passed	  articles	  in	  1832	  making	  all	  local	  level	  legislative	  assemblies	  powerless	  and	  dissolving	  their	  financial	  power.	  One	  effect	  was	  that	  in	  1837	  the	  newly	  crowned	  king	  of	  Hanover	  actually	  went	  through	  with	  disassembling	  the	  Hanover	  assembly	  and	  releasing	  all	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  Clark,	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  Clark,	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representatives	  from	  their	  oaths.32	  The	  reaction	  shows	  the	  German	  “aboriginal	  character”	  that	  List	  describes.	  	  Seven	  professors	  from	  the	  local	  Göttingen	  University	  refused	  to	  give	  up	  their	  oaths	  and	  directly	  defied	  the	  new	  king,	  earning	  banishment	  from	  Hanover.	  Among	  these	  seven	  were	  the	  great	  German	  folklorists	  Jakob	  and	  Wilhelm	  Grimm.	  Upon	  leaving,	  Jakob:	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  universities	  were	  the	  conscience	  of	  the	  nation	  and	  university	  professors	  must	  have	  a	  jealous	  regard	  for	  their	  word,	  lest	  students,	  seeing	  them	  waver	  on	  one	  issue,	  think	  them	  capable	  of	  compromising	  in	  their	  teaching.	  33	  	  	  The	  incident	  made	  all	  seven	  into	  heroes	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  classes	  across	  Germany.34	  The	  Göttingen	  incident,	  combined	  with	  their	  constant	  work	  on	  new	  editions	  of	  Children's	  and	  Household	  Tales	  and	  the	  seminal	  organizing	  of	  the	  German	  dictionary,	  meant	  these	  two	  brothers	  were	  forming	  the	  German	  culture	  by	  both	  artistic	  practice	  and	  political	  example.	  	  Constrictive	  political	  pressure	  also	  descended	  upon	  the	  smaller	  states	  from	  the	  two	  regional	  powers,	  Bavaria	  and	  Prussia.	  There	  are	  two	  people	  to	  blame	  for	  this,	  though	  there	  intentions	  were	  not	  hostile.	  The	  First	  is	  Friedrich	  von	  Motz,	  Prussian	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  and	  key	  supporter	  of	  the	  Prussia-­‐Hesse-­‐Darmstadt	  Customs	  Union.	  	  The	  second	  is	  King	  Ludwig	  of	  Bavaria,	  key	  supporter	  of	  the	  Bavaria-­‐Wuerttemberg	  Customs	  Union.	  Both	  men	  rose	  to	  power	  in	  1825	  and	  both	  men	  sought	  to	  extend	  their	  states’	  economic	  borders.	  Ludwig	  managed	  to	  secure	  a	  treaty	  with	  the	  smaller	  state	  of	  Wuerttemberg	  and	  attempted	  to	  block	  the	  Prussian-­‐Hesse-­‐	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Darmstadt	  Union,	  founded	  later	  in	  the	  same	  year.	  Motz	  was	  even	  more	  aggressive,	  though	  he	  did	  listen	  to	  being	  told	  not	  to	  damage	  the	  interests	  of	  any	  other	  German	  states.	  Still,	  Motz	  pursued	  several	  negotiations	  after	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  customs	  union	  with	  Hesse-­‐Darmstadt.	  Weimar,	  Nassau,	  and	  Hanover	  negotiated	  with	  Motz	  directly,	  while	  Hesse-­‐Kassel	  was	  contact	  via	  a	  Hesse-­‐Darmstadt	  mediator.	  A	  mediator	  was	  necessary	  because	  Prussia’s	  relationship	  with	  Kassel	  had	  earlier	  fallen	  apart.35	  This	  aggressive	  action	  of	  contacting	  even	  unfriendly	  states	  does	  make	  some	  sense.	  Motz,	  like	  List,	  had	  a	  vision	  of	  a	  unified	  Germany	  in	  mind;	  it	  made	  the	  most	  economic	  sense.	  However,	  as	  the	  member	  of	  a	  large	  state,	  he	  seems	  to	  have	  underestimated	  the	  importance	  of	  independence	  to	  the	  smaller	  states.	  	  When	  Motz	  was	  met	  with	  failure	  (except	  in	  Hesse-­‐Darmstadt).	  So,	  Prussia	  switched	  tactics	  and	  began	  to	  repress	  nationalization	  attempts	  through	  the	  political	  power	  given	  it	  by	  the	  Confederation	  of	  Germany.	  Prussia	  hoped	  to	  delay	  economic	  unification	  until	  her	  own	  regional	  influence	  could	  grow	  and	  unification	  could	  occur	  of	  its	  preferred	  terms.	  This	  is	  perfectly	  exampled	  by	  the	  1847	  Uniform	  Law	  on	  Bills	  of	  Exchange,	  which	  Prussia	  delayed	  for	  10	  years	  and	  was	  ultimately	  never	  instituted.36	  During	  this	  time,	  all	  of	  Germany	  suffered	  economic	  opportunity	  cost	  as	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  years	  were	  spent	  using	  the	  old,	  inefficient	  separate	  exchange	  laws	  system.	  	  Prussia	  was	  able	  to	  weather	  this	  cost	  so	  easily	  because	  of	  its	  proportionally	  smaller	  economic	  gain	  associated	  with	  early	  economic	  unification.	  Prussia	  had	  large	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domestic	  markets	  and	  vast	  resources,	  it	  could	  produce	  what	  it	  needed	  and	  had	  the	  domestic	  market	  to	  easily	  promote	  economic	  progress.	  Oppositely,	  many	  smaller	  states,	  especially	  Saxony,	  were	  highly	  industrialized,	  but	  had	  small	  populations	  and	  markets.	  The	  result:	  these	  smaller	  states	  disproportionately	  lost	  profit	  on	  every	  tariff	  and	  seaport	  access	  charge	  they	  had	  to	  pay	  to	  sell	  their	  goods	  on	  foreign	  markets.	  Moreover,	  every	  year	  that	  passed,	  Prussia	  was	  able	  to	  build	  up	  its	  industry	  to	  compete	  with	  that	  of	  the	  smaller	  states.37	  Prussia	  also	  received	  tariff	  free	  trading	  through	  its	  custom	  union	  allies	  and	  was	  able	  to	  produce	  most	  necessities	  on	  her	  own	  anyway.	  Since	  Prussia’s	  economic	  gain	  from	  early	  unification	  was	  low,	  its	  opportunity	  costs	  were	  low;	  making	  the	  waiting	  game	  it	  was	  playing	  very	  political	  profitable	  for	  comparatively	  little	  economic	  cost.	  These	  blatant	  politico-­‐economic	  plans	  caused	  the	  small	  central	  German	  States	  to	  create	  of	  the	  Central	  German	  Union	  of	  1828,	  which	  was	  dubbed	  an	  “anti-­‐union”	  for	  it	  disallowed	  its	  members	  from	  joining	  other	  unions.	  The	  anti-­‐union	  movement	  was	  a	  mishmash	  of	  various	  similar	  positions.	  On	  the	  extremes	  were	  men	  such	  as	  Schweitzer38	  from	  Saxe-­‐Weimar,	  interested	  in	  simply	  defying	  Prussia,	  and	  Thomas	  of	  Frankfurt	  who	  was	  a	  devoted	  anti-­‐unionist	  and	  staunchly	  believed	  that	  “individualism	  was	  one	  of	  the	  basic	  German	  characteristics.”39	  However,	  there	  were	  also	  several	  moderates	  who	  had	  economic	  goals	  in	  mind	  and	  some	  who	  eventually	  wanted	  to	  join	  Prussia’s	  Union.40	  The	  union	  hoped	  to	  be	  a	  geographic	  barrier	  for	  the	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larger	  regional	  powers,	  as	  well	  as,	  create	  a	  barging	  chip	  to	  later	  gain	  entrance,	  with	  favorable	  terms,	  into	  the	  larger	  trade	  unions.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  views,	  the	  Union	  was	  short	  lived	  and	  effectively	  died	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Treaty	  in	  Einbeck	  in	  1830,	  which	  stipulated	  a	  future	  customs	  union	  upon	  the	  legal	  removal	  of	  the	  Central	  German	  Union.41	  	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Einbeck	  was	  small	  and	  largely	  copied	  previous	  treaties,	  however	  one	  Article	  stands	  out.	  This	  customs	  union	  between	  Hanover,	  Hesse-­‐Kassel,	  Oldenburg,	  and	  Brunswick	  became	  known	  as	  the	  “Steuereverein,”	  the	  “tax	  union.”	  This	  name	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  Article	  XIV	  of	  the	  union	  was	  the	  first	  to	  established	  unified	  consumption	  tax	  laws	  in	  all	  member	  states.42	  This	  is	  interesting	  because	  all	  previous	  agreements	  left	  consumption	  laws	  as	  variable,	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  domestic	  laws.	  Instead,	  previous	  treaties	  dictated	  that	  the	  merchant	  should	  pay	  the	  difference	  in	  consumption	  tax	  at	  the	  border	  between	  states.	  This	  unification	  of	  consumption	  laws,	  and	  common	  law	  in	  general,	  is	  an	  important	  step	  in	  the	  unification	  of	  states.	  For,	  when	  unification	  did	  eventually	  come	  about,	  if	  there	  is	  little	  or	  no	  change	  in	  daily	  rule	  of	  law,	  then	  the	  people	  can	  more	  easily	  adjust	  to	  regime	  change.	  	  	  	   Since	  the	  Confederation	  never	  made	  economic	  progress,	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  representation	  for	  the	  small	  states	  was	  not	  discovered	  until	  the	  larger	  Germany	  states	  began	  to	  set	  up	  regional	  trade	  unions.	  Even	  when	  the	  solution	  was	  presented,	  most	  of	  the	  smaller	  states	  remained	  unwilling	  to	  accept	  the	  offer	  until	  much	  later.	  During	  the	  Bavaria-­‐Wuerttemberg	  Customs	  Union	  negotiations	  the	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Bavarian	  Ministries	  of	  Finance	  and	  Interior	  proposed	  a	  new	  idea,	  a	  creation	  of	  a	  Customs	  Union	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  common	  customs	  system.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  change	  was	  to	  simplify	  the	  process,	  prevent	  misunderstanding	  of	  Wuerttemberg’s	  position,	  and	  to	  solidify	  Wuerttemberg’s	  position	  as	  equal	  and	  sovereign.	  For	  giving	  equal	  representation,	  Bavaria	  was	  allowed	  to	  use	  its	  own,	  preferred,	  customs	  laws	  as	  those	  of	  the	  entire	  union.43	  The	  trade	  here	  is	  interesting	  and	  ground	  breaking.	  Wuerttemberg	  gains	  guaranteed	  political	  equality,	  despite	  its	  inferior	  power,	  and	  veto	  power	  over	  a	  much	  larger	  economic	  domain	  than	  before.	  Though	  it	  used	  to	  give	  in	  to	  Bavaria’s	  regional	  domination,	  it	  now	  gained	  veto	  ability.	  In	  addition	  it	  also	  gained	  the	  power	  to	  join	  further	  trade	  agreements	  attached	  to	  Bavaria,	  an	  important	  mechanism,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  later.	  In	  turn,	  Bavaria	  lost	  regional	  economic	  domination,	  but	  it	  gained	  economic	  markets	  and	  preferable	  customs	  laws	  in	  those	  markets.	  	  	  	   Further	  agreements	  showed	  the	  seriousness	  and	  detail	  that	  the	  statesmen	  used	  when	  negotiating	  the	  agreement.	  Plenipotentiaries	  were	  given	  the	  power	  to	  review	  each	  other’s	  books,	  accounts,	  and	  meetings.	  As	  well	  has	  having	  the	  power	  to	  voice	  official	  complaints	  and	  to	  protest	  the	  economic	  actions	  of	  the	  other	  state.	  Another	  highly	  detailed	  agreement	  of	  the	  union	  was	  the	  system	  of	  which	  costs	  the	  states	  covered	  and	  which	  costs	  were	  forwarded	  to	  the	  union	  as	  whole.	  While	  the	  union	  covered	  salaries	  and	  office	  supplies,	  pensions	  and	  facility	  maintenance	  were	  left	  to	  the	  states.44	  However,	  since	  these	  detailed	  rules	  worked	  they	  were	  copied	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into	  future	  documents.	  Thus,	  slowly,	  by	  trial	  and	  error	  the	  German	  state	  diplomats	  began	  to	  put	  together	  the	  eventual	  unification	  rules	  of	  Germany.	  	  	   The	  organization	  of	  trade	  unions	  began	  attaching	  small	  states	  onto	  larger	  regional	  powers.	  These	  combined	  economic	  organizations	  could	  more	  easily	  communicate,	  compromise,	  and	  unify	  with	  each	  other.	  This	  is	  the	  attachment	  mechanism,	  a	  process	  by	  which	  smaller	  states	  become	  economic	  attached	  to	  larger	  ones,	  while	  still	  keeping	  their	  political	  independence.	  A	  hierarchy	  of	  representation	  developed	  through	  the	  costume	  unions,	  which	  simplified,	  and	  thus	  allowed	  the	  success	  of,	  larger	  negotiations.	  The	  squabbles	  of	  the	  smaller	  states	  were	  dealt	  with	  at	  a	  regional	  level,	  as	  the	  smaller	  states	  had	  equal	  representation	  to	  every	  other	  member	  state	  within	  their	  unions.	  These	  domestic	  debates	  then	  became	  absorbed	  into	  the	  political	  positions	  of	  the	  larger	  states	  at	  national	  negotiations.	  Thus,	  the	  opinions	  of	  the	  smaller	  states	  were	  not	  expressly	  mentioned	  at	  the	  negotiating	  table,	  but	  rather	  were	  weaved	  into	  the	  terms	  presented	  by	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  entire	  trade	  union.	  For	  example,	  when	  Prussia	  economically	  communicated	  with	  Austria	  or	  Bavaria,	  Hesse-­‐Darmstadt	  did	  not	  send	  a	  representative.	  However,	  since	  Prussia	  could	  not	  enter	  a	  trade	  treaty	  without	  permission	  from	  Hesse-­‐Darmstadt	  the	  Prussian	  representative	  could	  only	  agree	  to	  terms	  that	  Hesse-­‐Darmstadt	  found	  favorable.	  This	  provided	  the	  simple	  logistical	  advantage	  the	  there	  were	  fewer	  voices	  and	  emotions	  involved	  around	  the	  negotiating	  table.	  This	  professionalism	  in	  German	  diplomacy	  quickly	  showed	  its	  merits	  as	  Germany’s	  unification	  process	  progressed	  by	  leaps	  in	  bounds	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  centuries.	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Section	  3:	  Successful	  Economic	  Unification	  	  	   Despite	  better	  organization,	  lots	  of	  political	  maneuvering	  was	  required	  to	  join	  the	  majority	  of	  Germany	  into	  the	  Zollverein.	  By	  1831,	  both	  Prussia	  and	  Bavaria	  had	  voiced	  wants	  to	  join	  in	  a	  customs	  union.45	  Unfortunately,	  Bavaria	  and	  Prussia	  were	  only	  awkwardly	  geographically	  connected.	  Saxony	  and	  the	  Thuringian	  States	  separated	  Prussia’s	  main	  territory	  from	  Bavaria	  in	  the	  southeast.	  Bavaria	  and	  Wuerttemberg	  did	  share	  a	  border	  with	  Prussia’s	  Rhineland	  enclave	  in	  the	  southwest,	  however	  the	  Hessian	  and	  other	  central	  German	  states	  separated	  Prussia	  from	  its	  enclave.	  This	  mess	  of	  borders	  made	  communication	  difficult,	  but	  they	  also	  complicated	  the	  matter	  of	  where	  to	  draw	  the	  customs	  border.	  It	  became	  clear	  that	  these	  smaller	  states	  would	  have	  to	  be	  included,	  luckily	  the	  Central	  German	  Union	  was	  quickly	  falling	  apart.	  	  Finally,	  three	  nearly	  identical	  treaties	  signed	  on	  different	  dates	  by	  various	  groups	  established	  the	  Zollverein	  to	  begin	  on	  January	  1,	  1834.	  First,	  Prussia,	  Hesse-­‐Kassel,	  and	  Hesse-­‐Darmstadt	  signed	  with	  Bavaria	  and	  Wuerttemberg.	  Second,	  Saxony	  signed	  with	  all	  members.	  Finally,	  the	  Thuringian	  States	  organized	  into	  a	  smaller	  union,	  which	  then	  signed	  into	  the	  Zollverein	  as	  a	  single	  unit.	  The	  resulting	  treaty	  simplified	  and	  unified	  nearly	  every	  shared	  system	  among	  the	  states.	  Still,	  the	  rules	  go	  on	  for	  pages:	  Hesse-­‐Darmstadt’s	  measures	  became	  standard,	  exchange	  rates	  were	  fixed,	  all	  tolls	  were	  capped	  by	  the	  Prussian	  tariff	  of	  1828,	  forced	  sale	  was	  abolished,	  equal	  access	  of	  port	  and	  consul	  was	  granted,	  maintenance	  and	  upkeep	  payments	  structures	  created,	  representative	  bodies	  established,	  an	  appeals	  process	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established,	  equal	  inspection	  rights	  granted,	  and	  and	  anti-­‐smuggling	  convention	  was	  established,	  etc..	  	  	  	   Section	  4:	  Conclusion	  	   The	  traditional	  progression	  of	  a	  colonized,	  fledgling	  industrial	  power	  is	  economic/	  industrial	  development,	  then	  political	  organization,	  ending	  in	  national	  stability.	  Strangely,	  Germany	  switched	  the	  first	  two	  steps.	  As	  List	  described:	  Elsewhere,	  high	  mental	  culture	  rather	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  material	  power	  of	  production,	  whilst	  in	  Germany	  the	  growth	  of	  material	  powers	  of	  production	  was	  the	  outcome	  chiefly	  of	  an	  antecedent	  intellectual	  development.46	  	  	  This	  may	  seem	  to	  contradict	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  explanations	  above,	  which	  show	  how	  Germany	  had	  to	  undergo	  several	  political	  and	  intellectual	  changes	  before	  it	  was	  able	  to	  begin	  becoming	  an	  industrial	  power.	  However,	  List	  is	  holding	  Germany	  in	  comparison	  with	  colonies,	  where	  no	  infrastructure	  exists	  and	  so	  first	  industry	  must	  be	  built	  to	  encourage	  education	  and	  intellectual	  growth.	  In	  Germany,	  the	  basic	  intellectual	  development	  process	  had	  long	  been	  successfully	  completed.	  Roads	  were	  maintained,	  schools	  well	  established,	  and	  handcrafts	  perfected.	  However,	  industry	  had	  never	  been	  built	  up	  to	  such	  a	  level	  that	  politicians	  would	  want	  to	  communicate	  about	  anything	  other	  than	  political	  squabbles	  and	  rudimentary	  trade.	  With	  the	  formation	  of	  trade	  unions,	  Germany	  passed	  a	  certain	  industrial	  threshold	  required	  to	  begin	  the	  constructive	  political	  conversations	  of	  progressive	  industrialization	  and,	  later,	  sovereign	  unification.	  It	  was	  the	  passing	  of	  this	  infrastructural	  threshold	  that	  was	  necessary	  for	  Germany	  to	  unify.	  So,	  while	  in	  most	  colonies	  the	  process	  is	  two-­‐step:	  industrial	  then	  intellectual	  growth;	  in	  Germany	  it	  was	  three	  step:	  basic	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intellectual	  growth,	  then	  modern	  industrial	  growth,	  followed	  by	  advanced	  political	  growth.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	  this	  was	  one	  of	  the	  secrets	  to	  Germany’s	  success,	  the	  divisive	  Germans	  found	  common	  ground	  in	  the	  ever-­‐growing	  mutual	  benefit	  of	  trade.	  Political	  borders	  then	  form	  naturally.	  The	  German	  states	  also	  added	  an	  interim	  step	  that	  again	  lengthened	  the	  process,	  but	  also	  made	  it	  proceed	  much	  more	  smoothly.	  As	  normal,	  the	  German	  unification	  process	  began	  with	  small-­‐scale	  political	  negotiations	  inspired	  by	  a	  small	  activists	  groups;	  in	  Germany	  this	  group	  included	  List,	  Motz,	  and	  Ludwig.	  Then	  came	  the	  step	  that	  the	  Germans	  innovated,	  the	  creation	  of	  medium-­‐sized	  trade	  unions	  inspired	  by	  the	  small-­‐scale	  unification	  movement.	  Finally,	  the	  territories	  were	  amalgamated	  from	  medium	  sized	  trade	  unions,	  into	  one	  large	  sovereign	  state.	  The	  addition	  of	  this	  middle,	  medium-­‐sized	  trade	  union	  step	  has	  several	  advantages.	  While	  German	  politicians	  fine-­‐tuned	  their	  negotiating	  and	  compromising	  skills	  by	  organizing	  the	  trade	  unions,	  there	  was	  not	  the	  wealth	  of	  a	  whole	  nation	  at	  stake.	  The	  trade	  unions	  created	  an	  environment	  that	  had	  plenty	  of	  margins	  for	  error	  and	  thus,	  one	  that	  was	  perfect	  for	  experimentation.	  Again,	  smaller	  scale	  equals	  smaller	  risk.	  As	  every	  single	  state	  in	  the	  German	  territories	  worked	  on	  various	  trade	  unions,	  it	  created	  a	  unification	  strategy	  brainstorm	  that	  was	  contemplated	  by	  every	  German	  speaking	  state.	  Each	  trade	  union	  had	  slightly	  different	  rules	  creating	  an	  opportunity	  to	  see	  which	  mechanisms	  worked	  and	  which	  did	  not.	  Of	  course,	  the	  most	  successful	  medium-­‐scale	  economic	  and	  political	  mechanisms	  were	  adopted	  when	  Germany	  unified	  in	  1871.	  Furthermore,	  the	  struggles	  of	  individuals	  such	  as	  List,	  Motz,	  and	  Ludwig	  fell	  to	  the	  wayside.	  Instead,	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the	  organized	  meetings	  of	  trade	  unions	  took	  up	  their	  efforts,	  with	  well-­‐established	  officials	  spearheading	  the	  unification	  effort.	  The	  conclusions	  of	  the	  Zollverein	  treaties	  created	  enough	  administrative	  organization	  to	  politically	  unify.	  Germany	  was	  finally	  past	  the	  petty	  squabbles	  of	  princes	  and	  now	  moved	  on	  to	  the	  limited	  wars	  of	  Kaisers.	  As	  this	  paper	  enters	  the	  mid-­‐1800s,	  Napoleon	  has	  fallen;	  the	  Hapsburgs	  will	  soon	  stumble;	  and	  Bismarck	  and	  Wilhelm	  prepare	  the	  establish	  Germany.	  Ironically,	  decades	  of	  negotiation	  were	  replaced	  by	  Bismarck’s	  reign	  of	  “Blood	  and	  Iron.”	  	  	  	  	  	   From	  the	  end	  of	  the	  18th	  century	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Zollverein	  in	  1833	  the	  seeds	  for	  unification	  had	  been	  successfully	  sown:	  industry	  had	  grown	  to	  the	  minimum	  required	  size,	  the	  works	  of	  various	  artists	  and	  intellectuals	  was	  creating	  a	  common	  culture	  to	  be	  proud	  of,	  and	  politico-­‐economic	  communication	  had	  developed	  into	  a	  constructive	  form.	  Still,	  the	  German	  path	  to	  unification	  was	  by	  no	  means	  guaranteed.	  The	  Zollverein	  unified	  the	  major	  trade	  unions	  into	  a	  single	  economic	  territory,	  but	  it	  took	  Bismarck’s	  military	  tactics	  to	  evolve	  economic	  unification	  into	  political	  unification.	  	  	  
Chapter	  II:	  
The	  Development	  of	  Industry	  Section	  1:	  Progress	  Made	  	   	  In	  The	  National	  System	  of	  Political	  Economy	  Frederick	  List	  presents	  the	  three	  ideal	  developmental	  steps	  for	  a	  growing	  economic	  power.	  First,	  a	  fledgling	  industrial	  state	  must	  engage	  in	  free	  trade	  with	  more	  advanced	  nations	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  modern	  agriculture,	  advance	  intellectually,	  and	  to	  develop	  basic	  industry.	  Second,	  domestic	  industry	  must	  be	  protected	  by	  minimal	  tariffs	  to	  encourage	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further	  domestic	  industrial	  development.	  This	  is	  a	  key	  step	  for	  new	  economies	  to	  become	  competitive	  with	  larger	  economic	  powers.	  Fledgling	  states	  must	  development	  an	  industry	  that	  has	  more	  to	  offer	  then	  simple	  raw	  resources	  or	  rough	  goods.	  Minimal	  tariffs	  help	  create	  a	  level	  economic	  playing	  field,	  which	  prevents	  hegemonic	  driven	  subjugation	  of	  the	  economically	  younger	  and	  smaller	  state.	  Finally,	  once	  domestic	  industry	  is	  fully	  developed,	  the	  tariffs	  are	  removed	  and	  the	  country	  can	  successfully	  engage	  in	  full-­‐scale	  free	  trade.47	  List	  categorizes	  the	  major	  countries	  of	  Europe	  as	  of	  1841:	  	  
In the first stage, we see Spain, Portugal, and the Kingdom of Naples; in 
the second, Germany and the United States of North America; France 
apparently stands close upon the boundary line of the last stage; but Great 
Britain alone at the present time has actually reached it.48 	  	  List’s	  1841	  analysis	  confirms	  the	  change	  that	  Stolper	  says	  occurred	  several	  years	  earlier	  in	  1833	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Zollverein.	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  1833	  Zollverein	  treaties	  gave	  the	  German	  states	  an	  advantage.	  This	  boost	  was	  felt	  most	  strongly	  by	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Prussia,	  which	  now	  could	  reach	  its	  enclave	  and	  bypass	  various	  other	  geographic	  obstructions.	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  the	  advantage	  was	  immediately	  felt.	  Like	  an	  automobile’s	  turbo,	  there	  was	  a	  small	  lag	  before	  Prussia,	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  Germany,	  became	  revved	  up	  enough	  to	  begin	  accelerating	  aggressive	  economic,	  political,	  and	  militaristic	  tactics	  in	  the	  name	  of	  unification.	  	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  largely	  skip	  the	  short	  period	  between	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Zollverein	  in	  1833	  and	  Revolution	  of	  1848.	  Again,	  this	  is	  because	  the	  15-­‐years	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  Nicholson,	  “Introduction”,	  in	  List,	  The	  National	  System,	  xx.	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were	  a	  lag	  period	  in	  which	  Germany	  built	  up	  here	  basic	  industry	  in	  preparation	  of	  drastic	  future	  growth.	  It	  was	  the	  transition	  period	  in	  which	  Germany	  made	  her	  switch	  from	  a	  fledging	  economy	  into	  a	  List	  category	  two	  economy.	  This	  paper	  will	  give	  more	  focus	  on	  four	  time	  spans	  of	  more	  interesting	  politico-­‐economic	  growth.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  Revolution	  of	  1848.	  The	  second	  lasted	  from	  1847-­‐1857	  and	  is	  defined	  by	  intense,	  but	  unorganized,	  development	  that	  ultimately	  ended	  in	  economic	  collapse.	  Third,	  the	  collapse	  of	  1857,	  and	  its	  importance	  in	  reorganizing	  the	  German	  industries	  into	  a	  more	  efficient	  pattern,	  will	  be	  analyzed.	  Last,	  this	  paper	  will	  cover	  1857-­‐1871,	  discussing	  the	  economic	  and	  military	  tactics	  of	  Otto	  von	  Bismarck	  and	  why	  they	  were	  ultimately	  successful	  in	  unifying	  the	  country.	  	  Section	  2:	  Industry	  1833-­‐1847	  One	  point	  that	  does	  need	  to	  be	  made	  about	  the	  1833-­‐1847	  period	  is	  the	  development	  of	  steam	  power	  and	  its	  use	  of	  coal	  based	  fuel.	  Having	  only	  400	  transportation	  steam	  engines	  in	  1834,	  Germany	  increased	  its	  steam	  capacity	  by	  1850	  to	  include	  1,200	  steam	  engines	  used	  in	  transportation.49	  In	  a	  complimentary	  relationship	  of	  industry,	  coal	  incentivized	  steam	  and	  steam-­‐incentivized	  coal.	  As	  steam	  technology	  developed	  the	  need	  for	  non-­‐timber	  based	  fuel	  greatly	  increased.	  Coal	  was	  the	  obvious	  solution,	  but	  many	  of	  the	  German	  states’	  reserves	  were	  held	  in	  remote,	  mountainous	  regions	  or	  deep	  underground.	  The	  solution	  was	  to	  develop	  steam	  locomotives	  and	  steam	  powered	  elevators	  to	  reach	  these	  areas	  and	  utilize	  the	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coal	  reserves.	  Thus,	  between	  1841	  and	  1849	  twenty-­‐four	  new	  coal	  pits	  were	  opened	  in	  what	  would	  become	  of	  Germany’s	  most	  famous	  iron	  and	  coal	  region,	  the	  Ruhr.50	  	  Section	  3:	  The	  1848	  Revolution	  	   The	  1848	  revolution	  rippled	  across	  the	  German	  states,	  but	  had	  the	  most	  defining	  effects	  in	  Prussia.	  Between	  1800	  and	  1848	  the	  position	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  greatly	  improved,	  but	  the	  lower	  classes	  felt	  little	  change.	  For	  the	  impoverished,	  who	  numbered	  as	  high	  as	  40%	  in	  some	  areas,	  even	  a	  small	  economic	  downturn	  meant	  catastrophe.	  Then,	  in	  1846,	  there	  was	  a	  bad	  harvest,	  whose	  most	  devastating	  effect	  was	  a	  food	  price	  spike	  in	  1848.	  In	  Prussia	  this	  price	  jump	  can	  be	  directly	  connected	  to	  the	  Typhus	  outbreak	  in	  Silesia,	  which	  left	  80,000	  dead.	  51	  It	  was	  an	  event	  in	  which	  even	  King	  Frederick	  William	  IV	  saw	  the	  “seeds	  of	  the	  overthrow	  of	  existing	  conditions.”52	  The	  combination	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  basic	  living	  standards	  for	  the	  middle	  classes	  and	  the	  extreme	  health	  issues	  of	  the	  impoverished	  cause	  a	  large	  disconnect.	  Those	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  change	  were	  unaware,	  at	  least	  not	  fully	  aware,	  of	  the	  circumstances	  in	  large	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  Simultaneously,	  the	  conservative	  bureaucracy	  was	  facing	  decreasing	  public	  popularity	  and,	  more	  imminently,	  the	  looming	  potential	  financial	  depression.	  The	  Prussian	  government	  became	  overwhelmed	  with	  the	  situation	  and	  fell	  into	  paralysis.53	  Martin	  Kitchen	  argues	  that	  an	  economic	  analysis	  is	  not	  enough,	  that	  one	  must	  understand	  the	  social	  wave	  breaking	  on	  Europe	  at	  the	  time:	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  Henderson,	  The	  rise	  of	  German	  industrial,	  54.	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  Martin	  Kitchen,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	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  1815-­‐1914	  (London:	  Croom	  Helm,	  1978),	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  Kitchen,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Germany,	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  Kitchen,	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It	  was	  a	  result	  of	  the	  widespread	  feeling	  that	  the	  day	  of	  reckoning	  had	  come,	  that	  the	  old	  order	  had	  failed	  and	  had	  lost	  its	  legitimacy.	  Life	  had	  become	  too	  complex	  and	  too	  hectic,	  menacing	  changes	  loomed	  on	  the	  horizon,	  the	  old	  certainties	  were	  lost.	  The	  world	  of	  the	  railways,	  the	  factory,	  the	  steam	  engine	  and	  applied	  science	  could	  not	  be	  mastered	  by	  the	  autocratic	  state,	  however	  enlightened	  its	  servants,	  and	  in	  [this	  new	  world’s]	  underworld	  were	  menacing	  forces	  that	  threatened	  to	  break	  loose	  and	  disrupt	  the	  ordered	  certainties	  of	  the	  familiar	  social	  world.54	  	  	  Germany	  was	  divided.	  Clearly	  the	  current	  conditions	  were	  not	  stable,	  but;	  were	  technology	  and	  industrialization	  the	  cause	  or	  the	  answer?	  	  The	  turmoil	  climaxed	  in	  Prussia	  in	  March	  of	  1848	  with	  a	  demonstration	  turned	  impromptu	  skirmish	  in	  Berlin.	  The	  government,	  lead	  by	  ministers	  Camphausen	  and	  Hansemann,	  managed	  to	  keep	  the	  peace	  by	  making	  structured	  concessions,	  be	  they	  on	  its	  terms.55	  One	  obvious	  solution	  was	  to	  extend	  the	  benefits	  of	  industrialization	  to	  the	  peasant	  class.	  In	  1848	  all	  remaining	  feudal	  rights	  were	  abolished	  in	  various	  German	  states	  including	  Prussia.	  The	  primary	  result	  of	  this	  was	  the	  freedom	  of	  movement	  for	  all	  citizens.56	  This	  change	  gave	  had	  large	  advantages.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  economic	  benefit	  presented	  by	  a	  flexible	  employment	  pool.	  However,	  more	  importantly,	  it	  allowed	  the	  various	  German	  peoples	  to	  interact	  at	  every	  level	  of	  society.	  Suddenly,	  the	  opinions	  of	  leaders	  did	  not	  necessarily	  define	  the	  peoples’	  opinion	  of	  neighboring	  states.	  	  The	  more	  creative	  concession	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  Germany’s	  first	  joint-­‐stock	  bank,	  the	  Schaffhausensche	  Bankverein.	  The	  brainchild	  of	  Hansemann,	  the	  bank’s	  self	  stated	  goal	  was:	  [T]o	  induce	  the	  capitalists	  of	  country,	  by	  recommendations	  based	  on	  exhaustive	  investigation,	  to	  turn	  idle	  capital	  toward	  such	  enterprises,	  which,	  when	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properly	  launched,	  in	  response	  to	  existing	  requirement,	  and	  offering	  the	  guarantee	  of	  expert	  management,	  bid	  fair	  to	  yield	  reasonable	  profits.57	  	  	  In	  Kitchen’s	  opinion	  this	  was	  a	  good	  move,	  for:	  	  	  It	  was	  the	  slackening	  of	  investment	  and	  contraction	  of	  the	  market	  in	  1847	  that	  was	  the	  main	  cause	  of	  the	  reduction	  of	  output	  in	  almost	  all	  sectors	  of	  industry	  in	  early	  1848,	  and	  not	  the	  sudden	  panic-­‐stricken	  reaction	  to	  the	  barricades	  in	  March.58	  	  	  This	  fiscal	  change	  combined	  with	  the	  Californian	  and	  Australian	  Gold	  Rushes	  to	  create	  a	  post	  revolution	  economic	  boom.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  caused	  the	  revolutionary	  political	  rights	  fights	  to	  be	  abandoned	  in	  favor	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  stability.	  Thus,	  Germany	  remained	  socially	  conservative,	  though	  its	  economic	  policy	  greatly	  liberalized.59	  	   Section	  4:	  Economic	  Policy	  1847-­‐1857	  	   By	  1847	  Germany	  found	  itself	  in	  both	  List’s	  and	  Stolper’s	  second	  stage	  of	  economic	  development.	  Stolper,	  who	  wrote	  his	  work	  nearly	  100	  years	  after	  List,	  does	  not	  accredit	  List	  with	  inspiring	  his	  three	  stage	  economic	  analysis.	  However,	  he	  does	  accredit	  List	  for	  inspiring	  the	  creation	  of	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  economic	  institutions:	  the	  Zollverein	  and	  the	  policies	  that	  would	  follow	  its	  creation:	  	   After	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Zollverein,	  protectionist	  tendencies	  began	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  German	  trade	  policy	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  devastating	  competition	  from	  the	  English	  textile	  industry	  and	  under	  the	  spiritual	  influence	  of	  the	  great	  German	  economist	  Friederich	  von	  List,	  the	  principal	  champion	  of	  the	  Zollverein	  idea.	  Consequently,	  a	  number	  of	  duties	  were	  imposed	  in	  the	  1840s.60	  	  	  Interestingly,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  confusion	  about	  how	  effective	  Lists	  plan	  actually	  was	  in	  the	  1840s.	  W.O.	  Henderson	  paints	  a	  similar,	  but	  also	  markedly	  different	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picture.	  “By	  1848	  a	  few	  concessions	  had	  been	  made	  to	  the	  protectionists,	  but	  most	  Zollverein	  import	  duties	  continued	  to	  be	  levied	  at	  much	  lower	  rates	  than	  those	  of	  other	  countries	  on	  the	  Continent.”61	  	  The	  disagreement	  of	  these	  two	  contemporary	  intellectuals	  fittingly	  shows	  the	  debates	  held	  between	  German	  intellectuals	  in	  the	  1840s.	  The	  intellectual	  leader	  of	  the	  free-­‐trade	  movement	  in	  Germany	  was	  aptly	  named	  John	  Prince	  Smith.	  Published	  two	  years	  after	  List’s	  book,	  Smith’s	  pamphlet	  Ueber	  Handelsfeindseligkeit	  argues	  that	  the	  Maassen	  Tariff,	  adopted	  by	  the	  Zollverein	  from	  Prussian	  law,	  had	  grown	  to	  a	  much	  larger	  proportion	  of	  profit	  then	  intended	  by	  1844.	  He	  examples	  pig-­‐iron,	  whose	  tariff	  had	  increased	  by	  £1/ton	  in	  1844	  due	  to	  that	  fact	  that	  the	  Maassen	  tariff	  was	  based	  on	  the	  value,	  not	  the	  weight,	  of	  a	  good.62	  Dr.	  John	  Bowring	  agreed,	  citing	  that	  import	  duties	  on	  manufactured	  goods	  had	  increased	  from	  10%	  to	  as	  much	  as	  “60%-­‐100%”	  in	  some	  cases.63	  In	  addition,	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  Taxes,	  Ludwig	  Kuehne	  reported	  in	  Der	  deutsche	  Zollverein	  waehrend	  der	  Jahre	  1834	  bis	  
1845	  that	  in	  its	  first	  11	  years	  the	  Zollverein	  had	  increased	  its	  tax	  revenue	  by	  90%	  even	  though	  its	  population	  had	  only	  increased	  by	  21%.64	  Based	  on	  these	  statistics	  it	  seems,	  as	  suggested	  by	  Stolper,	  that	  protectionist	  influence	  was	  growing	  and	  duties	  were	  being	  allowed	  to	  increase	  as	  required.	  However,	  Henderson	  makes	  the	  classic	  protectionist	  argument:	  despite	  the	  proportional	  increases,	  the	  Zollverein’s	  tariffs	  were	  still	  the	  most	  liberal	  in	  Europe.	  In	  fact,	  England,	  the	  supposed	  flagship	  of	  free	  trade,	  had	  some	  of	  the	  highest	  tariffs,	  especially	  for	  corn.	  England	  also	  followed	  a	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strict	  navigation	  code,	  which	  stipulated	  who	  could	  trade,	  where	  they	  could	  trade,	  how	  much	  they	  could	  trade,	  and	  what	  the	  price	  level	  should	  be.65	  The	  protectionist	  free	  trade	  conversation	  remained	  unresolved	  because	  the	  1848	  revolutions	  brought	  an	  end	  to	  the	  debates.66	  	  Arguments	  like	  the	  one	  above	  are	  the	  great	  frustration	  of	  Germany	  from	  1834-­‐1871.	  As	  exampled	  above,	  Germany	  was	  split	  between	  two	  vague	  groups.	  On	  one	  side	  were	  those	  with	  conservative,	  tradition	  base	  sentiments,	  on	  the	  other,	  liberals,	  with	  current	  events	  based	  sentiments.	  Otto	  von	  Bismarck’s	  philosophy	  of	  
Realpolitik	  will	  eventually	  break	  the	  stalemate	  and	  prove	  the	  protectionists	  right.	  However,	  even	  Bismarck	  was	  still	  completely	  infatuated	  with	  the	  conservative	  line	  of	  thought	  in	  the	  late	  1840s.	  A	  rowdy	  young	  man,	  Bismarck	  became	  deeply	  religious	  and	  conservative	  after	  his	  marriage	  to	  Johanna	  von	  Puttkamer	  in	  1847.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  ultraconservative	  party	  in	  the	  1847	  Prussian	  Diet,	  Bismarck	  voted	  to	  support	  the	  King’s	  ultimate	  divine	  rule.	  In	  fact,	  Bismarck	  opposed	  German	  unification,	  fearing	  it	  would	  damage	  Prussian’s	  autonomy.	  In	  1848	  Bismarck	  even	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  attempt	  to	  rally	  peasants	  into	  a	  militia	  to	  march	  on	  Berlin	  and	  save	  the	  king.	  This	  mission	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  Bismarck.	  Thankful	  for	  this	  loyalty	  the	  King	  appointed	  Bismarck	  as	  Prussian	  Representative	  to	  the	  German	  Confederation.67	  The	  Confederation	  had	  little	  power	  by	  1851,	  but	  it	  did	  teach	  Bismarck	  the	  art	  of	  politics.	  He	  began	  to	  hatch	  a	  new	  plan	  to	  undermine	  the	  power	  of	  Austria	  and	  to	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unify	  the	  German	  states.	  It	  started	  with	  simple	  mimicry.	  Insisting	  on	  every	  privilege	  extended	  to	  Austria,	  Bismarck	  began	  lighting	  cigars	  and	  removing	  his	  jacket	  when	  he	  saw	  the	  Austrian	  representative	  do	  so.	  Bismarck	  also	  developed	  a	  new	  theory	  for	  unification:	  unity	  through	  Prussian	  leadership,	  not	  through	  the	  fully	  democratic	  means	  in	  the	  1848	  Revolutions	  style.	  His	  opinion	  shift	  came	  with	  the	  realization	  that	  	  “People	  cannot	  create	  or	  divert	  the	  stream	  of	  time.	  They	  can	  only	  travel	  upon	  it	  and	  steer	  with	  more	  or	  less	  skill	  and	  experience;	  they	  can	  suffer	  shipwreck	  and	  go	  aground	  and	  also	  arrive	  in	  safe	  harbors.”	  68	  Bismarck	  eventually	  came	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  unification	  of	  Germany	  was	  necessary	  and	  inevitable,	  however,	  he	  did	  not	  want	  this	  to	  harm	  Prussia’s	  reputation.	  His	  response,	  in	  true	  Realpolitik	  fashion,	  was	  to	  take	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  circumstance	  and	  see	  how	  his	  own	  interests,	  the	  preservation	  of	  Prussian	  power,	  could	  be	  met	  as	  well.	  The	  obvious	  response	  was	  for	  Prussia	  to	  lead	  the	  unification	  process	  with	  her	  own	  institutions	  and	  laws	  in	  order	  to	  do	  make	  the	  unification	  go	  her	  way.69	  Bismarck	  would	  eventually	  correctly	  realized	  that	  the	  waiting	  game	  Prussia	  had	  been	  playing	  since	  1815	  could	  be	  capitalized	  on	  by	  the	  1860s.	  	   Section	  5:	  Industrial	  Banking	  Growth	  1848-­‐1857	  In	  1847	  Germany’s	  first	  Bills-­‐of-­‐Exchange	  Law	  was	  passed,	  fully	  enabling	  German	  states	  within	  the	  Zollverein	  to	  easily	  engage	  in	  fair	  trade.	  This	  law	  was	  passed	  just	  in	  time,	  because	  by	  1848	  the	  riches	  of	  the	  Californian	  Gold	  Rush	  began	  to	  reach	  the	  German	  economy.	  New	  modern	  credit	  banks	  utilized	  the	  gold	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Pflanze,	  Bismarck,	  I,	  3.	  69	  Evans,	  “The	  Wars	  of	  German	  Unification.”	  
	   40	  
investments	  and	  Germany	  entered	  her	  first	  promoters’	  boom.70	  However,	  the	  creation	  of	  these	  banks	  was	  not	  easy.	  The	  additional	  capital	  was	  not	  enough;	  Prussia	  also	  had	  to	  figure	  out	  a	  way	  to	  utilize	  the	  investments	  coming	  in.	  The	  director	  of	  the	  Prussian	  Bank,	  Christian	  von	  Rother,	  insisted	  on	  controlling	  industry	  through	  the	  state,	  both	  at	  the	  manufacturing	  and	  investment	  levels.	  Prussia	  in	  particular	  had	  extremely	  strict	  banking	  laws	  that	  discouraged	  investment.	  However,	  the	  problem	  was	  not	  only	  at	  the	  governmental	  level.	  Banks	  across	  Germany	  discouraged	  small	  savings	  deposits,	  even	  worse;	  the	  public	  felt	  the	  loose	  floorboards	  and	  jars	  buried	  in	  the	  garden	  were	  more	  secure	  than	  bank	  vaults.71	  By	  1848	  Rother’s	  plan	  was	  in	  shambles	  and	  he	  knew	  that	  the	  liberals	  he	  had	  fought	  for	  so	  long	  were	  right.	  Intelligently,	  Rother	  resigned.	  Liberal	  David	  Hansemann	  took	  his	  place	  as	  director	  of	  the	  Prussian	  Bank,	  in	  addition	  to	  his	  post	  of	  Minister	  of	  Finance,	  and	  attempted	  to	  reform	  the	  bank	  to	  encourage	  private	  growth.	  His	  goal	  was	  to	  develop	  joint-­‐stock	  banks	  that	  would	  focus	  on	  private	  sector	  investment	  and	  would	  provide	  funding	  to	  small	  entrepreneurial	  attempts.	  Unfortunately,	  his	  new	  ideas	  quickly	  caused	  him	  to	  be	  removed	  from	  his	  minister	  post	  for	  political	  reasons	  by	  September	  1848.72	  	  As	  director	  of	  the	  Prussian	  Bank,	  Hansemann	  was	  certainly	  aware	  of	  the	  huge	  change	  caused	  by	  the	  Californian	  and	  Australian	  Gold	  Rushes.	  Suddenly,	  between	  January	  and	  August	  of	  1851	  private	  deposits	  in	  the	  Prussian	  Bank	  increased	  from	  4.75	  Million	  thalers	  to	  9.33	  Million	  thalers.	  The	  increase	  in	  accounts	  was	  so	  sudden,	  and	  caused	  such	  logistical	  confusion,	  that	  the	  bank	  asked	  depositors	  who	  seldom	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used	  their	  accounts	  to	  remove	  their	  money.73	  Frustration	  caused	  Hansemann	  to	  leave	  his	  Prussian	  Bank	  directorship	  position	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  chance	  at	  creating	  a	  new	  private	  bank	  the	  same	  year.	  The	  Direktion	  der	  Diskontogesellschaft	  bank	  skillfully	  bypassed	  all	  Prussian	  regulations,	  stifling	  any	  cries	  to	  have	  it	  dismantled.	  Starting	  with	  a	  restricted	  member	  pool	  of	  256	  customers,	  by	  1856	  it	  had	  rebranded	  as	  the	  
Diskontogesellschaft	  to	  became	  one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  banks	  in	  Germany.	  There	  were	  several	  banks	  throughout	  Germany	  making	  similar	  progress.	  The	  resulting	  banking	  system	  had	  two	  interesting	  effects.	  The	  First	  was	  the	  mitigation	  of	  agricultural	  variability	  on	  Germany’s	  economy.	  Germany’s	  biggest	  industry	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1800s	  was	  agriculture,	  which	  had	  great	  sensitivity	  to	  yearly	  crop	  variability,	  as	  proved	  in	  1848.	  With	  the	  development	  of	  industry	  and	  consistent	  banking,	  Germany’s	  economy	  stabilized	  and	  became	  investor	  friendly.	  Second,	  with	  this	  stability	  German	  investments	  began	  staying	  in	  country	  instead	  of	  going	  overseas.	  Thus,	  investment	  increased	  from	  both	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  sources.74	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Section	  6:	  The	  Great	  Industries	  1848-­‐1857	  	   The	  section	  below	  will	  not,	  by	  any	  means,	  make	  an	  exhaustive	  analysis	  of	  the	  industrial	  growth	  in	  the	  period	  of	  roughly	  1848-­‐1857.	  In	  fact,	  this	  entire	  paper	  will	  never	  make	  such	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis.	  Instead,	  it	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  key	  changes	  that	  occurred.	  By	  1850	  the	  steam	  industry	  was	  growing	  so	  quickly	  that	  timber	  fuel	  resources	  no	  longer	  sufficed.	  Thus,	  in	  1850	  the	  use	  of	  coal	  began	  to	  exponentially	  expand.	  Before	  diving	  into	  the	  accomplishments	  of	  the	  steal	  and	  coal	  industries,	  it	  should	  be	  mentioned	  that	  neither	  was	  the	  largest	  in	  Germany.	  Agriculture	  remained	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the	  largest	  economic	  industry;	  textiles	  came	  second,	  then	  coal	  and	  steal.75	  However,	  despite	  their	  size,	  coal	  and	  steel	  were	  the	  most	  important	  industries.	  Coal	  and	  steel	  were	  the	  industries	  that	  encouraged,	  and	  arguable	  defined,	  modernity.	  Steel	  was	  the	  medium	  of	  the	  modernization	  in	  Germany	  and	  coal	  was	  the	  power.	  It	  was	  steel,	  coal,	  and	  later	  pharmaceuticals	  and	  chemicals,	  which	  came	  to	  define	  the	  modern	  German	  state.	  Less	  idealistically,	  steel	  and	  coal	  allowed	  Germany	  to	  compete	  economically	  with	  France,	  England,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  It	  was	  from	  the	  coal	  and	  steel	  industries	  that	  the	  sciences	  began	  to	  flourish.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  very	  dirt	  below	  the	  Germans’	  feet	  added	  to	  their	  “Volksgeist.”	  	  	  	   Other	  than	  the	  lack	  of	  lumber,	  two	  other	  factors	  encouraged	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  coal	  and	  steel	  industries.	  One	  was	  the	  continuous	  expansion	  of	  railways	  in	  Germany	  that	  connected	  collieries	  with	  populated	  areas.	  The	  second	  was	  the	  Joint	  Ownership	  Law	  of	  1851	  with	  which	  the	  Prussian	  government	  relinquished	  control	  of	  mining	  operations,	  except	  for	  safety	  regulations,	  juvenile	  employment,	  and	  mining	  engineer	  qualifications.	  In	  addition,	  the	  tax	  on	  gross	  coal	  output	  was	  halved	  from	  10%	  to	  5%.	  Predictably,	  the	  industry	  boomed,	  but,	  interestingly,	  not	  in	  the	  same	  geographic	  area.	  In	  1850	  Prussia’s	  region	  of	  Upper	  Silesia,	  in	  modern	  day	  southern	  Poland,	  produced	  twice	  as	  much	  coal	  as	  the	  Ruhr	  region.	  However,	  by	  1870	  the	  two	  regions	  had	  switched	  places.76	  This	  is	  important	  for	  the	  Ruhr	  region	  is	  still	  located	  in	  modern	  day	  Germany	  in	  the	  area	  of	  Essen	  and	  Aachen.	  The	  Ruhr	  eventually	  became	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  industrial	  areas	  in	  Europe.	  Large	  amounts	  of	  immigration	  occurred	  to	  the	  area	  from	  Poland	  and	  other	  Eastern	  European	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countries.	  It	  is	  an	  interesting	  speculative	  mystery	  of	  history	  to	  think	  what	  would	  have	  happened	  had	  Upper	  Silesia	  remained	  the	  dominant	  industrial	  area	  and	  German	  speakers	  had	  migrated	  to	  the	  Polish	  areas	  instead	  of	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  	   	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Ruhr	  rather	  than	  the	  continued	  dedication	  to	  Upper	  Silesia,	  was	  geographic	  proximity	  to	  iron	  reserves.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  Ruhr	  is	  located	  well	  within	  Germany	  proper,	  near	  several	  heavily	  populated	  areas.	  Though	  it	  had	  few	  iron	  reserves,	  which	  were	  also	  inconveniently	  mixed	  with	  coal,	  the	  Ruhr	  had	  huge	  amounts	  of	  coal	  and	  was	  surrounded	  by	  several	  iron	  rich	  regions,	  the	  important	  ones	  will	  are	  listed	  below.	  The	  largest	  iron	  reserve	  in	  Western	  Europe	  was	  found	  in	  French	  Lorraine,	  just	  to	  the	  south	  over	  the	  French-­‐German	  border.	  Slightly	  north	  or	  Lorraine	  were	  the	  iron	  fields	  within	  Luxemburg,	  Slightly	  east	  of	  Luxemburg	  one	  found	  the	  Saarland	  and	  even	  further	  east	  the	  high	  grade	  iron	  fields	  of	  the	  Siegerland,	  which	  were	  perfect	  for	  steel	  production.77	  All	  of	  the	  above	  mentioned	  areas	  are	  within	  roughly	  a	  two-­‐hour	  drive	  of	  the	  coalfields	  and	  iron	  works	  of	  the	  Zollverein	  in	  the	  Ruhr.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  between	  1852-­‐1861	  75	  new	  iron	  companies	  were	  established	  and	  from	  1851-­‐1857,	  27	  new	  coke	  furnaces	  were	  built	  in	  the	  Ruhr	  alone.78	  	   The	  simple	  ability	  to	  utilize	  these	  reserves	  shows	  the	  incredible	  progress	  Germany	  had	  made.	  Through	  the	  Zollverein,	  the	  Germans	  had	  managed	  to	  organize	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Prussia,	  the	  states	  of	  Thuringia,	  The	  Kingdom	  France,	  the	  Duchy	  of	  Luxemburg,	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Hanover,	  and	  the	  numerous	  small	  states	  that	  lay	  geographically	  in	  between.	  Even	  with	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Prussian	  banking	  system	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and	  the	  development	  of	  private	  mining	  companies,	  none	  of	  the	  listed	  reserves	  would	  have	  been	  utilized.	  For	  the	  tariffs	  and	  tolls	  would	  have	  made	  mining	  ventures	  unprofitable,	  the	  difference	  in	  measures	  would	  have	  made	  it	  impractical,	  the	  lack	  of	  consistent	  roads	  and	  rails	  would	  have	  made	  it	  impossible,	  and	  the	  differences	  in	  language	  would	  have	  added	  insult	  to	  injury.	  	  	  Section	  7:	  The	  1857	  Collapse	  	   Severe	  in	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Britain,	  the	  1857	  collapse	  served	  as	  a	  gentler	  warning	  shot	  to	  the	  German	  States.	  The	  economic	  failure	  began	  with	  a	  bumper	  harvest	  in	  the	  mid-­‐U.S.	  then	  spread	  to	  the	  Eastern	  U.S.	  when	  farmers	  were	  unable	  to	  pay	  their	  banks	  and	  investors	  due	  to	  plummeted	  crop	  prices.	  Once	  the	  main	  banking	  networks	  of	  the	  East	  Coast	  were	  hit,	  companies	  in	  various	  industries	  began	  to	  topple	  like	  dominos.	  Soon,	  trade	  and	  investment	  with	  England	  became	  affected	  spreading	  the	  crisis	  to	  Europe.	  Through	  trade	  links	  with	  Britain,	  Germany	  received	  the	  economic	  collapse	  third	  hand.79	  	  However,	  Germany’s	  comparative	  success	  it	  not	  only	  thanks	  to	  the	  English	  economic	  buffer	  zone.	  The	  German	  banking	  system	  was	  far	  more	  conservative	  and	  less	  speculative	  than	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Britain.	  Most	  of	  the	  ventures	  in	  the	  Germany	  states	  were	  carried	  out	  in	  responsible	  fashions.	  In	  fact,	  while	  criticizing	  certain	  business	  practices	  in	  Germany,	  the	  Magdeburg	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  held	  the	  United	  State	  as	  the	  prime	  example	  of	  irresponsible	  business:	  When	  we	  see	  that	  a	  bank	  with	  an	  acknowledged	  deficit	  equal	  to	  a	  quarter	  of	  its	  original	  capital,	  is	  nevertheless	  allowed	  to	  pay	  a	  dividend	  to	  its	  shareholders,	  and	  when	  dubious	  and	  half-­‐lost	  sums	  are	  included	  in	  bank	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balances	  and	  bank	  statements	  as	  if	  they	  were	  assets,	  we	  doubt	  whether	  we	  are	  so	  very	  far	  off	  from	  the	  road	  that	  will	  lead	  us	  to	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  United	  States.80	  	  	  	   In	  Germany	  the	  collapse	  affected	  mostly	  port	  cities	  and	  some	  major	  regional	  capitals.	  By	  far	  the	  worst	  case	  was	  Hamburg,	  due	  to	  its	  extensive	  trade	  with	  England.	  The	  British	  Consul	  General	  described	  Hamburg	  in	  November	  1857:	  	  [C]ommercial	  confidence	  is	  entirely	  at	  an	  end	  among	  the	  merchants	  and	  moneyed	  capitalists	  in	  Hamburg;	  and	  that	  only	  the	  bills	  of	  three	  or	  four	  of	  the	  first	  houses	  are	  negotiable	  at	  the	  highest	  rates	  of	  interest.81	  	  Berlin,	  Cologne,	  Magdeburg,	  Leipzig,	  and	  Stuttgart	  all	  suffered	  major	  company	  collapses	  caused	  by	  financial	  damage	  done	  in	  the	  port	  cities	  such	  as	  Stettin	  and	  Danzig.	  The	  port	  city	  of	  Bremen	  suffered	  the	  least	  of	  all	  the	  major	  port	  cities	  with	  “only	  14	  company	  failures.”82	  For	  a	  broader	  picture	  one	  can	  look	  at	  the	  Zollverein	  as	  a	  whole.	  In	  1857	  the	  Zollverein	  traded	  944	  Million	  thalers	  worth	  of	  goods,	  two	  years	  later	  by	  1859	  it	  produced	  only	  886	  thalers.83	  However,	  by	  the	  1860s	  industrial	  growth	  in	  the	  German	  States	  was	  once	  again	  positive.	  The	  experience	  of	  1857	  seems	  to	  have	  thinned	  that	  fat	  of	  German	  industry,	  encouraged	  prudent	  business,	  and	  discourage	  future	  rampant	  speculation	  and	  exaggeration.	  In	  addition,	  the	  1857	  collapse	  taught	  both	  states	  and	  banks	  how	  to	  cover	  for	  each	  others’	  failures.	  The	  prime	  example	  is	  the	  city	  of	  Hamburg,	  which	  was	  saved	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  £750,000	  worth	  of	  Austrian	  lent	  silver,	  a	  40%	  financial	  backing	  from	  the	  Hamburg	  Union	  Bank	  and	  Bank	  of	  North	  German,	  of	  the	  five	  largest	  Hamburg	  firms,	  and	  last,	  the	  remaining	  60%	  was	  backed	  by	  the	  Hamburg	  Senate	  itself.	  Each	  German	  State	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used	  slightly	  different	  means	  to	  recovery.	  Prussia,	  for	  example,	  suspended	  its	  interest	  laws	  for	  three	  months	  and	  authorized	  the	  extension	  of	  credit	  to	  merchants	  and	  firms	  from	  the	  Bank	  of	  Prussia.84	  This	  gave	  the	  German	  States	  a	  long-­‐term	  advantage,	  because	  every	  state	  acted	  as	  its	  own	  petri	  dish,	  each	  producing	  a	  slightly	  different	  financial	  situation,	  each	  allowing	  for	  experimentation	  of	  financial	  recovery,	  while	  being	  at	  least	  partially	  compartmentalized	  from	  each	  other.	  	  This	  financial	  experiment	  began	  proving	  the	  Prussian	  system	  better	  than	  the	  Austrian.	  In	  Prussia	  the	  crisis	  manifested	  itself	  mainly	  in	  the	  agricultural	  and	  capital	  market	  sectors,	  while	  reactive	  organization	  and	  lucky	  timing	  saved	  her	  modern	  industries.	  As	  the	  crisis	  broke	  Prussia’s	  mining	  companies	  resorted	  by	  forming	  associations	  to	  protect	  their	  interests.	  These	  organizations	  remained	  stable	  because	  many	  of	  the	  associations’	  members	  had	  managed	  to	  complete	  their	  first	  round	  of	  capital	  investments	  before	  the	  crisis	  broke.	  The	  shafts	  were	  dug,	  the	  machinery	  in	  place,	  and	  finances	  in	  order.	  Thus,	  these	  large	  new	  companies	  did	  not	  collapse	  due	  to	  inability	  produce,	  but	  instead	  had	  to	  run	  at	  a	  slight	  loss	  for	  a	  few	  years.	  In	  Prussian	  industry	  the	  main	  burden	  of	  the	  recession	  was	  spread	  out	  among	  the	  many	  investors	  of	  the	  various	  companies,	  not	  any	  single	  company.	  The	  result	  was	  an	  industry	  that	  stagnated,	  but	  did	  not	  suffer	  catastrophic	  loss	  of	  capital.	  Quite	  the	  success	  when	  stock	  prices	  fall	  50%	  and	  wholesale	  prices	  drop	  30%.	  Thus,	  when	  the	  crisis	  passed,	  Prussia	  was	  chomping	  at	  the	  bit	  to	  fully	  utilize	  free-­‐trade	  tactics.85	  	  Conversely,	  Austria	  suffered	  extreme	  losses	  directly	  to	  its	  investment	  and	  industrial	  sectors.	  The	  first	  large,	  and	  probably	  the	  biggest,	  institution	  to	  tumble	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was	  the	  firm	  Boskowitz.	  A	  period	  newspaper	  described	  the	  severity	  situation	  to	  its	  readership	  in	  Australia.	  	  The	  sum	  for	  which	  M.	  Boskowitz	  has	  failed	  exceeds	  £250,000,	  and	  his	  fall	  must	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  that	  of	  a	  great	  number	  of	  manufacturers	  of	  silk,	  cotton,	  and	  woolen	  goods…[i]nformation	  has	  just	  been	  given	  me	  that	  the	  insolvency	  of	  Boskowitz	  has	  already	  led	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  one	  or	  two	  other	  firms	  of	  some	  importance.86	  	  	  	   	  To	  help	  put	  the	  £250,000	  sum	  into	  perspective,	  the	  total	  value	  of	  M.	  Boskowitz’s	  non-­‐trade	  goods	  property	  was	  £70,000	  and	  the	  bail	  out	  from	  Austria	  for	  the	  entire	  city	  of	  Hamburg,	  arguable	  the	  biggest	  trade	  city	  in	  Germany	  at	  the	  time,	  was	  £750,000.	  As	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  initial	  failure	  was	  caused	  by	  bumper	  crop	  farmers	  who	  were	  unable	  to	  pay	  their	  over	  stretched	  investors,	  in	  Austria’s	  case	  Boskowitz.87	  Predictably,	  the	  response	  of	  Austrian	  popular	  sentiment	  was	  the	  opposite	  of	  Prussia’s	  calls	  for	  free	  trade,	  Austrians	  began	  calling	  for	  greater	  domestic	  protection	  of	  industry.88	  Economically,	  protectionism	  may	  have	  been	  the	  wise	  move,	  however,	  it	  certainly	  weakened	  Austria’s	  standing	  amongst	  the	  German	  states.	  This	  was	  an	  opportunity	  Prussia	  would	  not	  miss;	  soon	  Bismarck	  took	  the	  helm	  and	  steered	  Prussia	  “into	  safe	  harbors.”	  	  	  	  	  This	  collapse	  was	  not	  the	  first,	  nor	  anywhere	  near	  the	  last,	  financial	  crises	  Germany	  experienced.	  However,	  it	  proved	  the	  first	  major	  economic	  crisis	  to	  hit	  the	  industrialized	  German	  States,	  forcing	  it	  to	  react	  in	  the	  context	  of	  modern	  banking	  and	  business	  systems.	  The	  difference	  between	  1857	  and	  even	  1848	  is	  very	  clear.	  The	  crop	  failure	  of	  1848	  reignited	  the	  age-­‐old	  flame	  of	  conflict	  between	  lord	  and	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vassal.	  The	  reaction	  in	  1848	  was	  to	  build	  barricades	  and	  demand	  freedoms.	  By	  1857	  the	  reaction	  was	  to	  draw	  together	  to	  heal	  the	  financial	  bleeding.	  Instead	  of	  disrupting	  legislative	  actions	  and	  demanding	  change,	  connections	  were	  drawn	  between	  private	  institutions	  and	  between	  various	  sovereign	  states.	  In	  1857	  it	  also	  became	  stunningly	  clear	  that	  the	  economic	  actions	  of	  one	  city,	  such	  as	  Hamburg,	  held	  repercussion	  for	  all	  of	  Germany;	  that	  the	  financial	  systems	  of	  each	  state	  had	  become	  completely	  entangled	  in	  those	  of	  its	  neighbors.	  	  Section	  8:	  The	  Prussian	  War	  Theory	  of	  1857-­‐1871	  The	  Prussia	  military	  tactics	  used	  during	  the	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein	  Conflict,	  the	  Austro-­‐Prussian	  War,	  and	  the	  Franco-­‐Prussian	  War	  are	  perfect	  examples	  of	  Prussian	  General	  Carl	  von	  Clausewitz’s	  theory	  on	  war.	  His	  theory	  was	  used	  to	  great	  positive	  effect,	  as	  Pflanze	  describes,	  “[The	  wars]	  reconstructed,	  but	  did	  no	  destroy	  the	  European	  balance.89	  Strangely,	  though	  Clausewitz’s	  theory	  and	  Bismarck’s	  practice	  almost	  perfectly	  match,	  they	  were	  unrelated.	  In	  Bismarck’s	  own	  words,	  “[t]o	  my	  shame	  I	  have	  to	  confess	  that	  I	  have	  never	  read	  Clausewitz	  and	  have	  known	  little	  more	  about	  him	  that	  that	  he	  was	  a	  meritorious	  general.”90	  This	  should	  be	  held	  as	  a	  positive	  sign.	  Clausewitz	  and	  Bismarck	  were	  both	  inspired	  by	  their	  Prussian	  heritage	  to	  engage	  in	  war	  in	  a	  constructive,	  organized,	  and	  progressive	  manner.	  Assuming	  that	  Bismarck	  is	  not	  lying,	  this	  in	  an	  excellent	  show	  of	  how	  the	  “Volksgeist”	  of	  Germany	  developed.	  Thus,	  in	  a	  way	  the	  fact	  the	  Bismarck	  was	  able	  to	  meddle	  in	  military	  affairs,	  despite	  the	  generals’	  growing	  disapproval,	  makes	  sense.	  Sadly,	  while	  Clausewitz	  understood	  what	  was	  found	  to	  be	  the	  truth,	  he	  was	  unable	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to	  convince	  his	  contemporary,	  military	  compatriots.	  Perhaps	  this	  explains	  why	  Bismarck	  never	  read	  Clausewitz,	  he	  words	  were	  unconvincing	  and	  so,	  unimportant	  at	  the	  time.	  Luckily,	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm,	  with	  one	  foot	  in	  military	  and	  the	  other	  in	  political	  life,	  heard	  the	  sense	  in	  Bismarck’s	  similar	  arguments	  and	  acted	  as	  a	  bridge	  to	  facilitate	  his	  policy	  into	  military	  strategy.	  Thus,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  war	  one	  sees	  a	  fight	  between	  the	  military	  and	  Bismarck;	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  military	  urging	  the	  tradition	  method	  of	  complete	  invasion	  and	  domination,	  on	  the	  other,	  Bismarck	  arguing	  limited	  war	  in	  return.	  	  	  	  	  	  Acknowledging	  that	  Bismarck	  used	  Clausewitz’s	  theory	  without	  purposeful	  intent,	  this	  paper	  will	  refer	  henceforth	  to	  the	  method	  employed	  by	  both	  men	  as	  the	  Clausewitz	  method.	  This	  is	  simply	  because	  Clausewitz	  left	  behind	  a	  work,	  Vom	  
Kriege,	  which,	  though	  uncompleted,	  clearly	  structures	  and	  elaborates	  the	  details	  of	  this	  style	  of	  warfare.	  In	  his	  work	  Clausewitz	  outlines	  two	  interesting	  theories,	  first:	  	   	  	  	  War	  is	  a	  mere	  continuation	  of	  policy	  by	  other	  means…for	  the	  political	  view	  is	  the	  object,	  war	  is	  the	  means,	  and	  the	  means	  must	  always	  include	  the	  object	  in	  our	  conception.91	  	  Second,	  is	  his	  concept	  that	  “war	  is	  not	  a	  true	  chameleon,”	  he	  describes	  war	  this	  way	  because	  though	  each	  particular	  case	  is	  different,	  there	  is	  a	  trinity	  of	  powers	  involved	  in	  every	  armed	  conflict:	  	  [A]	  wonderful	  trinity,	  composed	  of	  the	  original	  violence	  of	  its	  elements,	  hatred	  and	  animosity,	  which	  may	  be	  looked	  upon	  as	  [1.]	  blind	  instinct;	  of	  the	  [2.]	  play	  of	  probabilities	  and	  chance,	  which	  make	  it	  a	  free	  activity	  of	  the	  soul;	  and	  [3.]	  of	  the	  subordinate	  nature	  of	  a	  political	  instrument,	  by	  which	  it	  belongs	  purely	  to	  the	  reason.92	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  London:	  N.	  Trübner,	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Clausewitz’s	  ideas	  present	  an	  interesting	  concept:	  that	  war	  should	  always	  be	  in	  a	  position	  subordinate	  to	  politics.	  	  Again	  and	  again	  we	  see	  Bismarck	  follow	  this	  principle.	  Before	  each	  of	  the	  three	  wars,	  Bismarck	  prepares	  everything	  with	  intense	  thoroughness.	  First,	  he	  prepared	  the	  army	  and	  its	  supplies	  years	  in	  advance.	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  Prussian’s	  were	  always	  well	  organized,	  fast,	  and	  well	  armed.	  So	  when	  “chance”	  caused	  things	  to	  go	  wrong,	  the	  Prussian’s	  could	  easily	  recover.	  	  Second,	  Bismarck	  surveyed	  the	  political	  landscape.	  Who	  could	  be	  his	  allies,	  who	  would	  remain	  neutral,	  and	  who	  did	  he	  want	  to	  fight.	  Often,	  this	  held	  serious	  geographic	  advantages,	  a	  worth	  Hitler	  clearly	  missed.	  Third,	  Bismarck	  stunted	  the	  “blind	  instinct”	  of	  the	  Prussian	  military	  off	  of	  the	  battlefield	  (Mars-­‐la-­‐tour	  proved	  the	  usefulness	  of	  blind	  instinct	  on	  the	  battlefield).	  To	  the	  incredible	  frustration	  of	  the	  Prussian	  Generals,	  Bismarck	  always	  controlled	  the	  end	  of	  each	  war	  by	  leveraging	  King	  Wilhelm.	  Bismarck	  controlled	  when	  and	  where	  the	  borders	  would	  be	  drawn	  and	  what	  the	  conditions	  of	  surrender	  would	  be.	  In	  this	  way	  Bismarck	  completed	  the	  third	  and	  final	  step	  in	  the	  Clausewitz	  method.	  He,	  himself,	  physically	  embodied	  the	  superiority	  of	  politics	  over	  the	  military.	  	   Section	  9:	  The	  1859-­‐1871	  Wars	  of	  German	  Unification	  During	  the	  1859	  New	  Years	  Day	  celebrations	  Napoleon	  III	  informed	  the	  ambassador	  of	  Austria,	  “I	  regret	  that	  our	  relations	  are	  not	  as	  good	  as	  I	  wished,	  but	  please	  report	  to	  Vienna	  that	  my	  personal	  feelings	  toward	  the	  Kaiser	  are	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unchanged.”93	  Upon	  hearing	  the	  news	  Bismarck	  wrote	  Gustav	  von	  Alvensleben,	  the	  Prussian	  regent’s	  adjutant,	  	  Ours	  will	  be	  the	  winning	  card	  in	  the	  present	  situation,	  if	  we	  let	  Austria	  become	  deeply	  involved	  in	  the	  war	  with	  France	  and	  then	  burst	  out	  with	  our	  entire	  army	  to	  the	  southward,	  taking	  our	  boundary	  stakes	  in	  our	  knapsacks	  and	  planting	  them	  again	  on	  the	  Bodensee	  or	  where	  the	  protestant	  faith	  ceases	  to	  predominate.94	  	  Similarly,	  Bismarck	  wrote	  Prussian	  foreign	  minister	  Schleinitz,	  Prussia	  would	  soon	  be	  able	  to	  construct	  better	  and	  more	  natural	  relations	  with	  her	  German	  neighbors,	  [without	  the	  German	  Confederation….]	  I	  would	  like	  to	  see	  the	  word	  ‘German’	  instead	  of	  ‘Prussian’	  inscribed	  on	  our	  banners	  only	  when	  we	  are	  more	  closely	  and	  more	  suitable	  united	  with	  our	  countrymen	  than	  previously;	  it	  loses	  some	  of	  its	  charm	  when	  used	  as	  it	  is	  now	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  confederate	  diet.95	  	  	  Bismarck	  was	  clearly	  gearing	  up	  for	  war.	  Even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  fighting	  the	  great	  military	  force	  of	  France,	  Bismarck	  was	  openly	  confident.	  “During	  the	  entire	  period	  of	  my	  visit	  in	  Germany,	  I	  never	  advised	  anything	  else	  but	  reliance	  upon	  our	  own	  strength	  and,	  in	  event	  of	  war,	  upon	  that	  evoked	  by	  us	  from	  the	  German	  nation.”96	  This	  confidence	  was	  a	  huge	  step	  for	  Germany,	  which	  had	  historically	  always	  been	  subordinate	  the	  France	  and	  England.	  	  Bismarck	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  thinking	  great	  change	  was	  on	  the	  horizon,	  	  “Woe	  to	  the	  unfortunate	  devotee	  of	  principle	  who	  thinks	  of	  the	  past,	  who	  is	  so	  naïve	  and	  so	  unrealistic	  to	  assert	  that	  right	  is	  still	  right	  and	  wrong	  still	  wrong,	  that	  success	  can	  create	  power,	  but	  never	  right!”97	  	  	  This	  quote	  from	  Wilhelm	  Liebknecht	  in	  1866	  shows	  the	  changing	  sentiments	  of	  the	  new	  age.	  This	  quote	  is	  a	  response	  to	  those	  conservatives	  who,	  despite	  the	  ever-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Pflanze,	  Bismarck,	  I,	  136.	  94	  Pflanze,	  Bismarck,	  I,	  136.	  95	  Pflanze,	  Bismarck,	  I,	  137.	  96	  Pflanze,	  Bismarck,	  I,	  145.	  97	  Pflanze,	  Bismarck,	  I,	  236.	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growing	  successes	  of	  social	  democracy,	  denied	  that	  it	  was	  the	  right	  way	  to	  govern.	  A	  personal	  friend	  of	  both	  Marx	  and	  Engels,	  and	  a	  veteran	  of	  French	  Revolutionary	  street	  fighting,	  Liebknecht	  started	  several	  liberal	  Marxist	  based	  parties	  including	  the	  Sozialdemokratishen	  Partei	  Deutschlands	  (SPD),	  the	  key	  party	  in	  the	  SPD/CDU	  coalition,	  which	  elected	  current	  German	  Chancellor	  Angela	  Merkel.98	  Leibknecht	  and	  Bismarck	  were	  men	  of	  very	  different	  opinions	  and	  political	  views,	  but	  as	  intensely	  political	  men	  they	  both	  knew	  they	  stood	  at	  the	  doorstep	  of	  an	  era	  of	  great	  change	  and	  that	  this	  great	  change	  had	  to	  be	  created	  by	  men	  like	  themselves.	  What	  Liebknecht	  said	  about	  social	  democracy,	  can	  also	  be	  said	  about	  Bismarck’s	  military	  conquests.	  He	  did	  not	  just	  take	  power,	  but	  also	  thought	  he	  was	  in	  the	  right	  to	  do	  so.	  He	  did	  not	  care	  if	  the	  other	  Royal	  European	  families	  thought	  it	  was	  “right,”	  or	  “proper,”	  of	  him.	  Both	  men	  knew	  that	  the	  old	  rules	  of	  European	  politics	  would	  not	  apply	  for	  much	  longer	  and	  they	  were	  both	  excited	  to	  see	  them	  go.	  	  Fittingly,	  the	  best	  example	  of	  this	  change	  is	  the	  first	  war	  that	  Bismarck	  instigated,	  the	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein	  War	  of	  1864.	  It	  is	  a	  good	  example	  because	  there	  was	  another	  unsuccessful	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein	  War	  in	  1848,	  a	  year	  in	  which	  traditional	  power	  proved	  dominant.	  In	  fact,	  the	  1848	  conflict	  is	  the	  event	  that	  proved	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  liberal	  Frankfurt	  Parliament,	  effectively	  denying	  revolutionary	  Paulskirche	  any	  power.	  Bismarck’s	  bold	  success	  in	  1864	  showed	  that	  though	  the	  old	  system	  did	  not	  work,	  his	  new	  Realpolitik	  did.	  	  Schleswig	  and	  Holstein	  were	  two	  different	  duchies	  between	  Germany	  and	  Denmark,	  settled	  by	  both	  Danish	  and	  German	  speakers.	  Traditionally,	  the	  duchies	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  "Wilhelm	  Liebknecht	  1826-­‐1900."	  LeMO	  Biografie	  -­‐	  wilhelm-­‐liebknecht..	  <https://www.dhm.de/lemo/biografie/wilhelm-­‐liebknecht>.	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Schleswig	  and	  Holstein	  were	  inseparable,	  however,	  while	  Holstein	  belonged	  to	  the	  German	  Confederation,	  Schleswig	  did	  not.	  Though	  possessions	  of	  the	  Danish	  crown,	  Denmark	  was	  met	  with	  revolts	  in	  the	  duchies	  when	  it	  attempted	  the	  officially	  incorporate	  Schleswig	  into	  Denmark.	  Threatened	  with	  the	  split	  of	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein	  between	  Germany	  and	  Denmark,	  the	  German	  speakers	  rebelled.	  Enthused	  by	  liberal	  German	  nationalism,	  the	  Frankfurter	  Parliament	  convinced	  Prussia	  to	  militarily	  support	  the	  rebellion.	  Facing	  wider	  European	  disapproval	  and	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  quagmire	  of	  politics	  surrounding	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein,	  Prussia	  did	  engage,	  but	  quickly	  withdrew.	  Facing	  similar	  political	  pressure,	  the	  King	  of	  Denmark	  was	  strong-­‐armed,	  with	  the	  Treaty	  of	  1851,	  into	  promising	  not	  to	  incorporate	  Schleswig	  and	  to	  consult	  the	  dukedoms	  about	  any	  future	  constitutional	  ideas	  concerning	  either	  duchy.99	  The	  result:	  Prussia	  looked	  politically	  weak,	  Paulskirche	  was	  effectively	  removed	  from	  the	  political	  scene,	  and	  the	  Danes	  are	  insulted.	  Though	  Austria	  eventually	  got	  its	  way,	  the	  entire	  conflict	  only	  added	  to	  the	  confusion	  of	  the	  infamously	  complicated	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein	  conflict,	  a	  fact	  that	  came	  back	  to	  haunt	  the	  Austrians	  in	  1864.	  In	  short,	  1848	  showed	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  any	  single	  party	  involved	  in	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein	  and	  showed	  the	  inability	  of	  all	  parties	  to	  constructively	  work	  together.	  Bismarck	  seized	  a	  chance	  to	  definitively	  end	  the	  conflict	  in	  1863	  when	  the	  King	  of	  Denmark	  died,	  leaving	  no	  heir.	  Danish	  law	  permitted	  succession	  through	  the	  female	  line	  however;	  German	  Salic	  law	  did	  not	  allow	  this	  in	  the	  German	  Holstein	  duchy.	  Additionally,	  Denmark	  created	  a	  new	  constitution,	  which	  further	  threated	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the	  German	  position	  in	  the	  duchies.	  Bismarck	  leveraged	  this	  conflict	  until	  Austria	  was	  convinced	  to	  annex	  Schleswig	  into	  the	  German	  Confederation	  with	  military	  force.	  On	  February	  1,	  1864	  38,000	  Prussian	  and	  23,000	  Austrian	  soldiers	  crossed	  into	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein,	  later	  joined	  by	  20,000	  Prussian	  reinforcements.100	  After	  an	  unsuccessful	  Prussian	  flanking	  maneuver	  with	  only	  36,000	  troops	  the	  Danes	  forces	  felt	  threatened	  enough	  to	  retreat	  from	  the	  border	  to	  the	  famous	  “Danevirke”	  fortifications	  further	  in	  country.	  Surrounded	  on	  three	  sides	  by	  water,	  the	  fortification	  became	  vulnerable	  to	  flanking	  in	  the	  freeze	  of	  the	  February	  winter.	  Fearing	  encirclement,	  the	  Danes	  made	  a	  running	  retreat	  from	  Danevirke	  on	  February	  5,	  eventually	  ending	  up	  at	  the	  fortification	  of	  Dybbøl.	  After	  taking	  heavy	  losses	  under	  intense	  artillery	  fire	  the	  Danes	  were	  defeated	  on	  the	  18th	  of	  April	  and	  were	  complete	  removed	  from	  Schleswig	  by	  the	  end	  of	  June.101	  The	  Prussian	  tide	  was	  now	  unstoppable	  and	  delved	  into	  Denmark	  against	  original	  plan	  and	  to	  the	  discomfort	  of	  Austria.	  By	  the	  30th	  of	  October	  Denmark	  the	  definitive	  loss	  and	  officially	  gave	  up	  the	  territories	  in	  exchange	  for	  peace.	  Prussia	  received	  Schleswig,	  while	  Austria	  received	  Holstein	  with	  the	  Gastein	  Convention	  of	  14	  August	  1865,	  to	  which	  Denmark	  lost	  about	  a	  quarter	  of	  its	  population.102	  In	  this	  first	  of	  three	  conflicts,	  Bismarck	  holds	  the	  least	  power	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.	  He	  is	  unable	  to	  stop	  the	  Prussian	  military	  from	  invading	  Denmark	  proper.	  Perhaps	  he	  did	  not	  mind	  the	  invasion	  or	  he	  simply	  did	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  have	  any	  say.	  Both	  are	  probably	  true,	  but	  more	  important	  is	  that	  Bismarck	  learned	  from	  the	  Galstein	  Treaty.	  What	  is	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clear	  is	  that	  Bismarck	  learned	  the	  value	  of	  post-­‐war	  negotiations.	  He	  realized	  that	  by	  building	  treaties	  with	  planned	  obsolesce	  he	  gave	  himself	  incredible	  leverage.	  He	  realized	  that	  more	  political	  doors	  could	  be	  coaxed	  open	  during	  negotiation	  than	  could	  be	  forced	  open	  with	  further	  violence.	  By	  purposefully	  designing	  the	  Galstein	  Treaty	  to	  fail	  he	  open	  the	  opportunity	  to	  control	  both	  duchies,	  without	  widespread	  international	  shock	  or	  outcry.	  He	  learned	  that	  failed	  negotiations	  were	  for	  more	  acceptable	  than	  sudden	  declarations	  of	  war.	  This	  could	  be	  why	  he	  was	  so	  adamant	  about	  controlling	  the	  end	  of	  the	  follow	  two	  wars,	  he	  was	  looking	  for	  further	  politico-­‐military	  opportunity	  as	  well	  as	  future	  border	  stability.	  Despite	  approval	  of	  the	  Schleswig	  War,	  Prussian	  liberals	  quickly	  became	  discomforted	  as	  Bismarck	  began	  antagonizing	  Austria	  about	  the	  governance	  of	  Holstein	  and	  Schleswig.	  Bismarck	  had	  certainly	  had	  many	  motives	  in	  mind.	  The	  most	  innocent,	  and	  defendable,	  argument	  from	  Bismarck	  was	  that	  the	  governance	  of	  a	  far	  north	  territory,	  Holstein,	  by	  a	  far	  south	  power,	  Austria,	  created	  another	  detailed	  complication	  in	  the	  already	  geographically	  convoluted	  politics	  of	  the	  German	  states.	  As	  Prussia	  was	  all	  too	  aware,	  governing	  enclaves	  is	  an	  inefficient	  business.	  Certainly,	  Bismarck	  also	  saw	  both	  an	  opportunity	  to	  receive	  territory	  and	  to	  weaken	  the	  Austrians.103	  Thus,	  for	  Bismarck	  the	  rewards	  were	  huge	  if	  he	  could	  take	  control	  of	  Holstein.	  He	  had	  already	  gained	  political	  calmness	  on	  his	  northern	  border,	  however,	  he	  looked	  to	  gain	  addition	  territory	  and	  ports,	  additional	  population,	  additional	  regional	  power	  through	  governance	  of	  Holstein	  and	  Schleswig,	  additional	  German	  power	  by	  directly	  challenging	  Germany’s	  former	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Evans,	  “The	  Wars	  of	  German	  Unification.”	  
	   56	  
leader,	  the	  Hapsburgs,	  and	  additional	  global	  power	  by	  challenging	  the	  world	  power	  of	  Austria-­‐Hungary.	  	  Goals	  in	  sight,	  Bismarck	  began	  getting	  on	  the	  political	  ducks	  in	  a	  row.	  Interestingly,	  his	  greatest	  political	  obstacle	  came	  from	  the	  peak	  of	  Prussian	  administration,	  King	  Wilhelm	  I.	  Respectful	  or	  fellow	  royalty	  and	  fearful	  of	  Austria’s	  former	  glory,	  Wilhelm	  had	  to	  be	  convinced	  of	  the	  truth,	  that	  Austria	  had	  become	  militarily	  and	  economically	  outmatched	  by	  Prussia.	  Bismarck	  also	  enlisted	  the	  help	  of	  the	  recently	  unified	  Italians,	  who	  were	  still	  fighting	  to	  expel	  the	  Hapsburgs	  from	  northern	  Italy,	  to	  help	  split	  the	  Austria’s	  military	  forces.	  Bismarck	  also	  secured	  neutrality	  from	  the	  French	  who	  were	  happy	  the	  slight	  the	  Hapsburg.	  Lastly,	  Bismarck	  contacted	  the	  Russians,	  who,	  disapproving	  of	  Austria’s	  position	  during	  the	  Crimean	  war	  and	  owing	  a	  favor	  to	  Prussia	  for	  helping	  quell	  a	  Polish	  revolt,	  agreed	  to	  back	  the	  Prussians.	  Britain,	  as	  always,	  had	  little	  interest	  in	  continental	  affairs.104	  Thus,	  before	  the	  war	  had	  even	  begun,	  Bismarck	  secured	  safety	  on	  his	  western,	  northern,	  and	  eastern	  borders	  and	  had	  guaranteed	  a	  war	  on	  two	  opposite	  fronts	  for	  Austria.	  Bismarck	  was	  securing	  military	  gains	  through	  political	  means,	  an	  impressive	  feat	  of	  Clausewitz’s	  theory	  that	  war	  must	  remain	  subordinate	  to	  politics.	  In	  addition	  to	  allied	  and	  geographic	  advantage,	  the	  Prussia	  had	  three	  technological	  advantages.	  The	  first	  was	  organization;	  the	  Prussian	  Conscription	  Reform	  of	  1862	  both	  increased	  the	  size	  and	  organized	  the	  conscription	  process.	  The	  second	  was	  railways;	  the	  design	  of	  Prussia’s	  newly	  extensive	  rail	  system	  had	  been	  influenced	  by	  the	  military	  and	  made	  transporting	  troops	  to	  key	  strategic	  positions	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easy	  and	  augmented	  the	  speed	  of	  conscription.	  The	  third	  was	  the	  needle	  rifle;	  highly	  effective	  in	  the	  Schleswig	  War,	  the	  needle	  gun	  was	  breach	  loading,	  which	  allowed	  soldiers	  to	  reload	  more	  quickly	  and	  without	  standing	  up	  from	  behind	  cover.	  Interestingly,	  the	  Austrians	  had	  the	  artillery	  advantage;	  both	  in	  numbers	  and	  technology,	  as	  Austria’s	  artillery	  was	  breach	  loading	  while	  Prussia’s	  was	  not.105	  Politics	  and	  technology	  primed,	  Bismarck	  simply	  needed	  an	  acceptable	  political	  reason	  to	  spark	  the	  powder	  keg.	  His	  opportunity	  came	  when	  Austrian	  attempted	  to	  have	  the	  German	  confederation	  mediate	  the	  conflict,	  which	  Bismarck	  was	  encouraging,	  about	  the	  governance	  of	  Schleswig	  and	  Holstein.	  Bismarck	  found	  this	  to	  be	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Gastein	  Convention,	  an	  agreement	  between	  only	  Prussia	  and	  Austria,	  in	  which	  the	  third	  party	  of	  the	  German	  Confederation	  had	  no	  place.	  According	  to	  Bismarck	  this	  violation	  effectively	  voided	  the	  Gastein	  Convention	  and	  Prussia	  promptly	  invaded	  Holstein.	  In	  response,	  Austria,	  supported	  by	  the	  middle	  German	  States,	  convinced	  the	  German	  Confederation	  to	  raise	  arms	  against	  he	  Prussian,	  at	  which	  point	  Bismarck	  declared	  the	  German	  Confederation	  abolished.106	  Again,	  Bismarck	  extended	  war	  as	  a	  means	  of	  politics.	  Incredibly,	  Bismarck	  had	  secured	  the	  ends,	  the	  destruction	  of	  non-­‐unifiers	  found	  in	  Austria,	  the	  small	  middle	  German	  States,	  and	  in	  the	  German	  confederation;	  and	  had	  secured	  the	  means,	  a	  controlled	  war	  in	  which	  Prussia	  had	  superior	  allied	  and	  military	  power.	  Bismarck’s	  politico-­‐military	  strategy	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  Austrio-­‐Prussian	  War	  can	  only	  be	  matched	  by	  men	  such	  as	  Julius	  Caesar	  and	  the	  evil,	  but	  undeniably	  brilliant,	  Adolf	  Hitler.	  However,	  while	  Caesar	  was	  assassinated	  by	  his	  compatriots	  and,	  thankfully,	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Hitler’s	  brilliance	  transformed	  into	  self	  destructive	  insanity;	  Bismarck	  died	  with	  his	  dreams	  intact,	  only	  having	  to	  endure	  bitterness	  towards	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  the	  II,	  who	  ultimately	  died	  an	  exile.	  In	  hindsight,	  it	  seems	  Bismarck	  will	  always	  have	  the	  last	  laugh.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Fittingly,	  conservative	  Austria,	  still	  bitter	  of	  its	  loss	  of	  the	  territory	  in	  1740,	  assembled	  its	  troops	  to	  retake	  the	  Prussian	  province	  of	  Silesia.	  Prussian	  forces	  under	  Helmuth	  von	  Moltke	  traveled	  to	  Selisia,	  fighting	  small	  skirmishes	  against	  the	  Austrians	  and	  Saxons	  along	  the	  way.	  Finally	  the	  two	  forces	  met	  near	  Konniggratz	  and	  Sadova	  on	  July	  3,	  1866.	  The	  setting	  was	  evenly	  balanced,	  even	  though	  the	  sides	  were	  not	  evenly	  matched	  in	  any	  single	  criteria.	  When	  the	  battle	  began	  Prussia	  had	  roughly	  half	  as	  many	  troops	  as	  Austria	  (250,000	  v.	  124,000).107	  The	  Austrians	  would	  have	  had	  greater	  numbers,	  but,	  as	  Bismarck	  had	  hoped,	  the	  Italians	  had	  tied	  up	  75,000	  Austrian	  troops	  in	  the	  Battle	  of	  Castoza	  in	  Northern	  Italy.	  A	  battle,	  which	  the	  Italians	  lost,	  but	  interestingly,	  was	  also	  the	  one	  that	  won	  them	  the	  war.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Prussian’s	  had	  100,000	  soldiers	  making	  swift	  time	  towards	  the	  battle	  on	  trains,	  who	  arrived	  part	  way	  through	  to	  turn	  the	  tide.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  two	  forces	  were	  roughly	  equal	  in	  armament,	  again	  by	  different	  criteria.	  The	  Prussians	  had	  side	  arm	  superiority	  with	  the	  needle	  gun,	  but	  the	  Austrians	  clearly	  had	  the	  advantage	  in	  numbers	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  artillery.108	  	  Early	  in	  the	  Battle	  Prussian	  managed	  to	  take	  the	  town	  of	  Sedova,	  but	  then	  become	  pinned	  by	  intense	  Austrian	  artillery	  fire.	  The	  Austrians	  then	  faced	  the	  decision	  of	  how	  to	  take	  control	  of	  Sedova.	  They	  could	  have	  used	  their	  extensive	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cavalry,	  but	  feared	  losses	  due	  to	  the	  wooded	  battlefield,	  which	  disadvantaged	  horses.	  Instead,	  the	  Austrians	  opted	  for	  a	  solely	  infantry	  advance.	  The	  Austrians	  quickly	  feel	  victim	  to	  the	  superior	  needle	  gun	  and	  the	  tide	  definitively	  turned	  when	  the	  missing	  Prussian	  army	  arrived	  later	  in	  the	  day.	  As	  the	  fresh	  Prussian	  force	  pushed	  in	  from	  the	  right	  flank	  the	  Austrians	  retreated.	  Killed,	  captured,	  injured,	  and	  missing	  totaled	  40,000	  Austrians,	  compared	  to	  only	  9,000	  Prussians.	  Austria	  was	  definitively	  defeated.109	  In	  traditional	  European	  fashion,	  King	  Wilhelm	  and	  the	  Prussian	  generals	  wanted	  to	  push	  to	  Vienna	  and	  completely	  topple	  the	  Austrians,	  but	  Bismarck	  disagreed.	  Bismarck’s	  Clausewitzesque	  argument	  was	  threefold:	  first,	  capturing	  Vienna	  would	  anger	  the	  Austrians	  and	  created	  long	  term	  resistance;	  second,	  Prussia	  did	  not	  have	  the	  strength	  to	  invade	  Austria’s	  south	  German	  allies,	  whom	  Bismarck,	  amongst	  many,	  hoped	  to	  incorporate	  into	  a	  unified	  Germany;	  last,	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  war	  had	  been	  achieved:	  Austria	  was	  removed	  from	  Germany,	  Prussia	  linked	  to	  its	  enclave	  with	  the	  capture	  of	  Hanover,	  and	  Prussia	  captured	  the	  financial	  and	  political	  hub	  of	  Frankfurt.	  Convinced,	  Wilhelm	  solidified	  peace	  three	  weeks	  later	  with	  the	  Prague	  Armistice.110	  	  	   	  German	  nationalism	  was	  on	  the	  rise,	  especially	  in	  Prussia.	  Having	  removed	  Austria,	  Bismarck	  knew	  that	  domestic	  power	  amongst	  the	  German	  speaking	  states	  had	  greatly	  shifted.	  Thus,	  Bismarck	  shifted	  his	  focus	  to	  domestic	  issues.	  Fittingly,	  the	  evolution	  of	  power	  at	  Koeniggratz	  was	  matched,	  on	  the	  same	  day,	  in	  the	  Prussian	  parliament.	  An	  election	  took	  place,	  in	  which	  the	  progressive	  lost	  control	  of	  parliament.	  Bismarck	  could	  have	  taken	  the	  opportunity	  to	  pass	  authoritarian	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restrictions	  on	  the	  constitution	  and	  take	  control	  of	  taxing	  power,	  but	  did	  not.	  Bismarck	  knew	  that	  a	  free	  middle	  class	  was	  key	  to	  modern	  society	  and	  that	  creating	  internal	  strife	  amongst	  so	  many	  foreign	  wars	  would	  cause	  disaster.111	  Instead,	  Bismarck	  expanded	  Prussia’s	  political	  powers	  amongst	  the	  German	  States	  by	  creating	  the	  North	  German	  Confederation	  which	  is	  discuss	  in	  section	  6.	  	  	  	   After	  the	  war,	  Austria,	  realizing	  it	  was	  overstretched,	  surrendered	  territory	  to	  the	  Italians	  and	  though	  the	  Empire	  stayed	  together,	  domestic	  politics	  began	  to	  fragment.	  Interestingly,	  as	  the	  age	  old	  Hapsburg	  dynasty	  began	  to	  fall	  apart,	  only	  France	  seemed	  to	  mind.	  Not	  because	  Napoleon	  III	  valued	  the	  Austrians,	  but	  instead	  because	  France	  feared	  the	  rising	  tide	  of	  Prussian	  power.	  Napoleon	  was	  losing	  political	  power.	  A	  new	  French	  parliament	  had	  been	  elected	  and	  the	  constitution	  of	  1870	  was	  taking	  effect,	  thus	  the	  people,	  and	  their	  ever-­‐increasing	  sense	  of	  nationalism,	  began	  to	  sway	  Napoleon.	  Feeling	  threatened,	  the	  new	  government	  copied	  Bismarck	  and	  initiated	  military	  reforms	  to	  enlarge	  and	  modernize	  the	  army.	  However,	  France	  failed	  to	  secure	  allies	  in	  the	  Bismarckian	  fashion.	  The	  Italians	  were	  disenchanted	  with	  the	  French	  due	  to	  their	  defense	  of	  the	  Pope	  and	  the	  Hungarians	  were	  discouraged	  the	  Austrians	  from	  joining	  the	  French.112	  As	  Bismarck	  saw,	  and	  would	  exploit	  in	  the	  imminent	  war,	  France	  was	  larger	  and	  more	  powerful	  but,	  unorganized	  and	  poorly	  led.	  	  	   Bismarck	  had	  five	  reasons	  for	  wanting	  to	  engage	  in	  war	  with	  France.	  The	  seminal	  reason	  was	  that	  Bismarck	  and	  Wilhelm	  feared	  Napoleon’s	  voiced	  want	  to	  diminish	  German	  power.	  Germany,	  they	  knew,	  was	  still	  in	  the	  position	  to	  possibly	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become	  a	  subordinate	  European	  client	  state.	  The	  next	  three	  reasons	  concerned	  timing;	  Bismarck	  wanted	  military	  support	  from	  the	  south	  German	  states	  whose	  sympathetic	  pro-­‐unification	  governments	  seemed	  to	  be	  losing	  power,	  the	  Hungarians	  seemed	  to	  be	  losing	  influence	  on	  the	  Austrians,	  and	  the	  French	  military	  reforms	  had	  not	  fully	  developed	  yet.	  The	  fifth,	  and	  final,	  reason	  was	  that	  Bismarck	  knew	  from	  Schleswig	  and	  Konniggratz	  that	  Prussia	  was	  in	  peak	  fighting	  condition.113	  Again	  Bismarck	  was	  following	  a	  Clausewitz	  style	  of	  thought.	  By	  considering	  the	  political	  position	  of	  the	  entirety	  of	  Europe	  Bismarck	  realized	  that	  the	  best	  political	  option	  was	  the	  engage	  in	  a	  decisive,	  restricted	  war	  to	  announce	  and	  secure	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  German	  nation.	  	  	   Cleverly,	  Bismarck	  exploited	  the	  traditional	  flaws	  in	  the	  Europe	  political	  scene	  to	  launch	  the	  German	  Revolution.	  With	  the	  abdication	  of	  Queen	  Isabella	  of	  Spain,	  the	  throne	  was	  offered	  to	  German	  Prince	  Leopold	  Hohenzollern.	  Enraged	  by	  this	  German	  encroachment	  in	  France’s	  sphere	  of	  influence,	  Napoleon	  accused	  Bismarck	  and	  indirectly	  related	  King	  Wilhelm	  Hohenzollern	  of	  plotting	  against	  France.	  Bismarck	  and	  Wilhelm	  thoroughly	  denied	  the	  claims	  and	  the	  other	  European	  states	  disapproved	  of	  Napoleon’s	  demand	  that	  Prussia	  withdraw	  Leopold’s	  bid	  and	  promise	  to	  never	  claim	  the	  Spanish	  thrown	  in	  the	  future.	  Though	  Wilhelm	  did	  eventually	  officially	  withdraw,	  documents	  were	  found	  post	  WWII	  proving	  that	  Bismarck	  had	  instructed	  Wilhelm	  to	  encourage	  Leopold’s	  father	  to	  have	  Leopold	  pursue	  the	  Spanish	  thrown.114	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Despite	  Wilhelm’s	  withdrawal,	  France	  still	  wanted	  a	  guarantee	  that	  no	  future	  claims	  would	  be	  made	  to	  the	  Spanish	  thrown.	  Wilhelm,	  a	  stern	  military	  man,	  became	  so	  annoyed	  with	  the	  Spanish	  ambassador,	  who	  was	  acting	  as	  the	  mouthpiece	  of	  the	  French,	  that	  he	  had	  a	  noncommissioned	  officer	  inform	  the	  ambassador	  that	  no	  such	  agreement	  would	  ever	  be	  made.	  This	  event,	  which	  to	  modern	  eyes	  may	  seem	  little	  more	  than	  a	  petty	  slight,	  was	  taken	  so	  personally	  by	  Napoleon	  that	  he	  declared	  war.115	  Napoleon	  III,	  poked	  and	  prodded	  by	  Bismarck,	  had	  started	  what	  would	  become	  the	  bloodiest	  European	  conflict	  since	  the	  defeat	  of	  Napoleon	  Bonaparte	  and	  second	  only	  to	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  as	  bloodiest	  in	  the	  19th	  century.116	  As	  both	  forces	  mobilized,	  it	  quickly	  became	  apparent	  that	  the	  Germans	  had	  a	  significant	  advantage.	  The	  German	  states	  quickly	  gathered	  a	  force	  of	  one	  million	  men,	  half	  of	  which	  were	  immediately	  armed	  and	  sent	  to	  the	  French	  front	  by	  rail.	  The	  French	  mobilization	  went	  slowly	  and	  chaotically,	  producing	  only	  250,000	  poorly	  supplied	  soldiers.117	  Interestingly	  the	  French	  did	  have	  one	  supply	  advantage	  that	  had	  always	  gone	  to	  the	  Prussians	  in	  the	  past	  two	  wars,	  superior	  side	  arms.	  The	  Prussian	  Needle	  Gun	  was	  prone	  to	  spitting	  flame	  from	  its	  breach	  after	  limited	  use.	  This	  made	  the	  rifle	  dangerous	  to	  shoot	  from	  the	  shoulder,	  meaning	  many	  soldiers	  began	  firing	  from	  the	  hip.	  The	  French	  Chassepot	  rifle	  was	  also	  breach	  loading	  but	  was	  fitted	  with	  a	  far	  better	  seal	  between	  the	  barrel	  and	  the	  cartridge;	  making	  the	  rifle	  more	  easily	  aimed,	  safer,	  and	  more	  reliable.	  Impressed,	  the	  Germans	  captured	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and	  utilized	  large	  number	  of	  the	  Chassepot	  Rifle	  during	  the	  war.118	  Instead,	  the	  Prussians	  seemed	  to	  have	  focused	  on	  lessons	  learned	  during	  the	  Austrio-­‐Prussian	  War	  and	  armed	  themselves	  with	  the	  new	  Krupps	  artillery	  gun;	  breach	  loading,	  the	  Krupps	  could	  shoot	  further	  and	  faster	  than	  the	  French	  arsenal	  of	  brass	  cannon.119	  The	  Germans	  also	  held	  the	  advantage	  in	  administration.	  As	  shown	  during	  the	  mobilization,	  France	  was	  unorganized,	  a	  fact	  augmented	  by	  Napoleon	  III’s	  ever	  worsening	  illness.	  Last,	  the	  German	  forces	  held	  superior	  moral.	  As	  proven	  during	  the	  war,	  even	  far	  outnumbered	  Prussian	  regiments	  fought	  were	  such	  fervor	  that	  they	  came	  out	  victorious.120	  	  	  The	  Germans	  quickly	  advanced	  to	  besiege	  the	  fortress	  of	  Metz.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  conflict	  occurred	  in	  and	  around	  Metz.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  battle	  of	  Mars-­‐la-­‐tour,	  here	  a	  French	  force	  of	  150,000	  hoped	  to	  relieve	  Metz	  from	  its	  siege	  with	  a	  large	  flanking	  maneuver;	  however,	  the	  French	  were	  spotted	  by	  a	  Prussian	  force	  of	  only	  30,000.	  In	  George	  S.	  Patton	  fashion,	  the	  inferior	  force	  leapt	  onto	  the	  offensive.	  Incredibly,	  despite	  heavily	  losses	  the	  Prussian	  delayed	  the	  French,	  winning	  the	  battle	  despite	  5-­‐1	  odds.	  Three	  days	  later	  the	  largest	  battle	  took	  place,	  Gravelotte.	  Here,	  112,000	  French	  battled	  188,000	  mixed	  Germans.	  Battling	  against	  well-­‐fortified	  French,	  the	  Germans	  took	  greater	  losses,	  but	  won	  the	  battles	  objective,	  to	  split	  the	  French	  armies.121	  French	  Marshell	  Bazaine	  and	  his	  men	  were	  not	  pinned	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relieve	  Metz,	  but	  was	  horribly	  and	  decisively	  beaten	  at	  Sedan.	  In	  Sedan,	  the	  Krupp	  Gun	  came	  into	  its	  element,	  shelling	  the	  pinned	  French	  with	  devastating	  effect.122	  Eventually,	  100,000	  French	  surrendered	  at	  Sedan,	  including	  Napoleon	  III	  and,	  two	  months	  later,	  were	  joined	  by	  180,000	  capitulators	  from	  Metz.	  The	  final	  tally	  comes	  to	  140,000	  French	  dead	  and	  an	  equal	  number	  wounded;	  compared	  to	  only,	  45,000	  German	  dead	  and	  70,000	  wounded.123	  	  The	  war	  was	  effectively	  decided,	  but	  the	  fighting	  did	  not	  end.	  Fueled	  by	  nationalism	  the	  French	  republicans	  deposed	  Napoleon	  and	  took	  control	  of	  Paris,	  raising	  a	  force	  of	  500,000	  men.	  The	  French	  met	  great	  success	  by	  attacking	  the	  spread	  out	  Germans	  from	  small	  pockets	  of	  resistance.	  However,	  eventually	  they	  grew	  bold,	  were	  drawn	  into	  the	  field,	  and	  were	  decidedly	  crushed	  by	  the	  better	  trained,	  equipped,	  and	  organized	  Germans.124	  	  Now	  the	  political	  war	  began	  for	  Bismarck,	  he	  faced	  political	  opposition	  in	  Germany	  and	  political	  chaos	  in	  Paris.	  At	  home	  Bismarck	  played	  political	  tug	  of	  war	  with	  Moltke.	  Moltke	  was	  tired	  of	  Bismarck	  intervening	  in	  his	  attempts	  to	  supremely	  dominate	  countries.	  Bismarck,	  aware	  that	  such	  a	  complete	  victory	  would	  result	  in	  future	  conflict,	  became	  excluded	  from	  military	  reports	  and	  meetings.	  At	  first	  Bismarck	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  this	  denial,	  however	  as	  the	  war	  drew	  to	  a	  close,	  Bismarck	  grew	  increasing	  concerned	  about	  peace.	  Soon,	  Bismarck	  convinced	  Wilhelm	  to	  issue	  two	  royal	  decrees.	  The	  first	  stipulated	  the	  Moltke	  have	  no	  correspondence	  with	  the	  French	  without	  consulting	  Bismarck.	  The	  second,	  no	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military	  action	  should	  be	  taken	  with	  the	  comment	  of	  Bismarck.	  Soon,	  Bismarck	  had	  soul	  control	  of	  the	  negotiations.	  Prussia’s	  winnings:	  the	  province	  of	  Alsace	  and	  Lorraine	  and	  German	  military	  presence	  in	  France	  until	  the	  payment	  of	  a	  five	  billion	  franc	  war	  indemnity.125	  	  Section	  10:	  Political	  Change	  during	  the	  Wars	  of	  Unification	  	  Following	  the	  Austro-­‐Prussian	  war,	  months	  of	  development	  produced	  the	  North	  German	  Constitution	  in	  July	  1867.126	  Made	  up	  of	  22	  separate	  states,	  the	  Confederation	  interacted	  far	  more	  as	  a	  single	  state	  that	  any	  past	  German	  organizations	  had.127	  The	  universal	  male	  suffrage	  parliament	  was	  given	  real	  powers,	  though	  it	  was	  heavily	  checked	  by	  Prussian	  dominance.	  The	  position	  of	  President	  of	  the	  Confederation	  was	  filled	  by	  the	  King	  of	  Prussia,	  King	  Wilhelm.	  The	  President	  controlled	  the	  joint	  confederate	  army	  and	  could	  summon	  or	  dissolve	  the	  Reichstag.	  
128	  The	  second	  highest	  office,	  Federal	  Chancellor,	  needed	  to	  undersign	  all	  documents	  before	  they	  became	  constitutional.	  The	  German	  Emperor	  chose	  the	  Federal	  Chancellor,	  Wilhelm	  chose	  Bismarck.	  Interestingly,	  upon	  signing	  an	  imperial	  order	  the	  Federal	  Chancellor	  assumed	  “responsibility”	  for	  it.129	  Vague	  at	  best,	  this	  check	  and	  balance	  does	  give	  an	  interesting	  line	  of	  blame	  and	  shows	  how	  confident	  Bismarck	  was.	  	  The	  bicameral	  parliament	  did	  share	  the	  important	  power	  of	  being	  able	  to	  approve	  or	  veto	  laws.	  Also,	  the	  lower	  house	  (Reichstag)	  had	  control	  of	  the	  purse	  and	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the	  higher	  house	  (Bundesrat)	  had	  to	  approve	  amendments.130	  Bismarck	  checked	  these	  powers	  in	  strangely	  progressive	  ways.	  He	  manipulated	  the	  lower	  house	  by	  allowing	  universal	  male	  suffrage,	  hoping	  to	  bypass	  the	  liberal	  upper	  and	  middle	  classes	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  larger,	  more	  conservative	  lower	  classes.131	  The	  upper	  house	  was	  made	  up	  of	  appointed	  officials	  from	  every	  member	  state,	  but	  Prussia,	  with	  17	  of	  the	  43	  seats,	  was	  easily	  the	  strongest	  party.132	  Despite	  all	  of	  these	  seemingly	  oppressive	  conditions,	  the	  North	  German	  Confederation	  was	  very	  liberal	  for	  its	  time.	  Especially,	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  south	  German	  states.133	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Then,	  on	  January	  18,	  1871,	  all	  of	  a	  sudden	  Germany	  was	  unified.	  In	  the	  Hall	  of	  Mirrors	  in	  the	  Palace	  of	  Versaille	  Bismark	  declared	  that	  the	  North	  German	  Confederation	  officially	  extended	  to	  the	  southern	  German	  States;	  there	  was	  no	  resistance,	  the	  German	  Empire	  was	  created.	  King	  Wilhelm	  now	  became	  the	  German	  Emperor.	  A	  title	  specifically	  phrased	  differently	  from	  “Emperor	  of	  Germany”.134	  Wilhelm	  did	  not	  own	  or	  rule	  over	  Germany,	  he	  represented	  it.	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  German	  Emperor	  Wilhelm	  I	  is	  the	  first	  official	  symbol	  of	  what	  being	  “German”	  meant.	  Yet,	  it	  is	  not	  Wilhelm,	  but	  Otto	  von	  Bismarck	  who	  is	  the	  looming	  German	  figure	  in	  this	  time	  period.	  As	  Bismarck	  is	  so	  often	  quoted,	  “[p]eople	  cannot	  create	  or	  divert	  the	  stream	  of	  time.”135	  Bismarck	  understood	  that	  Europe	  was	  liberalizing.	  Young	  in	  his	  life	  he	  understood	  that	  regardless	  of	  his	  feelings	  on	  the	  matter,	  the	  masses	  were	  slowing	  rising	  and	  their	  opinion	  becoming	  evermore	  important.	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Perhaps,	  he	  learned	  this	  lesson	  when	  he	  unsuccessfully	  attempted	  to	  rally	  the	  peasants	  in	  name	  of	  the	  King	  in	  1848.	  Perhaps,	  the	  other	  thing	  he	  learned	  from	  1848	  was	  that	  control	  could	  be	  brought	  to	  chaotic	  public	  opinion.	  Just	  as	  Camphausen	  and	  Hansemann	  had	  made	  concessions,	  but	  in	  a	  structure	  manner	  that	  limited	  internal	  strife	  in	  1848.	  Incredibly,	  Bismarck	  managed	  to	  unify	  the	  German	  states	  and	  almost	  none	  were	  fought	  into	  joining	  the	  Empire.	  In	  fairness,	  it	  must	  be	  mentioned	  that	  a	  hand	  full	  of	  smaller	  states,	  Hanover	  and	  Frankfurt	  most	  notable	  among	  them,	  were	  forcibly	  annexed	  by	  Prussia	  for	  backing	  Austria	  in	  1866.	  However,	  these	  smaller	  skirmishes	  were	  small	  and	  few,	  certainly	  nothing	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  domestic	  differences	  in	  America.	  	  
Chapter	  III:	  
Economic,	  Political,	  and	  Cultural	  Legacy	  
	  	   The	  following	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  achievements	  of	  1815-­‐1871.	  The	  analysis	  is	  broken	  into	  three	  sections:	  economics,	  politics,	  and	  culture.	  	  Section	  1:	  Post-­‐Unification	  Economic	  Development	  	  	  Following	  a	  short	  boom	  and	  bust	  between	  1871-­‐1876	  Germany	  experienced	  extensive	  growth,	  eventually	  dominating	  two	  industries,	  chemical	  and	  electrochemical.	  However,	  before	  these	  industries	  could	  be	  developed,	  Germany	  was	  retested	  on	  a	  subject	  it	  had	  previously	  passed,	  economic	  crises.	  	  In	  1869	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  opened,	  augmenting	  the	  general	  economic	  growth	  that	  Europe	  was	  experiencing.	  In	  1871,	  the	  British	  The	  Times	  announced	  its	  “undisturbed	  satisfaction”	  with	  the	  British	  economy	  and	  Britain’s	  “extending	  and	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multiplying	  [of]	  its	  world-­‐wide	  ramifications.”136	  The	  North	  German	  Confederation,	  experiencing	  similar	  growth,	  passed	  the	  Company	  Law	  of	  1870,	  removing	  the	  requirement	  of	  state	  approval	  to	  found	  new	  joint	  stock	  companies.	  The	  effects	  were	  immediate.	  Between	  1869-­‐1872	  120	  new	  credit	  banks	  were	  established	  in	  what	  became	  Germany.	  Growth	  was	  most	  stunning	  in	  Prussia.	  Between	  mid-­‐1870	  and	  mid-­‐1873	  1,000	  new	  companies	  were	  founded.	  Alone	  in	  1872,	  21	  construction	  companies,	  49	  banks,	  and	  12	  railways	  were	  founded	  in	  Prussian.137	  This	  time	  period	  saw	  the	  creation	  of	  many	  extremely	  successful	  companies,	  such	  as	  Deutsche	  Bank	  but	  many	  were	  also	  risky	  business	  ventures.	  Interestingly,	  though	  the	  Germans	  criticized	  the	  Americans	  in	  1857,	  the	  opposite	  was	  true	  in	  1873.	  	  Bankers,	  large	  and	  small,	  have	  had	  no	  scruple	  against	  burdening	  the	  public	  with	  shares	  in	  all	  sorts	  of	  enterprises,	  selling	  the	  same	  at	  par	  and	  at	  a	  premium,	  when	  the	  intrinsic	  value	  was	  never	  more	  than	  50	  or	  60	  per	  cent….those	  German	  bankers,	  who,	  from	  a	  desire	  to	  make	  large	  gains,	  were	  influenced	  to	  wink	  at	  the	  flimsy	  nature	  of	  many	  of	  the	  securities	  which	  they	  assisted	  to	  float	  in	  the	  market.138	  	  	  Even	  Hansemann	  and	  his	  Diskontogesellschaft	  participated	  in	  this	  speculation	  boom.139	  In	  Henderson’s	  words,	  “[g]ambling	  on	  the	  stock	  exchange	  and	  the	  property	  market	  became	  a	  national	  pastime.”140	  Heinrich	  von	  Treitschke	  gave	  an	  even	  more	  negatively	  toned,	  first	  hand,	  view	  “during	  the	  speculation	  mania,	  it	  really	  seemed	  as	  if	  the	  limits	  of	  human	  folly	  had	  been	  immeasurably	  extended.”141	  Germany	  was	  suffering	  from	  amnesia;	  it	  had	  forgotten	  the	  prudence	  that	  had	  saved	  it	  in	  1857.	  Luckily,	  this	  forgetfulness	  was	  not	  all	  encompassing,	  as	  proven	  by	  the	  Treitschke	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quote	  above,	  not	  all	  politicians	  and	  businessmen	  were	  fooled	  by	  the	  guise	  of	  economic	  boom.	  	  Frederic	  Engels	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  document	  the	  impending	  danger.	  In	  September	  1869	  Engels	  accused	  one	  of	  Germany’s	  greatest	  entrepreneurs	  Dr.	  Strousberg:	  “[h]is	  guiding	  principle	  is	  to	  swindle	  investors,	  while	  acting	  fairly	  towards	  his	  suppliers	  and	  other	  industrialists.”142	  Engels	  was	  referring	  to	  Strousberg’s	  practice	  of	  receiving	  many	  small	  investments	  from	  several	  investors	  as	  opposed	  to	  receiving	  backing	  from	  large	  financial	  institutions.	  Strousberg,	  who	  controlled	  large	  amounts	  of	  railways	  and	  other	  industrial	  facilities,	  suffered	  huge	  loss	  with	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  Franco-­‐Prussian	  War.	  When	  Otto	  Glagau	  exposed	  Strousberg	  in	  Die	  Gartenlaube	  in	  1874,	  the	  façade	  collapse.	  Strousberg,	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  financially	  support	  his	  railroad	  ventures	  in	  Russia,	  landed	  in	  Moscow	  Debtors	  prison	  and	  died	  impoverished.143	  Prima	  facia	  the	  reason	  for	  these	  risky	  business	  practices	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  removal	  of	  state	  authority	  with	  the	  1870	  Company	  Law.	  Given	  freedom,	  capitalist	  have	  a	  bad	  habit	  of	  pursuing	  high	  risk,	  high	  reward	  business.	  However,	  the	  problem	  was	  far	  more	  pervasive	  as	  proven	  by	  Eduard	  Laskar	  and	  his	  stunning	  1873	  exposé.	  On	  February	  7	  Laskar	  gave	  a	  three-­‐hour	  speech	  to	  the	  lower	  house	  of	  the	  German	  parliament	  exposing	  the	  economic	  corruption	  in	  the	  German	  government.	  He	  named	  several	  officials	  and	  accused	  them	  of	  purposefully	  turning	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  non-­‐regulation	  business	  practices.	  The	  speech,	  popularized	  by	  a	  pamphlet,	  inspired	  a	  royal	  commission	  to	  investigate.	  In	  the	  following	  56	  sessions	  the	  commission	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investigated	  26	  railway	  companies	  and	  discovered	  numerous	  violations.	  The	  result	  was	  the	  complete	  dismissal	  an	  on	  official	  and	  the	  reassignment	  of	  another.144	  This	  investigation	  and	  the	  previous	  exposés	  show	  how	  risky	  business	  practices	  had	  become	  acceptable	  in	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sector.	  	  The	  above	  incidents	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  all	  together	  negatively.	  First,	  the	  Germans	  understood	  what	  good	  business	  practices	  were;	  meaning	  the	  Germans	  were	  not	  hindered	  by	  the	  normal	  hurdle	  facing	  developing	  industries:	  lack	  of	  scientific	  knowledge,	  technical	  expertise	  or	  industrial	  facilities.	  Instead,	  many	  Germans	  suffered	  from	  capitalistic	  greediness.	  As	  Engels,	  Glagau,	  and	  Laskar	  show,	  there	  were	  many	  Germans	  in	  positions	  of	  power	  that	  perfectly	  understood	  the	  mechanics	  of	  an	  industrialized	  economy.	  This	  fact	  is	  further	  proven	  by	  the	  survival	  of	  stable	  companies	  such	  as	  Siemens	  and	  Deutsche	  Bank,	  which	  survived	  the	  economic	  crises.	  Second,	  Germany	  was	  hit	  by	  bust	  at	  an	  extremely	  exposed	  time	  and	  managed	  to	  recover	  in	  only	  4	  years.	  The	  collapse	  hit	  during	  a	  trifecta	  of	  economic	  vulnerability.	  Leading	  up	  to	  1873,	  Germany	  was	  receiving	  a	  war	  indemnity	  from	  France,	  which	  was	  paid	  off	  2	  years	  early	  and	  of	  which	  very	  little	  was	  put	  into	  state	  savings.	  Instead,	  the	  state	  opted	  for	  extensive	  spending	  on	  both	  employee	  bonuses	  and	  government	  subsidies.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  flood	  of	  money,	  both	  directly	  and	  indirectly,	  into	  the	  German	  economy.	  This	  was	  augmented	  by	  the	  second	  weakness,	  the	  botched	  currency	  exchange	  following	  unification.	  As	  Germany	  switch	  from	  thalers	  to	  marks	  both	  remained	  in	  circulation,	  causing	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  circulating	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cash145.	  The	  resulting	  tenacious	  optimism	  directly	  caused	  widespread	  precarious	  investments.	  The	  subsequent	  inflation	  then	  collapsed	  in	  1873.	  On	  May	  8th	  1873	  the	  Austrian	  economy	  collapsed,	  soon	  300	  companies	  failed	  in	  Austria	  alone.	  On	  October	  28,	  1873	  the	  crises	  officially	  spread	  to	  Germany	  with	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Quistrop	  Bank.	  27	  other	  banks	  reacted	  quickly	  by	  suspending	  payments,	  14	  never	  reactivated.146	  So,	  why	  does	  this	  economic	  crises	  stick	  out	  from	  1848	  and	  1857?	  The	  1873	  crises	  was	  not	  defined	  by	  political	  upheaval	  like	  1848	  or	  caused	  by	  agricultural	  fluctuations,	  such	  as	  in	  both	  1848	  and	  1857.	  Germany	  had	  successful	  stabilized	  these	  problems.	  The	  new	  issue	  presented	  in	  1873	  was:	  self-­‐caused	  economic	  crises.	  The	  1873	  crises	  was	  the	  first	  followed	  by	  a	  spike	  in	  suicides	  and	  mass	  fleeing	  of	  corrupt	  cashiers,	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  widespread	  deceitfulness	  of	  many	  Germans.	  1873	  was	  not	  a	  test	  of	  the	  German	  politico-­‐economic	  skill;	  instead,	  it	  tested	  Germany’s	  character,	  its	  Volkgeist.	  After	  1873	  Germany	  refused	  to	  become	  a	  gilded	  economy	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States,	  it	  decided	  to	  be	  defined	  by	  diligence,	  creativity,	  and	  innovation.	  Instead	  of	  competing	  in	  a	  laissez	  faire	  economy,	  German	  companies	  formed	  cartels.	  These	  amalgamations	  of	  Germany	  companies	  eliminated	  overlaps	  in	  research	  and	  development.147	  Each	  company	  had	  a	  specialized	  field	  of	  research.	  Thus,	  innovation	  efficiency	  was	  maximized	  across	  entire	  German	  industries;	  the	  only	  competition	  came	  from	  abroad.	  Between	  1876	  and	  the	  early	  1900s	  the	  diligence	  of	  large	  German	  companies	  grew	  Germany	  from	  a	  fledgling	  industry	  to	  the	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leading	  industrial	  power	  in	  the	  leading	  scientific	  fields.	  Thereby	  defining	  “Made	  In	  Germany”	  as	  an	  emblem	  of	  excellent	  quality.	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  industries	  that	  proved	  Germany	  not	  only	  equal,	  but	  also	  better	  were	  Chemicals	  and	  Electro-­‐Mechanical.	  By	  1913	  Germany	  was	  producing	  ¾	  of	  the	  world’s	  color	  dyes	  with	  an	  export	  worth	  of	  roughly	  195	  Million	  marks.	  British	  political	  economist	  Dr.	  John	  Bowring	  in	  1840	  explained	  that	  “chemical	  research	  in	  its	  various	  branches	  is	  further	  advanced	  than	  with	  us.”148	  The	  Electro-­‐Mechanical	  Industry	  was	  even	  larger,	  controlled	  ½	  the	  world	  industry	  with	  and	  export	  worth	  of	  220	  Million	  marks	  by	  1913.	  British	  Economic	  Historian	  J.H.	  Clapham	  proclaimed	  that,	  “beyond	  question	  the	  creation	  of	  this	  industry	  was	  the	  greatest	  single	  achievement	  of	  modern	  Germany….	  Her	  success	  was	  rewarded	  by	  a	  foreign	  trade	  in	  electrical	  appliances	  which	  no	  other	  nation	  could	  approach.”149	  	   Germany’s	  chemical	  industry	  was	  made	  successful	  by	  two	  factors.	  The	  first	  was	  luck,	  Germany	  possessed	  extensive	  materials	  needed	  for	  the	  chemicals	  industry.	  This	  included:	  rock	  salt,	  potassium	  salts,	  iron	  pyrites,	  and	  coal	  tar.	  The	  second,	  was	  institutions	  willing	  to	  invest	  in	  facilities.	  At	  first	  these	  facilities	  were	  in	  universities,	  then	  chemicals	  firms	  established	  their	  own	  research	  laboratories.	  The	  earliest	  German	  successes	  actually	  occurred	  in	  Britain,	  as	  German	  chemical	  jobs	  were	  in	  short	  supply	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1800s.	  Wilhelm	  Hofmann	  discovered	  how	  to	  usefully	  distill	  coal	  tar	  into	  benzene.	  Hofmann’s	  student,	  William	  Perkin,	  then	  produced	  the	  first	  dye,	  tyrian	  purple	  in	  1856.	  Hofmann	  discovered	  several	  more	  dyes,	  and	  then	  returned	  to	  Germany	  in	  1865,	  just	  as	  the	  dye	  industry	  began	  to	  boom,	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pharmaceuticals	  were	  developing,	  and	  Rudolph	  Frank	  discovered	  potassium	  salt	  fertilizers.	  Finally,	  Carl	  Duisburg	  brought	  the	  German	  chemicals	  industry	  into	  the	  20th	  century.	  Duisburg	  had	  great	  skill	  in	  the	  lab,	  most	  notably	  extensively	  researching	  pharmaceuticals,	  and	  great	  insight	  outside	  the	  lab,	  in	  1903	  he	  suggested	  the	  chemical	  companies	  form	  cartels	  to	  increase	  research	  and	  development	  efficiency.	  Duisburg	  only	  met	  limited	  success,	  but	  what	  was	  108	  Germen	  chemical	  firms	  in	  1896,	  became	  a	  single	  cartel	  by	  1935.150	  	  	  The	  German	  Electro-­‐mechanical	  industry	  was	  fare	  more	  competitive	  than	  the	  chemicals	  industry,	  however,	  by	  1914	  the	  AEG/Siemens-­‐Schuckert	  cartel	  controls	  the	  industry.	  The	  first	  German	  electrical	  firm	  was	  Siemens	  &	  Halske,	  founded	  in	  1847.	  Werner	  Siemens	  eventually	  came	  to	  dominate	  the	  German	  telegraph	  industry	  by	  producing	  most	  telegraphic	  equipment	  and	  wires,	  and	  by	  controlling	  a	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  wire	  and	  maintaining	  the	  Russian	  telegraph	  system.	  Siemens	  also	  invented	  the	  dynamo;	  however,	  heavy	  electrical	  industry	  proved	  not	  to	  be	  his	  forte.	  Emil	  Rathenau	  founded	  in	  1883	  what	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  Allgemeine	  Elektrizitäts-­‐
Gesellschaft	  or	  AEG.	  Rathenau	  specialized	  in	  heavy	  electrical	  industry	  including	  electrical	  wiring,	  lighting,	  and	  power	  generation.	  As	  Siemens	  expanded	  into	  light	  bulbs	  in	  1882,	  they	  soon	  came	  into	  conflict	  with	  this	  new	  fledgling	  company.151	  Rathenau	  proved	  a	  worthy	  opponent,	  producing	  such	  fierce	  competition	  that	  banks	  stepped	  in	  in	  1900,	  ultimately	  organizing	  the	  AEG/Siemens-­‐Schuckert	  cartel.152	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   It	  seems	  the	  Germans	  applied	  the	  same	  concept	  to	  private	  business	  as	  public	  business.	  Just	  as	  the	  German	  states	  started	  separately	  and	  slowly	  came	  together	  to	  increase	  economic	  efficiency,	  the	  German	  chemical	  and	  electrical	  companies	  drew	  together	  to	  increasing	  productivity	  and	  reduce	  inefficient	  research	  overlaps.	  This	  strategy	  allowed	  Germany	  to	  remain	  incredibly	  competitive	  with	  much	  larger	  powers.	  Germany	  competed	  with	  the	  United	  States	  despite	  its	  extensive	  forest	  and	  mineral	  reserve	  advantage.	  Germany	  also	  began	  to	  surpass	  Britain,	  despite	  its	  extensive	  empire	  and	  significant	  industrial	  head	  start.	  Section	  2:	  Post-­‐Unification	  Political	  Development	  Following	  unification,	  it	  seems	  Bismarck’s	  glory	  days	  were	  over.	  In	  fact,	  between	  1871-­‐1890	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  politics	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  ever-­‐growing	  divider.	  It	  seems	  that	  in	  his	  old	  age	  Bismarck	  began	  to	  favor	  conservative	  idealism	  over	  the	  utilitarian	  perspective	  he	  had	  used	  during	  the	  three	  wars	  of	  unification.	  Bismarck	  had	  undergone	  a	  great	  transformation	  after	  1848,	  but	  it	  seems	  one	  cannot	  teach	  an	  old	  dog	  new	  tricks.	  Bismarck	  was	  unable	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  nature	  that	  was	  developing	  in	  German	  psyche	  by	  1871.	  Hitler,	  too,	  struggled	  with	  this	  socialist	  German	  characteristic,	  which,	  following	  the	  First	  World	  War	  developed	  into	  full-­‐fledged	  communism.	  Though	  less	  popular	  after	  the	  German	  cold	  war	  split,	  the	  socialist	  sentiment	  lived	  on	  to	  created	  the	  already	  mentioned	  successful	  SPD/CDU	  coalition	  that	  is	  represented	  by	  current	  German	  Chancellor	  Angela	  Merkel.	  	  The	  period	  of	  war	  from	  1864-­‐1871	  was	  highly	  successful,	  but	  had	  drained	  the	  nationalistic	  fervor	  out	  of	  the	  German	  public.	  This	  fatigue	  was	  intensified	  by	  the	  economic	  downturn	  of	  1873.	  Knowing	  that	  further	  armed	  conflict	  would	  have	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incredibly	  negative	  economic	  implication,	  Bismarck	  turned	  his	  focused	  to	  the	  stabilization	  of	  Germany’s	  internal	  systems	  and	  international	  position.	  Bismarck	  introduced	  a	  new	  Tariff	  Law	  and	  created	  the	  Dual	  Alliance	  with	  Austria	  in	  1879.	  Bismarck	  hoped	  that	  the	  Tariff	  Law	  would	  encourage	  domestic	  growth	  in	  both	  the	  industrial	  and	  agricultural	  sectors.	  He	  also	  sought	  to	  capitalize	  on	  this	  growth	  by	  stabilizing	  the	  tense	  Austrian-­‐Russian	  relationship	  with	  the	  Dual	  alliance,	  which	  allowed	  Bismarck	  to	  mediate	  the	  conflict.	  However,	  Bismarck	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  only	  politician	  skilled	  enough	  to	  hold	  off	  the	  Russian-­‐Austrian	  conflict,	  and,	  ironically,	  the	  alliance	  dragged	  Germany	  into	  WWI.153	  	  Bismarck	  also	  believed	  he	  could	  continuously	  mediate	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  democratic	  constitutionalists	  and	  the	  conservatives,	  thus	  holding	  the	  unstable	  system,	  and	  the	  Emperor’s	  power,	  in	  place.	  This	  was	  an	  unfeasible	  plan.	  Even	  as	  Bismarck	  tried	  to	  hold	  the	  democrats	  in	  check,	  he	  also	  built	  up	  industry.	  Since	  industrial	  development	  produced	  the	  blue-­‐collar	  worker,	  and	  the	  worker	  was	  most	  likely	  to	  hold	  socialist	  sentiments,	  Bismarck	  was	  working	  against	  himself.	  154	  He	  was	  attempting	  to	  suppress	  the	  socialist	  philosophy,	  while	  also	  supporting	  proletariat	  industry:	  the	  breeding	  ground	  of	  socialism.	  His	  goal	  was	  simply	  unfeasible.	  	  To	  add	  insult	  to	  injury,	  the	  very	  man	  Bismarck	  was	  trying	  to	  hold	  in	  power,	  Wilhelm	  II,	  sided	  with	  the	  liberals	  and	  ousted	  the	  “Iron	  Chancellor.”	  The	  writer	  Theodor	  Fontane	  described	  the	  reason	  for	  Bismarck’s	  fall:	  	  Bismarck	  is	  the	  greatest	  scorner	  of	  principle	  who	  has	  ever	  existed	  and	  a	  ‘principle’	  finally	  brought	  him	  down,	  the	  same	  principle	  that	  he	  carried	  written	  on	  his	  banner	  all	  his	  life	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  which	  he	  never	  acted.	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The	  power	  of	  the	  Hohenzollern	  monarch…	  was	  stronger	  than	  his	  genius	  and	  his	  falsehoods.155	  	  In	  short,	  Bismarck	  gained	  his	  power	  by	  leveraging	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Hohenzollern	  family,	  when	  the	  new	  Hohenzollern,	  Wilhelm	  II,	  took	  the	  throne	  he	  also	  took	  away	  Bismarck’s	  power.	  Thus,	  the	  power	  that	  had	  built	  Bismarck	  up	  also	  broke	  him	  down.	  Bismarck	  often	  leveraged	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Hohenzollern	  monarch:	  sometimes	  he	  used	  the	  Kaiser’s	  power	  to	  force	  action,	  other	  times	  he	  avoided	  responsibility	  and	  disguised	  it	  as	  loyalty.	  One	  quick	  example	  is	  when	  Bismarck	  rejected	  the	  Lasker	  resolution	  in	  1884.	  He	  gave	  a	  speech	  giving	  the	  reason,	  which	  was	  really	  the	  method,	  by	  which	  he	  rejected	  the	  resolution,	  “As	  Chancellor	  I	  can,	  of	  course	  do	  nothing	  without	  the	  Emperor’s	  approval,	  and	  I	  could	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  ask	  his	  permission	  to	  present	  such	  a	  resolution	  to	  the	  Reichstag.”156	  This	  sort	  of	  constitutional	  interpretation	  eventually	  undid	  Bismarck’s	  power.157	  Wilhelm	  I	  did	  as	  Bismarck	  told	  behind	  closed	  doors.	  So,	  when	  Bismarck	  acknowledged	  Wilhelm	  I’s	  constitutional	  power,	  Bismarck	  was	  actually	  just	  forcing	  the	  topic	  to	  be	  handled	  behind	  closed	  doors.	  Wilhelm	  II	  purposefully	  took	  these	  public	  statements	  at	  face	  value	  even	  though	  he	  knew	  them	  to	  be	  guises.	  Thus,	  he	  was	  able	  to	  used	  Bismarck’s	  own	  words	  against	  him	  and	  took	  control	  from	  Bismarck.	  	  	  	   Bismarck	  did	  not	  realize	  that	  as	  Germany	  democratized	  the	  public	  view	  became	  ever	  more	  important,	  but	  Wilhelm	  II	  did	  and	  began	  to	  reverse	  the	  flow	  of	  Bismarck’s	  power.	  Wilhelm	  used	  the	  power	  given	  him	  in	  public	  to	  gain	  influence	  behind	  closed	  doors.	  Wilhelm	  began	  to	  work	  directly	  with	  the	  public,	  so	  Bismarck	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could	  not	  use	  political	  tricks	  behind	  closed	  doors	  to	  interfere.	  The	  two	  men	  came	  to	  loggerheads	  in	  May	  1889,	  when	  Wilhelm	  II	  agreed	  to	  see	  a	  delegation	  of	  striking	  miners.	  Angry	  with	  the	  meeting,	  Bismarck	  sent	  Wilhelm	  II	  a	  letter	  reminding	  him	  of	  the	  political	  strategy	  that	  had	  unified	  the	  country:	  	  I	  look	  for	  in	  a	  …	  monarch	  who	  is	  determined	  not	  only	  to	  co-­‐operate	  industriously	  in	  the	  business	  of	  governing	  the	  country	  but	  who	  in	  critical	  times	  would	  rather	  fall	  with	  sword	  in	  hand	  on	  the	  steps	  of	  his	  throne	  fighting	  for	  his	  right,	  than	  surrender.	  No	  German	  soldier	  would	  abandon	  such	  a	  ruler,	  and	  the	  old	  motto	  of	  1848	  is	  still	  true:	  ‘Gegen	  Demokraten	  helfen	  nur	  Soldaten.’158	  	  	  	  Bismarck’s	  use	  of	  the	  1848	  saying	  “Only	  soldiers	  help	  against	  [social-­‐]democrats,”	  shows	  just	  how	  poorly	  Bismarck	  predicted	  the	  sweeping	  political	  changes	  that	  were	  to	  occur	  not	  only	  in	  Germany,	  but	  across	  the	  globe	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  century.	  	  	   Two	  final	  events	  created	  such	  a	  wide	  rift	  between	  the	  Kaiser	  and	  the	  Chancellor	  that	  Wilhelm	  felt	  he	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  remove	  Bismarck.	  For	  a	  ruler	  who	  proved	  incompetent	  in	  the	  future,	  Wilhelm	  II	  acted	  properly	  and	  decisively	  in	  the	  dismissal	  of	  Bismarck,	  unfortunately	  it	  was	  a	  lose-­‐lose	  situation.	  In	  October	  1889	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  Chancellor	  and	  Kaiser	  escalated	  when	  Bismarck	  introduced	  a	  new	  (anti-­‐)Socialist	  Law.	  Wilhelm	  and	  his	  supporters,	  better	  described	  as	  influencers,	  took	  issue	  with	  one	  provision	  that	  allowed	  for	  the	  expulsion	  of	  suspected	  revolutionaries	  from	  their	  homes.	  Bismarck	  refused	  to	  remove	  the	  clause	  and	  the	  law	  failed.	  Bismarck’s	  complete	  unwillingness	  to	  compromise	  greatly	  worried	  the	  Kaiser,	  who	  grew	  ever	  more	  wary	  of	  Bismarck.159	  The	  event	  that	  finally	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toppled	  the	  legendary	  politician	  was	  the	  parliamentary	  election	  of	  February	  20,	  1890.	  In	  the	  election,	  concerning	  just	  under	  400	  seats,	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  received	  35	  seats,	  but	  it	  was	  the	  loss	  of	  seats	  by	  Bismarck’s	  three	  party	  coalition	  that	  caused	  the	  most	  damage,	  85	  seats	  lost.160	  	  	   Bismarck	  now	  attempted	  to	  put	  into	  motion	  the	  ridiculous	  plans	  he	  had	  thought	  up	  while	  the	  conflict	  between	  him	  and	  Wilhelm	  II	  was	  brewing.	  He	  hoped	  to	  rebuild	  the	  country	  from	  the	  ground	  up:	  	  It	  can	  very	  well	  happen	  that	  I	  will	  have	  to	  destroy	  what	  I	  made.	  People	  forget	  that	  the	  same	  thing	  can	  happen	  to	  the	  existing	  federation	  that	  happened	  to	  the	  Frankfurt	  Bundestag	  in	  1866;	  the	  princes	  can	  withdraw	  from	  it	  and	  form	  a	  new	  one	  with	  the	  Reichstag.161	  	  	  The	  ludicrous	  part	  comes	  with	  the	  violent	  extremes	  Bismarck	  was	  willing	  to	  go	  to:	  	   You	  can	  dissolve	  three	  or	  four	  times,	  but	  in	  the	  end	  you	  have	  to	  smash	  the	  crockery.	  These	  questions	  –	  like	  that	  of	  Social	  Democracy	  and	  that	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Parliament	  and	  the	  separate	  states	  –	  will	  not	  be	  solved	  without	  a	  blood-­‐bath,	  just	  as	  the	  question	  of	  German	  unity	  was	  not.162	  	  	  After	  the	  1890	  election,	  Bismarck	  went	  about	  activating	  old	  constitutional	  orders	  to	  control	  communication	  between	  the	  Kaiser	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  members	  and	  began	  talking	  with	  former	  rivals.	  	  Seeing	  the	  impending	  trouble,	  Wilhelm	  sent	  the	  Chief	  of	  Military	  to	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  Bismarck	  resign,	  four	  days	  later	  Bismarck	  took	  the	  hint.163	  	  	   In	  his	  final	  years	  of	  Chancellor	  Bismarck	  began	  to	  go	  against	  many	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  his	  paper	  outlines	  as	  the	  reasons	  for	  Germany’s	  success.	  Bismarck	  was	  unwilling	  to	  compromise	  as	  the	  German	  politicians	  had	  during	  the	  organization	  of	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the	  trade	  unions.	  Bismarck	  did	  not	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  changing	  political	  atmosphere	  as	  he	  had	  in	  1848-­‐1851.	  However,	  most	  importantly,	  Bismarck	  hugely	  underestimated	  the	  power	  of	  the	  ties	  being	  produced	  between	  the	  German	  kingdoms	  by	  economics	  and	  culture.	  Bismarck’s	  plans	  to	  breakdown	  and	  rebuild	  the	  German	  state	  would	  never	  work,	  because:	  as	  the	  democratic	  strength	  of	  the	  people	  had	  grown	  during	  Bismarck’s	  reign;	  the	  people,	  rather	  than	  the	  governing	  upper	  classes,	  created	  the	  culture	  that	  defined	  Germany	  (explained	  in	  section	  3).	  In	  1890	  Bismarck	  hoped	  to	  break	  up	  Germany	  back	  into	  it	  kingdo	  	  	  	  	  ms,	  then	  rebuild.	  What	  he	  did	  not	  realize	  was	  that	  the	  cultural	  and	  economic	  delineation	  between	  the	  German	  Kingdoms,	  by	  1890,	  no	  longer	  existed.	  One	  could	  no	  more	  break	  Germany	  into	  her	  kingdoms	  than	  one	  could	  England	  or	  France.	  	  	  Section	  3:	  Post-­‐Unification	  Cultural	  Development	  Following	  the	  unification	  in	  1871	  Germany	  continued	  to	  seek	  a	  national	  identity.	  While	  the	  Germans	  took	  pride	  in	  their	  romantic	  cultural	  successes	  in	  music,	  philosophy,	  and	  literature;	  they	  also	  took	  up	  new	  hobbies.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  briefly	  discuss	  the	  development	  of	  the	  two	  most	  important	  national	  pastimes,	  kabarett	  and	  soccer.	  Interestingly,	  neither	  of	  these	  pastimes	  originated	  in	  Germany,	  both	  are	  English.	  However,	  both	  became	  thoroughly	  adopted	  by	  the	  Germans,	  who	  molded	  these	  activities	  to	  create	  something	  distinctly	  German.	  Kabarett	  became	  the	  space	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  more	  traditional	  arts,	  such	  as	  theater,	  song,	  and	  humor.	  It	  focused	  on	  small	  theatrical	  and	  musical	  performances	  and,	  as	  the	  years	  passed,	  increasingly	  political	  satire.	  Kabarett	  often	  became	  the	  mouthpiece	  of	  the	  people,	  especially	  when	  kabarett	  performers	  discovered	  that	  improvised	  skits	  were	  
	   80	  
very	  difficult	  to	  censor.	  Soccer,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  served	  as	  a	  mass	  organizer	  rather	  than	  a	  mouthpiece.	  It	  created	  a	  forum	  where	  the	  German	  population	  could	  symbolize	  and	  express	  itself	  both	  at	  a	  regional	  and	  national	  level.	  New	  to	  Germany	  during	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  by	  1950	  both	  hobbies	  had	  served,	  and	  continued	  to	  serve,	  as	  the	  cultural	  tool	  that	  helped	  the	  German	  people	  forgive	  itself	  for	  its	  grievous	  political	  missteps.	  	  These	  two	  national	  pastimes	  worked	  so	  efficiently	  at	  unifying	  German	  culture	  because	  they	  physically	  congregated	  people.	  In	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  most	  Germans	  lived	  agricultural	  lives,	  separated	  from	  each	  other	  by	  acres	  of	  farmland.	  Like	  the	  medieval	  trade	  leagues,	  the	  countryside	  physically	  stopped	  that	  people	  from	  being	  able	  to	  engage	  with	  one	  another.	  Industry	  pulled	  the	  population	  from	  the	  countryside	  to	  the	  city.	  From	  here	  soccer	  and	  kabarett	  pulled	  all	  the	  different	  economic	  classes	  into	  one	  room	  or	  stadium.	  	  Interestingly,	  kabarett	  developed	  in	  the	  opposite	  class	  direction	  as	  soccer.	  While	  kabarett	  worked	  its	  way	  up	  the	  class	  structure,	  soccer	  moved	  downwards	  from	  the	  upper	  and	  middle	  classes.	  This	  shows	  the	  extensiveness	  of	  the	  culture	  being	  produced	  in	  Germany.	  It	  came	  from	  all	  corners	  and	  invited	  all	  groups	  to	  participate.	  Children	  and	  adults,	  Bavarians	  and	  Prussians,	  liberals	  and	  conservatives	  all	  went	  to	  the	  kabaretts	  and	  stadiums	  to	  share	  in	  their	  new	  found	  hobbies.	  Kabarett	  finds	  it	  roots	  in	  the	  song	  and	  dance	  variety	  show	  genre	  coined	  as	  vaudeville	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  but	  was	  originally	  from	  Britain.164	  Kabarett	  was	  the	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“Kleinkunst”	  or	  “Small	  Art”	  subset	  of	  the	  vaudeville	  style	  and	  was	  not	  a	  single	  kind	  of	  performance,	  but	  a	  family	  of	  arts.	  [Kabaretts]	  provided	  a	  "variety"	  of	  unconnected	  and	  "specialized"	  entertainments,	  primarily	  songs,	  acrobatic	  stunts,	  and	  animal	  acts,	  but	  also	  skits,	  magic	  tricks,	  tableaux,	  and	  even	  popular	  opera	  arias.165	  	  Size	  is	  a	  key	  component	  of	  Kabarett,	  often	  performed	  by	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  entertainers;	  the	  venue	  is	  always	  intimate,	  allowing	  for	  extensive	  interaction	  between	  the	  audience	  and	  the	  entertainers.	  Some,	  with	  male	  waiters,	  were	  considered	  decent	  establishments	  to	  which	  one	  could	  take	  the	  whole	  family.	  Far	  less	  reputable	  were	  establishments	  where	  waitresses	  served	  beverages	  to	  a	  male	  clientele,	  while	  soubrettes	  performed	  risque	  songs.	  Often	  several	  women	  would	  appear	  on	  stage	  at	  once,	  and	  each	  would	  sing	  a	  suggestive	  song.	  Afterward	  they	  might	  wander	  among	  the	  audience	  and	  selling	  "naughty"	  postcards,	  encourage	  the	  men	  to	  order	  more	  drinks,	  or	  even	  make	  assignations	  for	  later.166	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  quote	  is	  really	  meant	  to	  show	  the	  range	  of	  style	  in	  kabarett.	  However,	  this	  quote	  also	  shows	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  entertainers	  to	  go	  off	  stage	  and	  interact	  with	  the	  relatively	  small	  audience.	  The	  latter,	  risqué	  style	  of	  Kabarett,	  benefitted	  the	  most	  from	  the	  physical	  interaction	  with	  audience,	  but	  is	  relatively	  uninteresting	  to	  this	  paper.	  For,	  regardless	  of	  the	  country,	  bawdy	  acts,	  if	  legal,	  remain	  popular	  and	  show	  little	  hints	  at	  unique	  culture.	  Still,	  German’s	  seemed	  to	  have	  enjoyed	  this	  personal	  interaction	  in	  all	  forms	  of	  kabarett.	  Soon,	  the	  old	  styles	  of	  art,	  which	  did	  not	  react	  to	  the	  audience,	  began	  to	  become	  unpopular	  even	  amongst	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  classes:	  Indeed,	  this	  was	  precisely	  what	  worried	  German	  observers	  by	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century:	  vaudeville	  was	  becoming	  so	  popular	  that	  it	  was	  driving	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conventional	  dramatic	  theaters	  out	  of	  business….	  [But,	  b]y	  the	  1880s	  it	  had	  become	  apparent	  that	  broad	  sectors	  of	  the	  middle	  class,	  which	  had	  initially	  looked	  down	  upon	  vaudeville,	  were	  being	  won	  over	  to	  its	  popular	  theatricality.[…]The	  fact	  that	  vaudeville	  halls	  have	  increasingly	  supplanted	  and	  diminished	  the	  interest	  in	  theater	  has	  caused	  a	  stir	  for	  quite	  some	  time	  in	  all	  circles	  which	  still	  take	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  fate	  and	  the	  future	  of	  art	  in	  Germany.	  Perhaps	  this	  has	  never	  been	  so	  apparent	  as	  this	  winter	  in	  Berlin,	  where	  attendance	  at	  the	  performances	  of	  theaters	  dwindles	  day	  by	  day	  and	  has	  become	  limited	  almost	  exclusively	  to	  inferior	  farces,	  while	  the	  vaudeville	  halls	  can	  boast	  of	  sold-­‐out	  houses	  nearly	  every	  evening.167	  	  	   This	  quote	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  complete	  destruction	  of	  old	  culture,	  but	  instead	  shows	  the	  augmentation	  of	  old,	  romantic	  culture.	  Clearly,	  new	  forms	  of	  art	  were	  being	  popularized,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  a	  complete	  interest	  in	  the	  traditional	  arts	  was	  lost.	  One	  example	  is	  classical	  music.	  Otto	  Julius	  Bierbaum,	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  kabarett	  movement,	  wrote	  in	  1900	  that,	  	  The	  contemporary	  citydweller	  has	  vaudeville	  nerves;	  he	  seldom	  has	  the	  capacity	  of	  following	  great	  dramatic	  continuities,	  of	  tuning	  his	  senses	  to	  the	  same	  tone	  for	  three	  hours.	  He	  desires	  diversity-­‐Variete."168	  	  	  So,	  Richard	  Wagner’s	  multi-­‐hour	  “Gesamtkunstwerken,”	  such	  as	  The	  Nibelungen	  Ring,	  were	  out.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  classical	  music	  was	  dead.	  Instead,	  it	  shifted	  from	  the	  Romanticism	  to	  Expressionism.	  A	  perfect	  example	  is	  kabarattist	  Otto	  Erich	  Hartleben’s	  translation	  of	  Pierrot	  lunaire,	  a	  name	  more	  popularly	  associated	  today	  with	  Arnold	  Schoenberg.169	  Schoenberg	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  figures	  in	  contemporary	  classical	  music.	  His	  musical	  interpretation	  of	  Pierrot	  lunaire,	  a	  35-­‐minute	  collection	  consisting	  of	  21	  shorts	  songs,	  is	  one	  of	  his	  crowning	  works.	  Pierrot	  lunaire	  is	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  and	  most	  famous	  musical	  pieces	  to	  use	  Sprechstimme,	  a	  voice	  technique	  that	  remains	  in	  speech,	  but	  intonates	  as	  in	  song	  voice.	  Sprechstimme,	  along	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Jelavich,	  Berlin	  Cabaret,	  	  22-­‐23.	  168	  Jelavich,	  Berlin	  Cabaret,	  24.	  169	  Jelavich,	  Berlin	  Cabaret,	  25.	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Schoenberg’s	  other	  creation	  of	  12-­‐tone	  form,	  became	  one	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  Expressionism.170	  Expressionism,	  a	  defining	  German	  cultural	  movement,	  shows	  how	  the	  traditional	  arts	  were	  still	  greatly	  adding	  to	  the	  cultural	  growth	  of	  Germany.	  	  Despite	  the	  revolutionary	  changes	  composers	  like	  Schoenberg	  were	  making,	  their	  works	  are	  still	  distinctly	  classical	  music.	  A	  fact	  proven	  by	  Schoenberg	  being	  categorized	  as	  in	  the	  Second	  Viennese	  School,	  along	  with	  his	  students	  Alban	  Berg	  and	  Anton	  Webern.	  This	  gives	  Schoenberg	  a	  direct	  connection	  to	  the	  First	  Viennese	  School,	  which	  consisted	  of	  the	  classical	  music	  legends	  of	  Haydn,	  Mozart,	  and	  Beethoven.171	  A	  keen	  observer	  would	  also	  notice	  that	  Vienna	  is	  in	  fact	  in	  Austria,	  the	  country	  Bismarck	  expressly	  banned	  from	  Germany.	  Interestingly,	  the	  cultural	  connection	  between	  Austria	  and	  Germany	  never	  quite	  separated	  as	  their	  political	  and	  economic	  ties	  did.	  Schoenberg,	  Mozart	  and	  Beethoven	  all	  lived	  in	  Austria,	  but	  we	  often	  refer	  to	  them	  as	  German.	  In	  the	  arts	  “German”	  often	  means	  in	  the	  German	  style.	  The	  German	  style	  began	  before	  the	  German	  Unification	  of	  1871	  with	  artists	  such	  as	  Mozart	  and	  Beethoven.	  Consequently,	  many	  areas	  outside	  of	  Germany’s	  political	  borders	  still	  helped	  create	  German	  culture.	  Two	  other	  factors	  eased	  this	  sharing	  of	  culture:	  the	  German	  language	  and	  travel.	  Artist	  often	  spent	  most	  of	  their	  lives	  away	  from	  their	  birth	  cities;	  for	  example,	  Beethoven	  was	  born	  in	  Bonn,	  Germany.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  to	  this	  day	  there	  is	  a	  distinct	  cultural	  connection	  between	  the	  German	  speaking	  states	  of	  Germany,	  Austria,	  and	  Switzerland.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  170	  Wright,	  Craig	  M.	  "Early-­‐Twentieth-­‐Century	  Modernism,"	  (In	  Listening	  to	  Music.	  7th	  ed.	  Clark	  Baxter,	  2014),	  344.	  171	  Wright,	  "Early-­‐Twentieth-­‐Century	  Modernism,"	  343.	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Vaudeville	  also	  made	  a	  transformation.	  Around	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  Germany	  developed	  kabarett	  into	  an	  art	  form	  completely	  distinct	  from	  vaudeville.	  Germany’s	  first	  Kabarett,	  as	  opposed	  to	  vaudeville	  hall,	  was	  open	  by	  Ernst	  von	  Wolzogen	  in	  January	  1901.	  Named	  “Überbrettl”	  it	  was	  quickly	  closed	  again	  in	  1902.172	  For,	  “[l]ike	  so	  many	  of	  its	  successors,	  this	  first	  cabaret	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  dynamic	  but	  short-­‐lived	  venture,	  whose	  fortune	  was	  shaped	  by	  a	  continual	  negotiation	  among	  performers,	  the	  public,	  critics,	  and	  competitors.”173	  Kabaretts	  had	  an	  interesting	  democratic	  character.	  Like	  representatives	  and	  their	  constituents,	  kabaretts	  had	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  sentiments	  of	  the	  “performers,	  the	  public,	  critics,	  and	  competitors.”	  If	  the	  public	  disliked	  what	  a	  kabarett	  said,	  seats	  did	  not	  sell	  and	  the	  kabarett	  went	  out	  of	  business.	  This	  made	  kabaretts	  a	  perfect	  democratic	  medium	  for	  the	  public	  to	  express	  itself.	  What	  the	  majority	  liked	  stayed,	  quite	  a	  change	  from	  how	  the	  minority	  upper	  classes	  defined	  culture	  in	  the	  19th	  century.	  Max	  Reinhardt	  quickly	  followed	  Wolzogen	  and	  introduced	  the	  public	  to	  kabarett	  political	  satire,	  a	  key	  trait	  that	  it	  retains	  today.	  With	  the	  creation	  of	  Wolzogen’s	  more	  traditional	  vaudeville	  style	  kabarett	  and	  Reinhardt’s	  groundbreaking	  satirical	  style	  kabarett,	  the	  movement	  exploded	  in	  popularity.174	  Over	  the	  remained	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  kabarett	  developed	  into	  a	  key	  outlet	  for	  the	  German	  population,	  both	  during	  and	  after	  the	  wars.	  The	  effects	  of	  the	  wars	  on	  kabarett	  were	  that	  they	  added	  tones	  of	  sarcasm,	  satire,	  and	  gallows	  humor,	  but	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  Jelavich,	  Berlin	  Cabaret,	  39.	  173	  Jelavich,	  Berlin	  Cabaret,	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  174	  Jelavich,	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kabarett	  also	  managed	  hold	  onto	  the	  happiness	  provided	  by	  singing,	  poetry,	  and	  good-­‐natured	  silliness.	  	  	  Soccer	  found	  its	  way	  to	  Germany	  in	  1874	  through	  Dr.	  Konrad	  Koch,	  a	  language	  teacher	  in	  the	  town	  of	  Braunschwiege.	  Koch	  recognized	  the	  benefits	  of	  physical	  activity	  for	  his	  students	  and	  began	  organizing	  school	  games	  as	  part	  of	  the	  physical	  education	  curriculum.175	  At	  the	  time	  most	  schools	  simply	  practiced	  “German	  Gymnastics,”	  a	  method	  of	  education	  that	  focused	  on	  aerobics	  and	  gymnastic	  events.176	  With	  the	  help	  of	  a	  colleague	  Koch	  managed	  to	  buy	  an	  English	  football,	  which	  Koch	  then	  gave	  the	  students;	  who,	  lacking	  rules,	  simply	  threw	  the	  ball	  between	  them.	  Soon,	  Koch	  developed	  the	  first	  German	  soccer	  rules	  and	  set	  up	  a	  soccer	  field,	  successfully	  establishing	  the	  first	  German	  student	  soccer	  team.177	  Soccer	  quickly	  spread	  from	  the	  students,	  who	  greatly	  preferred	  soccer	  to	  old-­‐fashioned	  gymnastics,	  to	  the	  wider	  middle	  class.	  Middleclass	  men	  enjoyed	  playing	  soccer	  on	  their	  free	  Sundays.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  working	  class	  often	  did	  not	  have	  the	  free	  time	  or	  money	  to	  play	  soccer.178	  	   Just	  as	  soccer	  came	  as	  a	  relief	  for	  the	  students,	  German	  soldiers	  found	  comfort	  in	  the	  sport	  during	  World	  War	  I.	  In	  the	  tense,	  quite	  periods	  on	  the	  front	  the	  soldiers	  learned	  how	  to	  play	  soccer	  to	  calm	  their	  nerves.	  Incredibly,	  during	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175Konrad	  Koch:	  Eine	  Erfolgsgeschichte.	  <http://www.braunschweig.de/leben/stadtportraet/geschichte/konradkoch/143010100000149645.html>.	  176	  Pyta,	  Wolfram.	  “German	  football:	  a	  cultural	  history.”	  In	  German	  Football	  
History,	  Culture,	  Society,	  edited	  by	  Alan	  Tomlinson	  and	  Christopher	  Young,	  (New	  York:	  Routledge;	  2006),	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  177Konrad	  Koch:	  Eine	  Erfolgsgeschichte.	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  Pyta,	  “German	  football:	  a	  cultural	  history,”	  In	  German	  Football	  
History,	  by	  Tomlinson	  and	  Young,	  18.	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impromptu	  Christmas	  Truce	  of	  WWI,	  soccer	  even	  helped	  to	  sustain	  a	  temporary	  truce	  between	  enemy	  forces.179	  When	  the	  soldiers	  returned	  home	  after	  the	  war	  in	  1918	  they	  brought	  soccer	  with	  them	  and	  established	  soccer	  clubs	  across	  Germany.	  This	  popularity	  seems	  to	  indicate	  a	  change	  in	  body	  culture.	  The	  German	  soldiers	  witness	  the	  extremes	  of	  destructive	  power,	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  human	  body,	  during	  WWI.	  These	  experiences	  changed	  the	  perspective	  of	  physical	  contact	  for	  much	  of	  the	  population.	  Soccer	  was	  an	  outlet	  for	  this	  newfound	  physical	  competitiveness,	  a	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  more	  high-­‐class,	  and	  noncontact,	  sports	  of	  tennis,	  golf,	  or	  gymnastics.	  In	  addition,	  it	  gave	  soldiers	  a	  place	  to	  exercise	  the	  skills	  in	  tactics	  and	  organization	  they	  had	  learned	  in	  the	  war.180	  	  	  	   After	  becoming	  widely	  popular,	  soccer	  took	  on	  a	  greater	  cultural	  meaning.	  In	  his	  essay	  “German	  Football:	  A	  cultural	  History,”	  Wolfram	  Pyta	  outlines	  two	  constructive	  cultural	  benefits	  of	  soccer.	  The	  first:	  Football	  is	  a	  cultural	  phenomenon	  which	  is	  open	  to	  interpretation	  and	  in	  which	  diverse	  patterns	  of	  meaning	  have	  been	  recognized	  (Knoch	  2002:	  119–20).	  With	  football	  as	  the	  raw	  material,	  socializations	  of	  varying	  denseness	  and	  durability	  could	  be	  formed	  that	  were	  subject	  to	  cultural	  change.181	  	  The	  second,	  that	  soccer	  provides	  a	  place	  to	  create	  symbolism.	  As	  explained	  above,	  soccer	  (football)	  teams	  create	  socializations	  of	  “varying	  denseness,“	  meaning	  they	  creates	  loyalties	  at	  town,	  regional,	  nation,	  and	  international	  levels.	  They	  also	  create	  “varying…durability,”	  meaning	  a	  soccer	  team	  may	  last	  an	  afternoon,	  a	  year,	  or	  many	  years.	  The	  varying	  of	  “denseness”	  was	  key	  to	  collecting	  all	  the	  classes	  into	  one	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  Night:	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  Story	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  Time.	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  Pyta,	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  and	  Young,	  18.	  181	  Pyta,	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physical	  place,	  as	  the	  classes	  often	  lived	  apart.182	  The	  “durability,”	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  meant	  that	  new	  teams,	  and	  so	  new	  relationships,	  were	  constantly	  forming	  between	  the	  classes.	  The	  second	  benefit,	  symbolism,	  comes	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  teams	  require	  names	  and	  mascots.	  Each	  time	  a	  new	  team	  was	  created	  it	  required	  a	  new	  name	  and	  symbol.	  This	  is	  important	  because,	  	  Symbols	  play	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  constructing	  communities.	  They	  enrich	  the	  interpretation	  of	  behavior	  patterns	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  aesthetic	  condensation	  that	  facilitates	  the	  communication	  of	  shared	  cultural	  contents.	  Symbols	  act	  as	  perceivable	  expressions	  of	  those	  cultural	  dispositions	  that	  circulate	  in	  communities.	  The	  development	  of	  a	  long	  lasting	  collective	  identity	  is	  not	  possible	  without	  the	  use	  of	  symbols,	  which	  form	  shared	  meanings	  and	  values	  and	  provide	  it	  with	  vital	  visibility	  (Giesen	  1999:	  17–18).183	  	  Simply	  put,	  soccer	  provided	  a	  forum	  to	  build	  community	  ties	  with	  ones	  classmates,	  ones	  neighbors,	  ones	  fellow	  state	  citizens,	  and	  ones	  fellow	  national	  citizens.	  Additionally,	  it	  provided	  the	  medium	  to	  express	  these	  new	  relationships	  in	  symbolism;	  and	  created	  a	  place,	  stadiums,	  where	  this	  sense	  of	  belonging	  became	  tangible.184	  To	  this	  day	  German	  soccer	  games	  can	  become	  near	  religious	  experiences.	  There	  is	  something	  indescribably	  powerful	  about	  singing,	  crying,	  and	  cheering	  with	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  fellow	  fans.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  describe	  the	  weight	  of	  symbolism	  in	  German	  soccer.	  A	  hypothetical	  example	  provides	  some	  context.	  A	  citizen	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Köln	  (Cologne)	  may	  have	  gone	  to	  a	  local	  soccer	  game	  and	  sang	  the	  nostalgic	  opening	  song	  about	  “Kölle,”	  Köln’s	  medieval	  name.	  Thus,	  symbolizing	  his	  heritage	  with	  song,	  However,	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this	  same	  fan	  may	  have	  also	  have	  gone	  to	  2006	  World	  Cup	  and	  held	  up	  a	  German	  flag	  with	  a	  Bayern-­‐Munich	  fan.	  2006	  was	  revolutionary,	  because	  the	  German	  fans,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Nazi	  regime,	  did	  not	  feel	  self-­‐conscious	  about	  showing	  national	  pride	  by	  waving	  German	  flags.	  Thusly,	  the	  Köln	  fan	  has	  remembered	  the	  history	  of	  his	  city	  with	  his	  neighbors,	  but	  has	  also	  turned	  a	  historic	  national	  cultural	  page,	  together	  with	  a	  rival	  Bayern-­‐Munich	  fan.	  Thus,	  this	  hypothetical	  soccer	  fan	  built	  local,	  historical	  culture	  and	  produced	  national,	  new	  culture,	  all	  through	  the	  medium	  of	  soccer.	  	  Soccer	  is	  a	  cultural	  tool	  in	  many	  countries	  across	  the	  globe,	  but	  it	  has	  a	  unique	  form	  in	  Germany.	  Again,	  the	  sentiments	  are	  difficult	  to	  describe,	  but	  soccer	  has	  become	  a	  powerful	  outlet	  for	  the	  intense	  remorse,	  guilt,	  and	  shame	  that	  many	  Germans	  still	  feel	  about	  the	  events	  of	  1938-­‐1945.	  The	  flying	  of	  flags	  in	  2006	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this,	  but	  perhaps	  the	  epitome	  of	  these	  feelings	  were	  expressed	  in	  1954	  with	  what	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Miracle	  of	  Bern.	  In	  the	  final	  of	  the	  1954	  World	  Cup	  Germany	  won	  a	  3-­‐2,	  David	  and	  Goliath,	  victory	  over	  the	  Hungarians.	  The	  moment	  when	  the	  ball	  hit	  the	  back	  of	  the	  net	  for	  the	  third	  goal	  is	  forever	  remembered	  in	  Germany	  with	  a	  yell	  of	  gleeful	  disbelief	  from	  a	  radio	  commentator:	  “TOR!	  TOR!	  TOR!	  TOR!”,	  “Goal!	  Goal!	  Goal!	  Goal!”.185	  It	  was	  a	  symbol	  that	  Germany	  was	  not	  a	  destroyed	  country,	  that	  Germany	  was	  to	  rise	  again,	  but	  this	  though	  peaceful	  means	  such	  as	  soccer.	  A	  different	  famous	  commentator	  even	  recently	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